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Introduction
Our country is undergoing a sea change as it transits from an
industrial to an information economy. The information industries
have moved to economic center stage, displacing the manufacturing
sector not only in shear size, but also as the new engine of economic
growth and opportunity.' The policies underpinning the creation and
exploitation of intangible intellectual property, however, differ
sharply from those for the manufacture and sale of tangible goods.
Trying to force fit intellectual property into the confines of industrial
goods law is reminiscent of the ugly sisters of Cinderella butchering
their feet to fit slippers never meant for them.
A sad example of this myopia is the revision of Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, commonly called "Revised Article 9" or
simply "Revised 9."2 In the emerging information economy, secured
financing has become a matter of some importance. The companion
article, Financing Intellectual Property Under Federal Law: A
National Imperative,3 discusses how effective financing of copyrights,
patents and trademarks under federal law should operate in harmony
with state personal property financing laws. In the original Article 9
the need for harmony was understood. It reflected an appropriate
partnership between state and federal law.4
Revised Article 9 does not reflect such a partnership. The
fundamental purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage new
works by allowing creators to collect royalties as a reward for
creativity. The goal of Revised 9, however, is to allow financiers of
1. Stephen E. Siwek & Gale Mosteller, Copyright Industry in the U.S. Economy: The
1999 Report (1998). This Report was prepared by Economists Incorporated for the
International Intellectual Property Alliance. A copy is available on-line at
http://www.iipa.com/html/reports-by-issue.html (visited May 15, 2000). See The American
Law Institute, Proposed Final Draft, Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 9,
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Seventy-Fifth Meeting,
April 15, 1998.
2. Revised Article 9 was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws at its 1998 Annual Meeting and promulgated to the state legislatures
in 1999. As of this writing, twenty states have adopted Revised 9. For a useful
compendium, see The New Article 9, prepared by the ABA Business Law Section.
3. See Lorin Brennan, Financing Intellectual Property under Federal Law: A
National Imperative, 23 Hastings Comm/Ent L.J. 2 (2001) ["Federal Financing"].
4. See Grant Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property, vol. 1, § 19.9, 544-545
(Little, Brown & Co. 1965) ["Gilmore"] ("[I]t seems to be generally assumed that the
federal filing systems [for copyrights and patents] are exclusive, and it is surely desirable
that they should be; no useful purpose would be served and much confusion would result if
it were held to be within the power of a state to require a state filing in addition to the
federal filing.").
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remote licensees to seize creators' royalties without restraint. The
result is a statute out of synch with the new information economy.
Unlike industrial commodities, intangible information is a
"public good." For viable markets to exist, the law must protect
creators against "free riders" who copy and use information without
paying royalties. Free riders are justly categorized as economic
parasites, since, by siphoning off the income necessary to encourage
creation, they deprive creators, and ultimately the public, of sources
of new information. For this reason, the law allows creators various
exclusive rights to exploit their information through controlled
licensing. There are often tiers of licensees, sublicensees and sub-
sublicensees down to the end user. Royalties are remitted from each
sublicensee to its sublicensor until eventually returned to the creator.
The result is that intellectual property is exploited like real property,
with a complex "chain of title" allowing creators to exercise control
over remote users, just like the owner of an office building has control
over tenants and through them subtenants.'
Industrial goods are the opposite. For them, competition is
created by driving down manufacturing and distribution costs. The
law encourages free alienability of industrial goods, which allows
suppliers to compete in bringing the goods to those who will pay the
best price. To allow easy transfer it suppresses any concept of a
"chain of title. 6 Once goods are sold, the seller loses the ability to
control further resale or use of the goods by the buyer, retaining at
best only a right to payment. This approach would be anathema to
intellectual property, which must control distribution to direct income
back to the creative sector. If buying a DVD movie allowed
worldwide broadcasting, or buying a patented drug allowed
unrestricted manufacturing and sale, the movie producer or the drug
inventor would not be able to recover their costs of production or
invention.
Unfortunately, Revised Article 9 insists that the free
transferability policy for industrial goods must now apply to
intellectual property. It does this by severely restricting a licensor's
ability to prevent a forced dedication of its royalties to a licensee's
secured lender. When licensing information, the licensor in effect
becomes a creditor of the licensee for the royalties. A licensor can, of
course, be merely a general creditor, so that its claim to royalties is
junior to a licensee's secured creditor. But current law also allows the
5. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § II.D.2
6. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § II.D.3.
licensor mechanisms to perfect its royalty payments ahead of other
creditors of the licensee. Revised Article 9 would now systematically
eliminate a licensor's ability to do. so. The result is that licensees,
through the unrestrained use of security devices, can obtain use of
royalty income that was otherwise payable to their licensors. When all
goes well, there is no problem; but when all goes well, there never is.
When something does go wrong, however, a licensor may now find
itself unable to collect royalties ahead of the license's "floating"
lender. The effect is to require licensors to dedicate their creations to
licensees with no assurances they will be able to collect royalties for
so doing.
Such a major policy shift has deep economic and legal
implications. The Drafters of Revised 9 argue that allowing free
alienability for security encourages economic efficiency in the
distribution of goods, since by encumbering their assets to the hilt
debtors can obtain the cash needed to pay their debts. Whatever the
correctness of this approach for industrial goods, it does not apply to
intellectual property. Allowing a licensee to use its assets for
collateral is one thing. Saying the licensee must have unrestricted use
of the licensor's royalties as well is something else entirely. Such a
policy encourages licensees to become free riders, putting Revised
Article 9 on a collision course with federal information law.
Correcting the problems caused by Revised 9 requires immediate
and comprehensive federal intervention. True, federal law preempts
many problem areas. But the scope of preemption, especially for
income earned outside the United States, is far from complete. To
focus the issues involved, Part II contains an executive summary of
the conflicting policies that underpin intellectual property law and
that are adopted in Revised Article 9. Part III then provides a
detailed review of the provisions of Revised .9 that are incompatible
with intellectual property law. Part IV concludes an illustration of the
effect of Revised 9 on information financing.
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I
Executive Overview
An examination of information financing must begin with the
basic differences between intangible information and industrial
goods.
A. Intellectual Property Law
The essential purpose of intellectual property law is to. benefit
the public by encouraging new creations.7 It does this by allowing
7. For copyright, see Harpers & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539,
558 (1985) ("[I]t should not be forgotten that the Framers intended copyright itself to be
the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one's
expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas,");
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The immediate effect
of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the
ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good.").
For patents, see Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc,. 489 U.S. 141, 150-
151 (1989) ("The federal patent system thus embodies a carefully crafted bargain for
encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful and nonobvious advances in
technology and design in return for the exclusive right to practice the invention for a
period of years."); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Hass Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980) ("The
policy of free competition runs deep in our law.... But the policy of stimulating invention
that underlies the entire patent system runs no less deep."); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicon
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1973) ("The patent laws promote this progress [of Science and
the useful Arts] by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to
inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research and development.
The productive effect thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society through the
introduction of new products and processes of manufacture in the economy, and the
emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens.").
For trademarks, see W. T Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 338 (7th Cir.
1985) ("The purpose [of trademark law] is to reduce the cost of information to consumers
by making it easy for them to identify the products or producers with which they have had
either good experiences, so that they want to keep buying the product (or buying form the
producer), or bad experiences, so that they want to avoid the product or the producer in
the future.").
In general, see Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance the public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and
useful Arts."'); Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 485 ("Trade secret law will encourage
invention in areas where patent law does not reach, and will prompt the independent
innovator to proceed with the discovery and exploitation of his invention. Competition is
fostered and the public is not deprived of the use of valuable, if not quite patentable,
invention."); Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Dev Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir.
1991) ("The future of the nation depends in no small part on the efficiency of industry,
and the efficiency of industry depends in no small part on the protection of intellectual
property.") See also Lorin Brennan, The Public Policy of Information Licensing, 36 Hous.
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creators to realize value by controlling the exploitation of their works,
inventions, and marks. Unlike a tangible product, intangible
information is not consumed by use. Without legal protection against
"free riders," creators could not survive. As Profs. Landes and Posner
explain:'
A distinguishing characteristic of intellectual property is its "public
good" aspect.... In its absence [copyright protection], anyone can
buy a copy of the book when it first appears and make and sell
copies. The market price of the book will eventually be bid down to
the marginal cost of copying, with the unfortunate result that the
book will not be produced in the first place, because the author and
publisher will not be able to recover their costs of creating the
work. The problem is magnified by the fact that the author's cost of
creating the work, and many publishing costs (for example, editing
costs) are incurred before it is known what the demand for the
work will be. Uncertainty about demand is a particularly serious
problem with respect to artistic works. . . . Thus, the difference
between price and marginal cost of the successful work must not
only cover the cost of expression but also compensate for the risk of
failure.
Creators must be able control unauthorized uses for a viable
market to exist for their creations.
[C]reators and their potential customers would face a market
failure in the absence of a legal rule that requires copyists to seek
permission and pay license fees.... In a world where lack of legal
restraint on copying leads to market failure, authors cannot easily
get paid. Yet, if in a world that has copying restrictions copyists can
form markets, they are not stymied. Rather, markets evolve.9
This relationship between creator and copyist represents a classic
case of a "prisoner's dilemma."' Without intellectual property law,
L.R. 61, 74-77 (1999).
8. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 326-327 (1989). ["Landes & Posner"]. See also A. Samuel
Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents - The Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 Notre
Dame L.R. 267 (1996); and William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of
Trademark Law 78 Trademark Reporter 267 (1988); Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic
Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1 UCLA Ent. L.R. 97 (1994).
9. Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner's Dilemma in
Intellectual Property, 17 U. Dayton L. R. 853, 854-855 (1991). In this usage, "copying" is
shorthand for infringing any of the copyright owner's exclusive rights. SOS v. Payday, Inc.,
886 F.2d 1081, 1085 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1989).
10. The "prisoner's dilemma" models the situation where two parties are better off
cooperating, but would not do so absent a rule mandating it. Without legal protection for
intellectual property, "choosing not to be a creator becomes the dominant strategy. The
reason is clear. There is a huge potential loss associated with creating, and a huge potential
gain associated with copying. Both may opt to be copyists [and get nothing]. After all, zero
payoff is better than losing one's shirt. Yet had both been creators, they would be better
off - as would society, their potential customers. To cure this situation, the law creates
anti-copying rules, in the forms of doctrines such as copyright, patent, and
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neither creator nor copyist has a rational incentive to create, and both
suffer. With it, however, creations can flourish and both parties
prosper.
[Aluthors typically desire wide dissemination of their work, but
want the public to pay for the access they receive. To give authors
bargaining leverage with which to extract fees, the law gives them
the right to exclude that functions in much the same way as do
fences, or real property's rights against trespass: These rights gives
owners an ability to bar certain uses of their creative work and thus
gives them the ability to extract a price from those who wish to use
the work."
Restraining unauthorized use is essential to collect the royalties
creators need to cover the costs and risks of new creation."
Few creators have the resources both to make new creations and
to bring them to market. Thus, creators often exploit their creations
by licensing. There can be tiers of licensees, sublicensees, and sub-
sublicensees. They arrange for making necessary physical
configurations, advertising and promotion, and generally make the
information available to the end user. The end user pays royalties to
its sublicensor, who in turns pays a royalty to its licensor, and so on,
until income is returned to the creator. The result is a cycle: rights
flow from creators through licensees to end users, and royalties flow
back from end users through licensors to creators.
An essential part of this cycle is the ability of the "upstream"
licensor to negotiate the terms of the use by its "downstream"
licensees and the corresponding payment of royalties. 3 Controlling
misappropriation." Gordon, supra n. 9, at 855. For further discussion of the prisoner's
dilemma, see Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner & Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and
the Law, ch. 6 (Harvard University Press 1994).
11. Gordon, supra n. 9, at 855 (emphasis in original).
12. See J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 2.4,
at 2-6 (West 2000 ed.) ["McCarthy"] ("In economic parlance, the infringer who 'reaps
where he has not sown,' would be known as a 'free rider.' ... Such a 'free rider' is an
economic parasite who must be enjoinable by law. If such an infringer is not enjoinable,
the quality encouragement function [of trademark law] is destroyed.").
13. See e.g. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964), reh. den. 379 U.S. 985 (1965)
("A patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate with the
leverage of that monopoly."); Automatic Radio Co. v. Hazeltine, 339 U.S. 827, 833 (1949)
("The right to a patent includes the right to market the use of the patent at a reasonable
return."); Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 260 (1891) ("The right conferred by
letters-patent for an invention is limited to a term of years; and a large part of its value
consists in the profits derived from royalties and license fees. In anology to the rules
governing mortgages of lands and chattels, and with even stronger reason, the assignee of
a patent by a mortgage duly recorded, whose security is constantly wasting by lapse of
time, must be held (unless otherwise provided in the mortgage) entitled to grant licenses,
to receive license fees and royalties, and to have an account of profits or an award of
damages against infringers.").
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who exploits a creation, on what terms, for how much money, and
with what assurances of payment, is an essential part of what
intellectual property law accords to creators.14 This is often reflected
in contractual terms restricting transfer of either party's rights or
royalties. There are a variety of reasons why this is done.
Controlling parties: For creators and licensors, it is important to
find licensees who will give the best exposure for the highest
royalties. 5 For licensees, it is important to recoup the investment in
exploitation expenses and to establish brand loyalty by ensuring a
continuous supply of desirable creations.16 Works of the mind are
fragile constructs. It is often difficult, if not impossible, to know in
advance how the public will respond. Given this uncertainly, the
decision about who is the best licensee or what creations are the most
desirable is often highly subjective. Intellectual property law leaves
these decisions to the individual parties to sort out by enforcing
contract terms that prohibit transfer. 7Controlling arbitrage: Another reason for restricting transfer is to
control arbitrage. Given the ease of copying, in many cases the
differentiating factor is the scope of the license, not the characteristics
of the copy. For example, in Pro CD v. Zeidenberg,s a vendor
provided a database of telephone directories in the consumer market
at one price, and in the business market at a much higher price. To
control arbitrage, the court upheld that the license limited the
consumer version to personal use.19 Similarly in Adobe Systems Inc. v.
14. See Marie T. Reilly, The Federal Interest in the Transfer of Patent Licenses in
Bankruptcy, 1 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 6 (Jan./Feb. 2001); Claude E. Barfield and Mark A.
Groombridge, The Economic Case for Copyright Owner Control over Parallel Imports, 1 J.
World Int. Prop. 903 (1998).
15. See e.g. Delacroix v. Lublin Graphics, Inc. 993 F. Supp. 74 (D. Conn. 1997) (artist
terminated relationship with publisher over concern about amount of royalties and quality
of representation).
16. See Meiners & Staff, Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks: Property or
Monopoly? 13 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Policy 911, 931 (1990) ("A price premium over and
above the costs of production (including a normal profit) can create incentives for firms to
produce high quality products. These price premiums represent the return to investments
in brand-names or trademarks.").
17. E.g. Third Story Music, Inc. v. Waits, 41 Cal. App. 4th 798 (1995) (music
distributor did not breach of covenant of good faith by refusing to grant license after song
writer objected). For a discussion see infra n. 254 and accompanying text.
18. Pro CD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
19. "Competition among vendors, not judicial revision of a package's contents, is how
consumers are protected in a market economy. Pro CD has rivals, which may elect to
compete by offering superior software, monthly updates, improved terms of use, lower
price, or a better compromise among these elements.... [A]djusting terms in buyers'
favor might help Matthew Zeidenberg today (he already has the software) but would lead
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One Stop Micro,2 Adobe provided software for educational use at
low prices but restricted re-licensing in the commercial market. One
Stop adulterated the educational versions by cutting open the box and
removing the "educational use only" labeling, and then disposed of
the software in the general market, taking for itself the difference
between the lower educational price and higher commercial price.
Since without the restrictions Adobe would have no incentive to
provide discounted software in the educational markets, the court
upheld the license restrictions and found One Stop's conduct
infringing.
Unique aspects: Works of the mind are not fungible goods. Star
Wars is not Star Man. Viagra is not Vita-Grow. "All painters do not
paint portraits like Sir Joshua Reynolds,... nor do all writers write
dramas like Shakespeare or fiction like Dickens. Rare genius and
extraordinary skill are not transferable, and contracts for their
employment are therefore personal and cannot be assigned." 21:For a
licensee commissioning a new creation, the personal skill of the
creator can be a critical factor. A licensee may therefore, desire to
restrict the creator's ability to squander its royalties through over-
encumbrance that reduces the incentive to, render future
performance. For a licensor, the personal characteristics of a licensee
may be equally important for presenting a creation in a fitting light.22
And, of course, a licensor would resist, over-encumbrance by the
licensee that threatens to deprive the licensor of its royalties.
B. State Commercial Law
State commercial law has a different goal: the free transferability
of' tangible goods. Free transferability allows owners of goods to
negotiate the best price from those who want them most, leading to
the most efficient utilization of assets. The Reporters of Revised
Article 9 affirm that this principle is a primary motivation for the
to a response, such as a higher price, that might make consumers as a whole worse off."
Pro CD, 86 F.3d at 1453. For a similar argument, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and
the Economic System, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 12 (1984).
20. Adobe Sys. v. One Stop Micro, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
21. Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 241,266 (1866).
22. See e.g. Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 486-87 ("A-most fundamental human right,
that of privacy, is threatened when industrial espionage is. condoned or is made
profitable."); Unarco Indus., Inc. v. Kelly Co., 465 F.2d .1303 (7th Cir, 1972) cert. denied,
410 U.S. 929 (1973) (patent license originally granted because company was "not a serious
competitor"); Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (authors of Monty
Python programs objected to sublicense from BBC to ABC because of intended editing of
their work.); Third Story Music, Inc. v. Waits, 41 Cal. App. 4th 798 (1995) (songwriter
objected to exploitation of his works by formed record company).
revision:
Our normative theory of security interests is grounded on the
normative theories that justify the institution of private property.
The right to own private property is the bedrock of capitalism and
an essential component of a market economy.... A central feature
of the economic account of property is transferability - free
alienability - of property rights, without which resources could not
find their way to users who value them more."
From this principle derives the notion that a debtor should be
allowed to transfer, for security reasons, as many assets as possible.
As the Reporters say, "For the most part, the current version of
[Revised] Article 9 reflects our position: The law should not impair
the ability of debtors to secure as much or as little of their debts with
as much or as little of their existing and future property as they deem
appropriate."24 The primary mechanism for allowing the debtor to do
so is the floating lien. "A central theme of the Article 9 revision
project is to reassert the floating lien by sweeping away some of the
limitations the original drafters placed on floating liens."25 A specific
application in Revised Article 9 is to make royalties otherwise
payable to intellectual property licensors junior to pre-existing
floating liens against licensees.
Of course, too easy an extension of secured credit can
disadvantage unsecured creditors. "The ability to victimize
involuntary creditors may in significant part explain why secured
credit is such a widespread phenomenon. Simply by entering into a
security agreement, the debtor and a favored creditor can expropriate
for themselves value that, absent the agreement, would go to the
involuntary creditors."26 The result is that debtors, especially those
sinking into financial distress, have an incentive to encumber their
assets up to and beyond their liquidation value, leaving nothing for
the unsecured creditors.27
23. Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security
Interests: Taking Debtor's Choices Seriously, 80 Va. L. Rev. 2021, 2047-2049 (1994).
24. Harris & Mooney, supra n. 23, at 2021. This argument begs the question whether
a licensor's right to royalties under an intellectual property license is or should be an
"asset" of the licensee subject to encumbrance, regardless of objection by the licensor.
25. Julian B. McDonald, Article 9 and the Security Controversy, in Peter F. Coogan,
William E. Hogan, Detlev F. Vagts & Jullian B. McDonnell, Secured Transactions under
the Uniform Commercial Code, § 7.02 (1999 ed.) ["Coogan"] ("Emboldened by their
success, the sponsors of the U.C.C. have now proposed a Revised Article 9. A central
theme of the Article 9 revision project is to reassert the floating lien by sweeping away
some of the limitations the original drafters placed on floating liens.").
26. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 Va. L. R. 1887, 1897-
1898 (1994).
27. See LoPucki, supra n. 26, at 1930-1931: "The express intention of the drafters of
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The Reporters for Revised Article 9 concede the problem when
a debtor is sinking into bankruptcy.28 Nonetheless, they assert that the
widespread availability of secured credit may allow a debtor to obtain
the cash necessary to pay off its debts, helping stave off insolvency.29
As Official Comment 8 to Revised 9-408 says, "Compared to the
relatively few debtors that enter bankruptcy, there are many more
that do not. By making available previously unavailable property as
collateral, this section should enable debtors to obtain additional
credit."
C. Irreconcilable Differences
Whether or not it is good policy to allow debtors to encumber
their tangible assets to the hilt, the policy is inappropriate where
intellectual property is concerned. The Reporters for Revised 9
acknowledge as much. Immediately following the statement quoted
above, they say:
Nonetheless, some restrictions on alienability actually may promote
efficiency. In her study of alienability, Susan Rose-Ackerman
explained that "the familiar problems of externality control[,] ...
imperfect information, 'prisoner's dilemmas,' free rider problems,
and the cost of administering alternative policies" may each justify
appropriate restraints on alienation. 3°
Intellectual property represents the classic case of "free rider
problems" and "prisoner's dilemmas" for which the law has long
recognized the need for restrictions on alienability in order to create a
market for new creations." For industrial goods, paying the purchase
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code has been to expand the amount of credit
available to debtors by making it easier and less expensive to take security. The drafters
also have sought to legitimize the use of virtually every kind of asset as collateral. Once
the law authorized the encumbrance of nearly all assets, many kinds of debtors
encumbered them. Except among the largest firms, it is a rare debtor that, at the time of
liquidation, has assets not encumbered beyond their liquidation value. As every
bankruptcy practitioner knows, security tends to expand to the liquidation value of the
collateral as a debtor sinks into financial distress."
28. See Coogan, supra n. 25, § 7.02[5][b]: "If these impressions of the floating lien in
bankruptcy can be confirmed, the shielding effect that prompted the historic resistance to
personal property security devices remains alive and well. Indeed, the academic defenders
of the floating lien (who also happen to be the reporters for the Article 9 revision) appear
to concede how bleak the picture is once the debtor ends up in bankruptcy but rest on the
positive effects secured credit can have when firms do not fail."
29. See Harris & Mooney, supra n. 23, at 2055.
30. See Harris & Mooney, supra n. 23, at 2049.
31. See e.g. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Hass Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980) (stating that
without patent law ".... noninventors would be almost assured of an opportunity to share
in the spoils, even though they had contributed nothing to the discovery"); Kenner Parket
Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("Both the mark's fame
price recoups the seller's value in that item. But for intellectual
property, the cost of a single copy does not recoup the value of the
intangible information. The real value comes ,in the ,research and
development costs inherent in creativity; free riding by end users does
not encourage competition in creativity but, by feeding on the
revenues it needs to thrive, destroys it. As Baudelaire put it, "God
has driven us to create, but Nature has contrived that to do so we
must eat, three times a day."
Unfortunately, the Drafters of Revised 9 decided to subject
intellectual property to the same unrestrained transferability rules as
tangible goods after all. They elected to "make the value of otherwise
nonassignable rights under a license available to licensees so they can
obtain more credit (and be more likely to pay their debts, including
license fees). 32 Such a rule, they said, "reflects the strong public
policy in favor of the assignability of the right to receive money
because this enhances the value of the account as collateral (to the
benefit of the debtor and the account debtor)."33 Indeed, they assert
that receiving royalties is no longer something a creator is entitled to
expect. "Once the licensee's rights have been transformed into
money, the licensor no longer has an intellectual property interest to
protect. If the licensee does transfer its rights.., the secured party is
entitled to enforce its security interest in the proceeds generated by
the transfer of the licensee's rights."' "Grabbing the proceeds," as the
and the consumer's trust in that symbol ... are subject to exploitation by free riders.");
Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1430 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The more
valuable the trademark, the more other firms will be tempted to take a free ride.... As
marks become less use for identification, search, and hostage purposes, firms invest less in
them, and consumers suffer.").
32. Steven 0. Weise, The Financing of Intellectual Property under Revised Article 9,
74 Chi.-Kent L.R. 1077, 1089, 1093-1094 (1999). Such "nonassignable rights" are of course
assignable with consent of the licensor, but usually in consideration of royalties.
33. Weise, supra n. 32, at 1089. This alleged "strong public policy," if it even exists,
arises for the sale of industrial goods, not the exploitation of intellectual property. See
Shubha Ghosh, The Morphing of Property Rules and Liability Rules: An Intellectual
Property Optimist Examines Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 8 Fordham Int. Prop. Media & Ent.
L.J. 99, 172 (1997) ("Advocates of article 9 or bankruptcy law reform generally ignore the
effects their reform will have on intellectual property because they address the issue solely
from the perspective of the secured creditor and the debtor. This approach is flawed
because the success of any reform proposal will depend on a full understanding of the
intricate conflicts between intellectual property law, bankruptcy law, and secured credit
law.").
34. Weise, supra n. 32, at 1096 (emphasis in original). But see Chem. Found., Inc. v.
E.I Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 29 F.2d 597, 600 (D.C. Del. 1928) affd. sub nom.
Farberke Vormals Meister Lucius & Bruning v. Chem. Found., Inc., 283 U.S. 152 (1930)
("Royalties to accrue and damages and profits for future infringement are incident to and
accompany the patent unless separated by express reservation"); Crom v. Cement Gun Co.
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Drafters now christen it,35 is deemed a "strong public policy" to which
a licensor can not object. Indeed, the Official Comments assert that
information creators have "no rational basis" for objecting to a
licensee security interest that necessarily stands ahead of, and can
thus deprive them of, any royalties due from the exploitation of their
creations. 6
Undoubtedly, there are cases where readily available secured
credit can provide needed working capital. But cash hides many sins,
and in a declining enterprise too easy cash merely delays the
inevitable. There is a difference between funding growth and fueling
a Ponzi scheme.3 ' The real question is who decides. Under current
law, the parties do. The ability to earn royalties is an essential part of
the bargain intellectual property accords to creators. Thus, a creator
may grant'a license in exchange for an unsecured claim for royalties."
Alternatively, the creator may insist on security from a financially
shaky licensee. These decisions are made at each stage as rights are
transferred from licensor to licensee. In each case, the parties
negotiate who will bear the credit risk. This best promotes the societal
goal of encouraging new creations by allowing the parties to decide
themselves how to cover the risks of creativity.
Revised 9 would now strip the royalty proceeds from the
46 F. Supp. 402, 405 (D. Del. 1942) (same); Estate of White, 84 Cal. App. 2d 409, 413
(1948) (bequest of common law copyright carried with it right to royalties by implication).
35. Weise, supra n. 32, at 1096.
36. Official Comment No. 6 to Revised 9-408.
37. A Ponzi scheme "refers to an investment scheme in which returns to investors are
not financed through the success of the underlying business venture, but are taken from
the principal sums of newly acquired investments. Typically, investors are promised large
returns for their investments. Initial investors are actually paid the promised returns,
which attract additional investors." In re Hedged-Investments Assoc., Inc., 48 F.3d 470, n. 2
(10th Cir. 1995). The term comes from the "remarkable, criminal financial career" of one
Charles Ponzi, who in the 1920s duped investors of more than $14,000,000 in a fraudulent
pyramid marketing scheme, colorfully described in Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1
(1923). A Ponzi is the epitome of a financial swindle with no economic substance. See
David Gray Carlson, Secured Lending as a Zero-Sum Game, 19 Cardozo L. R. 1635 (1998)
(arguing that classical zero-sum analysis of secured credit is actually modeling a Ponzi
scheme.).
38. For example, a motion picture producer may acquire rights in a novel, intending
to spend considerable sums producing and exploiting a movie derived from it. The
producer may therefore insist on an irrevocable assignment and the author's agreement
that any royalty payments will merely be general claims against the producer. The author
may find this acceptable, especially if the producer is a major company and is making
significant up-front payments. See e.g. Fosson v. Palace (Waterland), Ltd., 78 F.3d 1448,
1454-55 (9th Cir. 1996) (recording contract). Similarly, an exclusive licensee may desire a
security interest in its rights to protect against termination in case of the licensor's
bankruptcy. See Recorded Picture Co. v. Nelson Ent., Inc. 53 Cal. App. 4th 350, fn 2 (1997).
informational rights and make them available to a licensee's lender
regardless of the deal with the licensor. A landlord could not accept a
regime that says lease the room but do not collect the rent. Yet under
Revised 9:
" Revised 9-102(a) now treats intellectual property royalties
as accounts that must be perfected under the filing rules in
Revised 9. This means a prior "floating lien" against a
licensee will take priority over a licensor's right to
royalties under Revised 9's "first to file or perfect"
priority rules. Without purchase money status, the licensor
cannot obtain priority unless it begs the licensee's lender
to subordinate.39
* Although a seller of goods can protect its right to receive
payment ahead of a prior "floating lien" against its buyer
with a purchase money security interest, Revised 9-103
prohibits information licensors from claiming purchase
money status.
* Under current law, a creditor of a licensee takes any
intellectual property license subject to the licensor's
royalty obligation. Under Revised 9-102(a)(6) & 9-307(c)
for the licensor to take priority over the creditors of
licensees now requires filing against each licensee where
ever it is "located," including filing against many
international licensees remitting royalties to the United
States in their home countries.
* Revised 9-316 further provides that any attempt by a
licensor to secure it claim to royalties against a licensee's
creditors only endures for one year unless the licensor files
against every licensee wherever it is "located" worldwide.
Failure to do so invalidates the licensor's security position
not only prospectively but also retroactively.
* Under Article 2-210, a seller of goods can enforce
restrictions on a buyer's security assignment of its
executory contractual rights, allowing sellers to obtain
assurances of payment before performance. Revised 9-408
denies this protection to licensors, allowing licensees to
assign rights under executory contracts despite contract
39. "The Drafting Committee considered whether to extend superpriority to PMSIs
in software generally. The Drafting Committee decided not to do that. If a secured party
that has a security interest in software desires superpriority, it can seek to obtain a
subordination agreement with the prior secured party." Weise, supra n. 32, at 1103.
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language to the contrary or a material impairment of the
licensor's rights.
* Under current law, a licensor can cancel an exclusive
license for material failure to pay royalties when due.
Revised 9 now purports to reclassify assignments and
exclusive licenses of information as "really" security
interests, that can only be "foreclosed" under the rules in
Revised 9, a result that could impair a licensor's ability to
cancel an intellectual property license even for material
breach.
* Under current law, licensors of software can rely on filing
in the Copyright Office to establish priority in their rights
and royalties. Revised 9 now purports to allow secured
lenders to perfect a security interest in a copyright merely
by taking possession of a copy of the software
("embedded software") or the record evidencing the
license ("chattel paper"), and prevail even over a prior
federal recording.
Since there is little a licensor can do to prevent it, a licensee is
both authorized and encouraged to utilize the licensor's royalties to
the hilt to fund its own business, even if that means encumbering a
failing business beyond its liquidation value. Absent federal
preemption, a licensor can only change this result through
extraordinary, and oft times futile, efforts. The end result is to direct
the income necessary for new creations away from creators and into
the hands of secured creditors of remote licensees.
I
What Revised 9 Does to Intellectual Property Financing
Revised Article 9 is a subtle and difficult statute. Many of its
changes must be examined individually before a coherent pattern
emerges. This Part tries to provide such a look. It begins with a brief
'review of matters covered more fully in the companion article to set
the conceptual framework. The next five sections then discuss
problems in the perfection rules for information. The following two
sections discuss Revised 9's alteration of the law of assignment for
intellectual property. Following that, four sections discuss provisions
of Revised 9 that conflict with federal intellectual property law. This
Part concludes with some traps in the transition and choice of law
rules.
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A. An Information Primer
This section briefly reviews matters discussed in greater detail in
the companion article, discussing the financing intellectual property
under federal law.4
"Intellectual property" encompasses a wide variety of interests,
which for convenience we will sometimes call "information." For
analytic convenience, we can divide information into:
" Federal Information, meaning interests under the
Copyright Act,' the Patent Act4 2 and the Lanham Act;
43
and
* State Information, meaning purely state interests, such as
state trademarks and related franchise rights, ' trade
secrets , rights of publicity, pre-1972 sound recordings,
rights to ideas,48 droit de suite,49 and the like.
Information interests are transferred either by assignment or
license. Broadly speaking, an "assignment" is an ownership transfer,
and a "license" is a use privilege." Licenses are further divided into
"exclusive," meaning the licensor can not make another transfer
within the same scope, and "nonexclusive," meaning the licensor
can." For patents, an exclusive license of all three patent rights is
treated as a partial assignment; otherwise it is a license.52 The
40. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § II.A & B.
41. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 etseq (1994). To avoid needless detail, this article will not discuss
mask works, rights in digital sound recordings, or vessel hull designs.
42. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq (1994). Similarly, a discussion of design patents is omitted.
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1005 etseq (1994).
44. See McCarthy, supra n. 12, esp. ch. 18.
45. See generally Roger J. Milgrim, Milgrim on Trade Secrets, esp. ch. 2 (2000 ed.)
["Milgrim"].
46. See J. Thomas McCarthy, The Right of Publicity (2d ed. 2000); also Harold
Orenstein & David E. Guinn, Ent. Law and Business, ch. 2 (1997 ed.).
47. See Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 8C.03 (Bender
2000).
48. See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 47, § 16.01; also Orenstein & Guinn, supra n. 46,
ch. 1A.
49. See 'Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 47, § 8C.04; Liliane de Perredon-Fawcett, The
Droit de Suite in Literary and Artistic Property (Eng. trans. by Louise-Martin-Valiquette
1991).
50. See J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy's Desk Encyclopedia of Intellectual Property
(1991) (definition of "assignment" and "license").
51. See I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, n. 8 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[A]n exclusive license
[is] leave to do a thing, and a contract not to give leave to anyone else to do the same
thing.").
52. Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Genetics Inst., Inc. 52 F.3d 1026, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 1995);
Vaupel Textilmaschinen v. Meccanica Euro Italia, 944 F.2d 870 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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Copyright Act has eliminated this "indivisibility doctrine" for
copyrights. An exclusive license is an ownership transfer akin to a
patent partial assignment that confers standing on the licensee.53
Unlike tangible goods, information has a chain of title. U.C.C.
Article 2-401 provides that in a sale of goods "title" passes
mandatorily to the buyer upon delivery of the goods. This does not
apply to information; termination of a prior transfer terminates all
subsequent transfers, making further use infringing.54 This means that
in information transfers rights flow "down" to the transferee, and
money or other consideration flows back "up" to the transferor. Both
the information interest and the payments can be transferred for
security, either together or separately.
An information asset can be financed anywhere in the chain of
title. Of course, if .the borrower is the initial creator of the
information there will be no prior transferors, and if the borrower is
the end user there will be no later transferees. However, when taking
an information interest as collateral the lender must typically be
prepared to "look up" the chain of title to see who has come before,
and to "look down" to assure itself of priority in its royalty
receivables over creditors of later transferees. Therefore, in
information financing transactions, the creditor potentially has four
different sources of collateral to consider:
* The transferor's (debtor's) interest in the information;
* The transferor's (debtor's) royalty income received from
transferees ("receipts");
* The transferee's interest in the information; and
* The share of transferee's exploitation income from which
royalties are due ("receivables").
A secured lender needs to perfect its interest in all four. The
secured creditor needs to ensure that the debtor owns the
information. This requires "looking up" the chain of title by
conducting a title search - just like a real estate lender does. The
lender must then perfect its security interests against the information
rights that the debtor owns (Item 1) and ensure that it has priority in
royalties received by the debtor (Item 2) over other creditors of the
debtor, including any bankruptcy trustee. The lender also wants to
ensure that it has priority over the information interest granted to
subsequent transferees (Item 3) and priority over other creditors of
the transferee in collecting the share of any exploitation income
53. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2); see Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 47, § 10.02[A].
54. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.D(3).
earmarked as royalties (Item 4).
In this scheme, it is transferees that have the due diligence
burden of searching the chain of title to determine ownership. They
get the benefit when they in turn become transferors. This is
necessary to fulfill the basic purpose of intellectual property law of
protecting against free riders. As we will see, Revised 9 tries to turns
this process on its head.
B. R 9-317(d): Priority Rules and Secret Liens
1. Original Article 9
The most ancient tenet of commercial finance law has been the
need to avoid secret liens." For nonpossessory interests, this happens
through the public filing systems. These systems establish a priority
line-up so the public user can know: "Who's on first?" For security
interests in informational rights, original Article 9 uses a simple set of
rules to do so.
Current 9.201
Except as otherwise provided by this Act a security interest is
effective according to its terms between the parties, against
purchasers of the collateral and against creditors.
Current 9-301
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) [for purchase
money interests], an unperfected security interest is subordinate to
the rights of
(a) persons entitled to priority under section 9-312 [for
conflicting security interests];
(b) a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security
interest is perfected;...
(d) in the case of accounts, general intangibles and investment
property, a person who is not a secured party and who is a
transferee to the extent that he gives value without knowledge
of the security interest and before it is perfected.
Under original Article 9-302, filing a financing statement is
necessary to perfect all security interests unless an exception applies.
Putting aside for the moment where the filing must be done, under
Article 9-301 a security interest in informational rights must be
perfected by a public filing to gain priority over other security
interests, lien creditors and bona fide transferees. Original Article 9
did not classify royalties as "accounts," so a "sale" (executed
assignment) of royalties is outside of original Article 9.56
55. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.A(1).
56. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.B(3).
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2. Revised Article 9
Revised 9, while starting off in the, same place, veers Off in a
different direction. Its priority provisions read:
Revised 9-201
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this code, a security agreement
is effective according to its terms between the parties, against
purchasers of the collateral, and against creditors.
Revised 9-317
(a) A security interest or agricultural lien is subordinate to the
rights of:
(1) A person entitled to priority under Section 9-322 [for
conflicting security interests]; and
(2) A person that becomes a lien creditor before the earlier of
the time the security interest or agricultural lien is perfected or
a financing statement covering the collateral is filed.
(d) A licensee of a general intangible or a buyer, other than a
secured party, of accounts, electronic chattel paper, general
intangibles, or investment property other than a certificated
security takes free of a security interest if the licensee or buyer
gives value without knowledge of the security interest and before it
is perfected.
Although Revised 9-201(a) continues original Article 9-201
unchanged, Revised 9-317(d) makes a significant change from
original Article 9-301(1)(d). For many transfers of informational
rights, it apparently reverts to the "secret lien" regime under the pre-
Code validation statutes. 7
3. Detailed Analysis
Revised 9-317(d) could have continued the language in original
Article 9-301(1)(d) and referred to a "transferee" of a general
intangible. Instead it refers only to a "licensee" and a "buyer." Does
either one include an "assignee?" There is good reason to believe
they do not, at least for executory assignments. If not, then such an
"assignee" would not take free of an unperfected security interest,
but instead be subject to it under Revised 9-201(a)."
a. Assignees Are Not "Licensees"
Since Revised Article 9 omits any definition of "license," under
Revised Article 9-102(c) one must look to general principles of law
57. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.A(1).
58. Revised 9-201(a) refers to "purchasers" of collateral, while Revised 9-317 refers
to "buyers." A "buyer" is not a "purchaser," since a "purchaser" includes secured
creditors. See UCC Article 1-201 (32) & (33). Does the term "purchaser" include an
assignee under an executory contract? Revised 9 gives no answer.
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under UCC Article 1-103. Under long settled law, a "license" is not
an "assignment."59 An assignment is an ownership transfer; a license is
a use privilege. In some situations an exclusive license can be treated
as an ownership transfer akin to a partial assignment, such as an
exclusive license of all three patent rights or of a divisible copyright
interest. Whether these are "licenses" under Revised 9 we do not
know. But an ownership transfer (assignment) is not a use privilege
(license).
b. Assignees Are Not "Buyers"
A more complicated question is whether a "buyer" includes an
"assignee." In a strict sense, intellectual property is not "sold" 6
although parties sometimes speak of "selling" information interests.61
As far as Revised 9 goes, it appears that the term "buyer" is only
intended to apply, at most, to assignees under executed assignments,
not under executory ones. The reason comes from the way Revised 9
deals with Octagon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Rimmer.62
In the 1980s, a type of financing called "securitization" arose.63
Basically, an "originator" company transfers accounts to a "special
purpose vehicle" ("SPV"). The SPV then issues securities on the
capital markets to pay for them. The trick is to categorize the transfer
to the SPV as a "sale," i.e., an executed assignment, on the theory that
a fully executed transaction is immune from challenge in the
originator's bankruptcy. 64 Proponents argue securitization allows an
59. See supra n. 50 and accompanying text. The proposed Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act does define "license" as a generic term that includes
"assignments." UCITA § 102(a)(37). However, this was an express statutory definition to
simplify the drafting, and the statute takes care not to confuse assignments with licenses,
using terms like "transaction" or "transfer" where necessary to do so.
60. See e.g. Burkert v. Petrol Plus of Naugatuck, Inc., 216 Conn. 65 (1990) (trademark
licensor not a "seller" within meaning of state Product Liability Act); also Lorin Brennan,
Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, 38 Duq. L.R. 459 (2000).
61. Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1091 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (acknowledging that trade usage commonly uses sales terminology in software
licensing agreements because the terms are convenient and familiar, but that all parties
understand that the software is licensed, not sold).
62. Octagon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Rimmer, 995 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1993).
63. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Impact on Securitization of Revised UCC Article 9,
74 Chi.-Kent L.R. 947,947-948 (1999).
64. See Thomas E. Plank, Sacred Cows and Workhorses: The Sale of Accounts and
Chattel Paper under the U.C.C. and the Effects of Violating a Fundamental Drafting
Principle, 26 Conn. L.R. 397, 457 (1994) ("To obtain the necessary rating [for the SPV to
issue securities], there must be a true sale of the receivables from the originator to the
bankruptcy-remote entity or trustee. The structure must ensure that the receivables would
not be considered part of the bankruptcy estate of the originator if they were to file for
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originator to obtain financing otherwise unavailable or at lower
rates.6" Detractors argue it is an end-run around bankruptcy policy.'
In any case, securitization blossomed.
Then came Octagon Gas. A gas company made an absolute,
perpetual assignment of a percentage royalty in mineral rights to
Rimmer, who never filed a financing statement. The gas company
went bankrupt and sold its assets to a third party in reorganization.
The issue was whether the third party could avoid the royalty.
Rimmer argued that he "bought" the royalty, so the gas company no
longer held an interest that passed to its bankruptcy estate. The Tenth
Circuit disagreed. It held that mineral rights following extraction
constitute a "good," so that the royalty was an "account" under
Article 9. Thus, "Article 9's treatment of accounts sold as collateral
would place Rimmer's account within the property of [the]
bankruptcy estate." 67 This would potentially allow the trustee to reject
the assignment to Rimmer as an executory contract.
The response from the financing community was little short of
apoplectic6 Therefore, the Drafters of Revised 9 therefore set out to
ensure that Octagon Gas would not impair securitization. To this end,
Revised 9-318(a) says "a debtor that has sold an account, chattel
paper, payment intangible, or promissory note does not retain any
legal or equitable interest in the accounts sold. 69 This was intended to
"drive the final nail into the Octagon coffin" by eliminating the
"'rarified' argument that Octagon was correctly decided because
certain limited property interests may remain with the originator after
the sale of financial assets., 70 As a result, for purposes of Revised 9a
"buyer" is a party who takes under a fully executed assignment.
Where information is concerned, however, in many assignments
the assignor does retain significant interests in the assigned
information, a matter discussed further below.7' The result is that
bankruptcy.").
65. See Schwarcz, supra n. 63, at 948.
66. See David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of Securitization, 39 Wm. &
Mary L.R. 1055, 1106 (1998).
67. Octagon Gas, 955 F.2d at 954. Under original Article 9-106, an "account" is "any
right to payment for goods sold," so classifying the mineral rights as a "good" was critical
to the court's reasoning.
68. See Plank, supra n. 64; but see Carlson, supra n. 66 (arguing Octagon Gas wrongly
decided).
69. See Schwarcz, supra n. 63, at 947-948.
70. See Schwarcz, supra n. 63, at 952. The "rarified" argument comes from Carlson,
supra n. 66, at 1088-1016.
71. See infra § III.G below and text accompanying n. 231, infra.
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many assignments are executory and subject to rejection under
Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.72 Whether a contract is
executory for this purpose is a matter of federal law.73 Courts relying
on the "Countryman Test" find a contract is executory if breach of
the remaining obligations by both parties would constitute a material
breach.74 An outright assignment of all rights worldwide in perpetuity
is treated as full performance by the transferor and hence not
executory, even if the transferee owes on-going royalty obligations.75
On the other hand, if the transfer grants exclusive rights for a limited
media, territory or term, the transferor's on-going obligation to
refrain from granting to others and to defend the transferee from
infringement, and the transferee's on-going obligation to account and
pay royalties, makes the contract executory.76 The case law has not
differentiated between an executory exclusive license and an
executory partial assignment, but one can expect that they will be
treated under the same rules. After all, section 365(a) refers to an
executory "contract," which certainly covers assignments as well as
licenses.77 And the courts have held that whether a contract is
executory turns on the rights and duties of the contracting parties, not
the characterization of the instrument.78 An influential decision, In re
72. For an extended analysis see Moore, supra n. 401, at 580-588.
73. See In re Qintex Ent., Inc., 950 F.2d 1491, 1495 (9th Cir. 1991); In re Wegner, 839
F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1988).
74. Qintex, 950 F.2d at 1495 ("Thus, we will only consider a contract executory if
material unperformed obligations remain for both parties.") See Moore, supra n. 401, at
581 (discussing "Countryman Test").
75. See e.g. Qintex, 950 F.2d at 1497 (fully performed actor's contract granting
worldwide perpetual rights not executory despite royalty obligations); Chesapeake Fiber
Packaging Corp. v. Sebro Packaging Corp., 143 B.R. 360, 365 (D. Md. 1992) (patent
assignment not executory despite on-going royalty obligations); In re Learning
Publications, Inc., 94 B.R. 763 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988) (assignment of worldwide
perpetual rights in book not executory); In re New York Shoes, Inc., 84 B.R. 947, 960
(Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1988) (trademark license); In re Stein & Day, Inc., 81 B.R. 263 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1988) (copyright assignment).
76. See Qintex, 950 F.2d at 1496 (motion picture license for limited term, with duty by
licensor not to license to others and to supervise colorization of films, and by licensee to
pay royalties, executory); In re Select-A-Seat Corp., 625 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1980) (exclusive
software license executory); In Re Biopolymers, Inc., 136 B.R. 28 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1992)
(patent license); In re Three Star Telecast, Inc. 93 B.R. 310 (D. Puerto Rico 1988)
(exclusive television broadcast license); In re New York City Shoes, Inc. 84 B.R. at 960
(Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1988) (exclusive trademark license); In re Best Film & Video Corp. 46
B.R. 861 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1985) (exclusive movie distribution contact).
77. See e.g. In re Braley, 39 B.R. 133 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984) (assignment of proceeds
executory).
78. See Qintex Ent., 950 F.2d at 1496.
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Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.79 rejected the Countryman
Test, holding that whether a contact is executory turns solely on the
unperformed obligations of the debtor. If this decision is followed
generally, then even a worldwide, perpetual assignment of all rights
can be executory as to an assignee that owes on-going royalty
obligations.
If a contract is executory, then the trustee can accept or reject the
contract for the benefit of the estate. Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v.
Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.80 allowed the trustee for a bankrupt
licensor to reject an executory technology license saying: "[the
licensee] would be entitled to treat rejection as a breach and seek a
monetary damages remedy; however, it could not seek to retain its
contract rights in the technology by specific performance even if that
remedy would ordinarily be available in this type of contract."'" In
response, Congress added Section 365(n) to the Bankruptcy Code,
allowing a licensee to retain its rights under certain conditions.'
Section 365(n), however, only refers to a license, not an assignment,
and there could be a difference.83 In any case, Section 365(n) does not
apply where the transferee is the bankrupt.
This means that in an executory assignment, the assignor does
retain an interest in the information that may be affected by the
assignor's bankruptcy, just as Octagon Gas said a seller of accounts
79. In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 138 B.R. 687 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).
80. Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th
Cir. 1985).
81. Id. at 1048. The license in Lubizol was nonexclusive. However, Lubizol relied on
In re Select-A-Seat Corp., 625 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that under the prior
Bankruptcy Act, that an executory exclusive software license could be terminated by the
trustee for a bankrupt licensor).
82. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (1994). Section 365(n) does not extend to trademarks, trade
names or service marks due to Congress' belief that such licensing relationships needed
more study. Collier on Bankruptcy 365.14[e] (15th ed. rev. 1999). Section 365(n) is
largely untested. One problem is that the definition of "intellectual property" in 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(E) only refers to a "work of authorship protected under title 17." It is unclear if this
applies outside the U.S. (e.g. to a transfer of a copyright interest in France) or whether a
"world-wide" assignment can be severed, allowing the trustee to terminate at least as to
the non-U.S. rights.
83. Sen. Rpt. 100-505, at 4 (Sept 14, 1998): "When intellectual property is assigned
rather than licensed, the original creator loses his personal stake. The licensee or assignee
frequently is interested in the intellectual property for a specific application or geographic
market. In order to assure the continued availability of the intellectual property against
the contingency of the creators' bankruptcy, however, the party seeking the intellectual
property for limited use must demand assignment of the property, notwithstanding that a
license of the property would otherwise serve his purpose. The creator then is either
totally alienated from his creation or, at best, given a license by the assignee." It is clear
from the context that the Senate Conferees are speaking of patents.
may retain an interest in the accounts affected by the seller's
bankruptcy. Since the definition of "buyer" in Revised 9-318(a) is
intended to reverse Octagon Gas, and since it omits general
intangibles, what does this mean for a "buyer" in Revised 9-317(d)? Is
a "buyer" of accounts the same as a "buyer" of general intangibles?
As one commentator observed:
There is, however, a potential ambiguity in the language of Revised
section 9-318(a). By stating that a 'debtor that has sold an
account.., does not retain a legal or equitable interest in the
collateral sold,' it invites a court to find that where the debtor is in
fact shown to have retained a legal or equitable interest, there is no
sale under state law.84
It would thus appear that, if the assignment is executory, there is
no "sale," and hence no "buyer."
On the other hand, maybe "buyer" means one thing for accounts
and another thing for general intangibles. But using "buyer" to mean
two different things in the same statutory provision violates a
fundamental drafting rule of using words in their ordinary meaning.85
Moreover, the meanings are direct opposites. For accounts, a buyer
would mean someone who leaves no legal or equitable interest with
the assignor, whereas for general intangibles it would include
someone who does. If the Drafters intended "buyer" to have this
Janus-like quality, they gave not a hint in the statutory text or Official
Comments. To the contrary, they repeatedly emphasized the need for
clarity in drafting and the use of plain English.86
84. See Schwarcz, supra n. 63, n. 31. Prof. Schwarcz also argues that Revised 9-401(a),
which says whether collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred is governed
by law outside Revised 9, makes clear the categorization of the transaction is not effected
by the definition in Article 9 that a security interest includes a sale of accounts. See
Schwarcz, supra n. 63, at 952. However, Revised 9-401(a) refers to transferability of the
intellectual property interest, not whether the assignor retains an interest in the first place.
85. See Plank, supra n. 64, at 399-400: "Legal writing, like all writing, is best when the
writer follows well-recognized principles. This is especially true and perhaps more
important for drafting statutes that regulate the lives and livelihood of millions of people
and businesses. One of these fundamental principles is the principle of normal usage: the
drafter of legislation should use words in the sense that the audience would normally
attribute to them. ... In other words, one should not define the term 'cow' to include a
horse."
86. Louis F. Del Duca, Vincent C. DeLiberato, Jr., David L. Hostetter, Kenneth C.
Kettering & Steven 0. Weise, Symposium, Simplification in Drafting - The Uniform
Commercial Code Article 9 Experience, 74 Chi.-Kent L.R. 1309 (1999); Steven L. Schwarz,
A Fundamental Inquiry into the Statutory Rulemaking Process of Private Legislatures, 29
Ga. L. Rev. 909, 928 (1995) ("A statute.., governing commercial law.., should be clear.
Clarity is important to minimize mistakes, ambiguities, and resulting disputes and
litigation. Clarity also helps to preserve expectations, which is essential to market
transactions.").
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In a sale of accounts, as in Octagon Gas, there are two different
contacts: the contract creating the account, and the contract assigning
that account. It is quite, possible for the assignment to be a "sale," i.e.,
executed, while the underlying account is -not. For an executory
information assignment, however, there is only one contract - the
assignment itself. Revised 9-317(d) has collapsed these two different
contracts, and apparently consciously so. During the drafting process,
the Drafters claimed that assignments and exclusive licenses of
intellectual property were "really" security interests. In this view, all
transfers of intellectual property fall into only three categories: a non-
exclusive or "true" license, an executed assignment or "sale" and a
"security interest." Revised 9-317(d) then covers the "true" license
and sale cases, and Revised 9-322 allocates priorities among security
interests. Revised 9-317(d) does not address executory information
assignments, because, for Revised 9, they do not exist. Other
language is consistent with this approach. "Account" in Revised 9-
102(a)(2) refers to property "sold, leased, licensed, assigned or
otherwise disposed of." Revised 9-617 refers to a "transferee" on
foreclosure, thus including both an "assignee" and a "lice'nsee."
Revised 9-505 lists words the statute considers equivalent to "buyer;"
"assignee" is not among them. This demonstrates that Revised '9 can,
and does, distinguish a "buyer" from an "assignee" when it means to
do so.
c. The Resurrection of Secret Liens
The canard that information assignments and exclusive licenses
are "really" security transfers is discussed below.87 If it is wrong, then
executory informati6h assignments are not within Revised 9-317(d).
This means that under Revised 9-201 a security interest is perfected in
the informational rights under an executory assignment and against
further executory assignments of those rights without the necessity of
filing. This is not unprecedented. After Klauder88 numerous states
enacted validation statutes providing that an assignment of accounts
was perfected when made without need of a filing.89 Indeed, for more
than a decade, California, no slouch where intellectual property is
concerned, said that an assignment of a right to payment for common
law literary and artistic property was perfected without filing.9" One
87. See infra n. 231, and accompanying text.
88. Corn Exch. Natl. Bank and Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943).
89. See Gilmore, supra n. 4, § 8.7, discussing Klauder and the subsequent validation
statutes.
90. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.B.(2).
could argue that Revised 9 has merely, albeit inexplicably, reverted to
this regime for information. But it does raise problems.
The first is with state information. State trademark registers
typically provide that an assignment is invalid against a bona fide
transferee unless registered with the Secretary of State." Assume the
owner of a state trademark makes a secret security assignment of the
mark, and then later makes an executory assignment to an ignorant
third party who records in the state trademark register. The secured
creditor forecloses. Who owns the trademark, the transferee at the
foreclosure sale of the "secret" lien, or the recording executory
assignee? Under Revised 9, apparently the foreclosure sale transferee
does. As a result, state trademark registers may no longer be reliable
sources of information about who owns the mark.
The second problem is with federal information. The validation
statutes never applied to federal interests. A state statute that now
asserts that a security interest in federal information is effective
without a filing runs directly counter to federal policies against secret
liens. 9 Indeed, unlike simple accounts, intellectual property often has
an elaborate chain of title, such that foreclosure of any prior interest
would wipe out a junior transfer.93 Under Revised 9, foreclosure of a
prior secret security interest would trump a later executory
assignment. Under current law, this result would be preempted for
copyrights, and, arguably, for patents. Federal trademarks are
another matter. The courts holding that security interests in federal
trademarks are only perfected under state law have potentially
allowed Revised Article 9 to gut the Lanham Act.
Finally, there is bankruptcy law. Section 54 8 of the Bankruptcy
Code allows the trustee to avoid fraudulent transfers comparable to
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act.94 Since Twyne's Case, secret
liens have been one of the "signs and marks" of fraud.95 If Revised 9-
317(d) now allows a secret information security interest against an
executory assignment without a filing, the security interest may be
subject to attack under Section 548. Of course, it might be argued that
91. See McCarthy Trademark, supra n. 12, ch. 22, discussing Model State Trademark
Act.
92. See e.g. Yamamoto & Co. (Am.) Inc. v. Victor United, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 968, 980
(C.D. Cal. 1982) (undisclosed private letter agreement for recapture of trademark in case
of default by assignee a fraud on creditors.).
93. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.D.(3); also infra n. 302, and accompanying
text.
94. See generally 5 Collier on Bankruptcy 548.1 et seg. (15th rev. ed. 1997 Lexis
Publishing).
95. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.A.
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the old validation statutes did not require a filing for an assignment of
accounts, so eliminating a filing is not fraudulent per se.96 The
bankruptcy courts will need to decide that. Note that the secured
creditor cannot insulate itself from such an attack by filing the
security interest anyway. If a statute does not require a document to
be filed, then its filing does not impart constructive notice.w If
Revised Article 9-317(d) does not require a filing, then filing will not
insulate the secured creditor from a federal fraudulent conveyance
attack.
The distinctions between licensee, buyer and executory assignee
may appear to be nitpicking. If so, it is the courts who have insisted
on it. Security National Bank &Trust Company v. Dentsply
Professional Plan98 illustrates the judicial attitude:
Although strict adherence to [UCC] requirements may at times
lead to harsh results, efforts by courts to fashion equitable solutions
for mitigation of hardships experienced by creditors in the literal
application of statutory filing requirements may have the
undesirable effect of reducing the degree of reliance the market
place should be able to place on Code provisions. The inevitable
harm doubtless would be more serious to commerce than the
occasional harshness from strict obedience.
The courts have routinely held that Article 9 must be strictly
interpreted to avoid uncertainty and to prevent prejudice to third
persons." The commercial bar has long agreed."°
96. As discussed in Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.G(2), the decision in City
Bank & Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric, Inc., 83 B.R. 780, 782 (D. Kan. 1988), indicates that a
security interest in a patent is perfected against a bankruptcy trustee without the need of
either state or federal filing. See also Barkley Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions
under the Uniform Commercial Code, T 1.08[a][1][g], at 1-91 (rev. ed. Warren Gorham
Lambert 1993). As discussed in the text following notes 169, infra, the Drafters' intended
to incorporate the Otto Fabric result in Revised 9-311(a)(1). Revised 9-317(d) would
continue this policy. If the assignment is treated as non-executory, then the lender's
collateral - the assignee's interest - is not affected. If the assignment is treated as
executory and the trustee tries to reject, the lender can argue that it has priority over
whatever rights revert to the trustee, or other general creditors, regardless of a filing due
to Revised 9-317(d). This effectively reads Section 365 out of the Bankruptcy Code.
97. See e.g. Hall v. Kansas City Terra Cotta Co., 97 Kan. 103 (1916); Am. Solid
Leather Button Co., 47 F. at 743; 6 Am.Jur.2d Attachment and Garnishment § 498
("Transfers not within a recording statute are not effected by it."); 51 AmJur2d Liens § 8
("[T]he mere filing of a lien on the public records does not give constructive notice to
anyone, unless such effect is provided for by statute."); 11 Corpus Juris Chattel Mortgages
§ 226 (1917).
98. 617 P.2d 1340, 1343 (Okla. 1980).
99. See Ronald A. Anderson & Lary Lawrence, Anderson on the Uniform
Commercial Code §§ 9-102:89 (1999 Rev. ed.); accord Thrift, Inc. v. A.D.E., Inc., 454
N.E.2d 878, 882 (Ind. App. 1983) ("A fundamental policy of Article 9 of the U.C.C. is to
discourage secret liens.").
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The merits and demerits of the validation statutes were
extensively vetted before the adoption of original Article 9.0 They
need not be repeated here. While such a system may benefit the first
assignee, it creates a minefield for the public user trying to discover
"Who's on first?" The federal information statutes show the
preferable approach: a centralized national location for federal
intangibles where subsequent transferees can find public information
about prior transfers and avoid secret liens.
C. R 9-307(c): Filing Confusion - Location of the Debtor
1. Original Article 9
After "Who's on First?" the next question ,every secured creditor
asks is "Where do I file?" In a good system, the answer should be
easy. Under original Article 9, for intellectual property, it is. Under
original Article 9-106, intellectual property is classified as a "general
intangible."'0'2 Article 9-103(3)(b) says for general intangibles:
Current 9-103(3)(b)
The law (including the conflicts of law rules) of the jurisdiction in
which the debtor is located governs the perfection and the effect of
perfection or nonperfection of the security interests in collateral.
Typically, this rule- would require filing in the state where the
debtor is located. Of course, for federal -information or for
information interests located in another country, the applicable law
may direct filing in the federal information registers or the registers in
other countries. We will consider these, cases in later sections after
reviewing the general rule here.-
100. See e.g. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Impact on Securitization Revised UCC Article 9,
74 Chi-Kent L.R. 947, 953 (1999) ("Two of the essential goals of a commercial law statute
are clarity and simplicity of implementation.").
101. For a thorough discussion of the debate,see Plank, supra n. 64.
102. Under original Article 9-106, general intangibles "means any personal property
(including things in action) other than 'goods, accounts, chattel. paper, documents,
instruments, instruments, investment property, rights to proceeds of written letter of
credit, and money." Prof. Gilmore describes the thinking: "The only real function of all
three terms [account, contract right, general intangible] as the Article finally came to be
drafted, is to describe intangible rights which cannot be pledged.... The third term,
'general intangibles,' was introduced relatively late in the drafting process when an astute
but friendly critic pointed out that neither 'account' nor 'contract right,' as defined,
described a great many types of intangibles which did in fact 'serve as commercial
collateral: copyrights, patents, . . . rights in literary and'artistic property and so on without
end." Gilmore, supra n. 4, § 12.5, at 380.
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2. Revised Article 9
Under Revised 9, a secured creditor must now wade through a
bewildering thicket of sections to determine where to file (at least for
licenses and executed assignments). On its surface, Revised 9-301(1)
continues the "location of the debtor" rule:
Revised 9-301(1)
Except as otherwise provided in this Section [the other provisions
are inapplicable to intangibles], while a debtor is located in a
jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the
effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of security
interests in collateral.
In application, however, this rule is not as simple as it seems.
Revised 9-307 contains a complex set of rules to determine the
location of a debtor. The relevant sections are:
Revised 9-307
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the following rules
determine a debtor's location:
(1) A debtor who is an individual is located in the individual's
principal residence;
(2) A debtor that is an organization, and has only one place of
business is located at its place of business;
(3) A debtor that is an organization and has more than one place
of business is located at its chief executive office;
(c) Subdivision (b) applies only if a, debtor's residence, place of
business, or chief executive office, as applicable, is located in a
jurisdiction whose law generally requires information concerning
the existence of a nonpossessory security interest to be made
generally available in a filing, recording, or registration system as a
condition or result of the security interest's obtaining priority over
the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the collateral. If
subdivision (b) does not apply, the debtor is located in the District
of Columbia.
(e) A registered organization that is organized under the law of a
State is located in that State.
Putting aside any questions of federal preemption for the
moment, under this rule, it appears that security interests in
intellectual property collateral held by a variety of debtors must now
be perfected under the law of the District of Columbia.
3. Detailed Analysis
a. Omission of the Bona Fide Purchaser
Original Article 9-103(3)(b) looks to the law where the debtor is
located to determine perfection of the security interest. By referring
broadly to the security interest, it applies both to a bona fide
purchaser and a lien creditor. Revised 9-307(c), however, has omitted
the bona fide purchaser from the priority calculus. Instead, the sole
test is whether state law "generally requires" a filing for "the security
interest" to obtain priority over "the rights of a lien creditor with
respect to the collateral." The reference to the security interest and
the collateral makes it clear that "generally requires" applies to the
security interest and collateral in question, not to any security interest
on any collateral. 3 This is the crucial point. If Revised 9-307(c) is
merely a generalized reference to the fact that the state maintains a
filing system for perfecting a nonpossessory security interest in any
type of collateral, then Revised 9-307(c) is filled with unnecessary
verbiage. But Article 9 must be strictly interpreted. To give effect to
the phrase "with respect to the collateral" requires applying the
"against a lien creditor" test to the collateral covered by the security
interest in question, not just any collateral.
Before examining how Revised9-307(c) works, the first step it to
analyze to which debtors it applies. Putting aside the special cases,
Revised 9-307 provides for up to three potentially overlapping classes.
The first class, under Revised 9-307(e), is a "registered organization,"
which Revised 9-102(a)(70) defines as an organization organized in a
State in the United States that maintains a public record of the
organization. This will typically be a corporation or limited
partnership. The second class, under Revised 9-307(b), is any
individual or other organization, such as a general partnership,
organized in the United States. The third class includes all entities
outside the United States. Since the definition of registered
organization only applies to entities organized in the United States,
this class will also include corporations organized in other countries.
Debtors falling under Revised 9-307(b) are certainly subject to
103. But see Neil B. Cohen & Edwin E. Smith, International Secured Transactions and
Revised Article 9, 74 Chi.-Kent. L.R. 1191, 1204 (1999), arguing thus: "Revised Article 9
requires a judgment call in order to apply section 9-307(c) - the secured party must decide
whether that law generally requires public filings or the like as a condition of priority over
lien creditors. The qualification inherent in the word 'generally' is an important one. After
all, even under Original Article 9, not all nonpossessory security interests must be filed;
there are several temporary perfection and automatic perfection rules for such interests."
(emphasis in original). Apparently, the "generally" test is not applied to all security
devices for all collateral, but to all security devices for the collateral. Thus, if in most cases
a filing is required for the specific type of collateral, the test is met. On the other hand, if in
most cases a filing is not required for the collateral, then despite a few cases where a filing
is required, then test is not met. Indeed, if Revised 9-307(c) did not intend to apply the lien
creditor test to the collateral, the phrases "of the security interest's" and "with respect to
the collateral" would be extraneous.
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the test in Revised 9-307(c). Thus, all individuals - and many creators
of information are individuals - as well as sole proprietorships,
general partnerships and corporations organized outside the United
States are covered. It is unclear whether registered organizations are
subject to Revised 9-307(c). One interpretation is that Revised
9-307(e) states an absolute rule independent of Revised 9-307(b), an
interpretation supported by the introductory phrase "except as
otherwise provided in this section." Another interpretation is that
Revised 9-307(e) merely says that the State of organization is
conclusively deemed the "place of business" for registered
organization purposes of Revised 9-307(b)(1)&(2), at which point the
filing rules in that State are then tested against Revised 9-307(c).
While this interpretation is less obvious, it does make the entire
section internally consistent. The last sentence of Revised 9-307(c)
states categorically, "If subsection (b) does not apply, the debtor is
located in the District of Columbia." If Revised 9-307(e) is
independent of Revised 9-307(b), then of course Revised 9-307(b)
"does not apply" and a registered organization would not be located
in the District of Columbia under Revised 9-307(c), but in its state of
organization under Revised 9-307(e). The courts will need to sort out
the proper result under the "strict interpretation" policy. Let us call
debtors subject to Revised 9-307(c) "covered debtors."
The Drafters of Revised 9 assert that "[a]ll United States
jurisdictions, having adopted Article 9, generally require information
concerning the existence of nonpossessory security interests to be
made generally available in a filing system as a condition of the
secured party's obtaining priority over a lien creditor."'" In support
they merely cite to Article 9-301(1)(b). But this overlooks Article 9-
301(1)(d). That section says that in the case of general intangibles, an
unperfected security interest is subordinate to a transferee for value
and without knowledge. The priority rules in original Article 9-301
cover both lien creditors and bona fide purchasers. The drafters of
original Article 9 adopted the lien creditor concept to accommodate
the floating lien, but they realized there were limits to its reach.'
They adopted a mixed system establishing priority over a lien
creditor, a necessary construct for a floating lien, but they continued
the historic role of providing priority over the bona fide purchaser
where the floating lien was inappropriate. Revised Article 9, in its
desire to extend the floating lien, has lost the bona fide purchaser.
104. Cohen & Smith, supra n. 103, at 1203.
105. See Gilmore, supra n. 4, § 11.7, at 361-364.
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Revised Article 9 does not :determine how or when a creditor
becomes a lien creditor. State enforcement of judgment law does that.
How that law operates where information is concerned is discussed at
length in the companion article."" Since Revised 9 now makes it the
litmus test for determining where to file an information security
interest against a covered debtor, we need to review it briefly here.
Revised 9-102(a)(52) continues the definition of "lien creditor"
unchanged from current Article 9-301(3). It basically covers two
classes of creditors: (i) judicial creditors who have obtained a lien by
attachment, levy or the like; and (ii) insolvency representatives, i.e.,
the bankruptcy trustee, assignee for the benefit of creditors, and a
receiver in equity.
Judicial Creditors: As discussed in the companion article,"°7 in
many states a judgment creditor cannot lien intangible information by
attachment or levy because under local enforcement of judgment law
a levy requires the sheriff to take physical possession of personal
property, an action that is not possible for an intangible. Federal law
also does not allow an involuntary judicial lien because an assignment
of federal information requires a writing signed by the information
owner or an authorized agent, and a sheriff under a levy does not so
qualify. Together these requirements mean that for federal
information, and typically state information as well, a judgment
creditor must reach information through equitable execution, i.e., by
a supplemental proceeding or, in the few states where still available, a
creditor's bill. This requires the judgment creditor to bring the debtor
into court, have the court order the debtor to transfer the
information, and, if the debtor refuses, to appoint a receiver to
execute an assignment as an "authorized agent" for the debtor. A
creditor utilizing such procedure, however, is not a lien creditor. In
most states, use of the supplemental proceeding does not create a lien
at all. In a few states the procedure creates the equivalent of an
equitable lien, but it is ineffective against prior or subsequent bona
fide information security interests without notice, even if unfiled.
Such a judgment creditor only perfects its interest by proceeding to
judicial sale, at which point the creditor qualifies as a bona fide
transferee, not a lien creditor, and can invoke original Article 9-
301(1)(d). This means that a filing is typically not necessary to perfect
a security interest in information against a lien creditor, but is
required against a bona fide purchaser.
106. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, III.E.
107. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, III.E(3).
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Two recent decisions illustrate this result. In South Bay
Enterprises v. Miranda Bay Petroleum,"° the' inventor of a cleaning
solvent had a lien against a licensee to secure the payment of
royalties.' 0 A judgment creditor with a writ of execution against the
licensee returned unsatisfied and claimed nonetheless that it was a
lien creditor with priority over the security interest. Not so, said the
South Bay court. Since the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied,
this eliminated the judgment creditor's status as a lien creditor, and
the inventor's .security interest, though unfiled, had priority."
Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro International, Inc.' addressed
whether a writ of garnishment could reach a judgment debtor's
contract right to a domain name. The court reasoned that since a fieri
facias cannot reach an intangible patent or copyright, a writ of
garnishment can not reach the intangible contract right to a domain
name. Thus, a lender loaning to a Web company need not worry that
the rights in the domain name will be lost to a later lien creditor
(assuming it attaches). The worry is a judgment sale purchaser."
Insolvency Representatives: A lien creditor also includes
insolvency representatives. As. discussed in the companion article,"3
under Section 541(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, -for intellectual
property the bankruptcy trustee should be treated as an unsatisfied
execution creditor who has, utilized equitable execution and
proceeded to judicial sale. For..a state receiver,- under state and
federal law, intellectual -property does not become subject to the
108. 957 S.W.2d 287 (Ky.App. 1997).
109. Unfortunately, the court'says only that the inventor had "an unperfected security
interest due to the royalty agreement." Id. at 288. It does not tell.us whether it was treating
the royalty obligation itself as a security interest, or whether, as is common in such
transactions, the inventor obtained a separate security agreement in the rights granted to
the licensee, or other assets, to secure royalties.
110. Accord In re Baird, 55 B.R. 316, 318 (Bankr. 1985) (writ of execution returned
after automatic stay did not perfect lien against bankruptcy trustee); In re Wilson, 38 B.R,
940 (Bankr. 1984) (bankruptcy trustee prevailed over creditor with writ of execution on
real property returned unsatisfied).
111. 259 Va. 759,761 (2000).' "
112. Code of Virginia § 8.01-501 allows the creation of a lien on intangible property by
delivery of a writ of fierifacias to the judgment debtor, but the lien is ineffective against an
assignee for valuable consideration and without notice. This follows the traditional pattern
of an equitable lien that establishes priority over later executing creditors, but not
innocent third parties. In re Dulany, 29 B.R. 79; 80 (Bankr. 1982) involved judgment
creditors who had obtained issuance of writ of fieri facias against the accounts
(intangibles) of a partnership. The IRS then asserted a tax lien. The court held that
although the creditors had obtained a lien as of the date of delivery of the writ to the
sheriff, it "remained inchoate and unperfected as against third parties" acquiring
subsequent liens without notice. Thus, the IRS prevailed. Id. at 82.
113. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.F.
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receivership until the receiver obtains a court ordered transfer to the
receiver or other person entitled."' The receiver has a lien as of the
date of appointment, but it is inchoate and ineffective against third
parties without notice until perfected by receiver's sale."'
The assignee for the benefit of creditors is more complicated. As
discussed in the companion article,"6 for federal information, an
assignee's interest is arguably not perfected without a federal filing of
the assignment. If federal law, not state law, requires the filing, then
Revised 307(c) should not apply because state law does not require a
filing. However, although the assignee has the lien avoidance power
of a lien creditor, the assignee's interest arises by assignment, so it
appears that the federal writing requirement would be satisfied.
Under Revised Article 9-317(d), a security interest is perfected
against an executory assignment without the necessity of filing. Will
there be cases in which an assignment for the benefit of creditors is
executory? If so, does Revised 9-317(d) mean that a secured creditor
need not file to perfect against a later executory assignment for the
benefit of creditors?
Finally, there is the "generally" test. Revised 9-307(c) asks
whether a state "generally requires information concerning the
existence of a nonpossessory security interest to be made generally
available in a filing, recording, or registration system as a condition or
result of the security interest's obtaining priority over the rights of a
lien creditor." If both federal information law and state enforcement
of judgment law do not require a filing against a levying creditor or a
receiver, is the "generally" test met even though in some rare
circumstances a secured creditor must file against the assignee for the
benefit of creditors? The Drafters argue that the "generally" test is
met where filing is required except in rare cases."7 It should then also
be met where filing is not required except in rare cases. If the goal of
the filing rules is to create certainty, then it would give greater
certainty if the "generally" test is met when one need not file against
most lien creditors. The result would be that a creditor needs to
perfect information security interests against covered debtors under
114. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.E.5.
115. This is just like the situation in "order of delivery" states. They provide that
delivery of a writ of execution to the sheriff creates a lien, but the lien is inchoate until the
sheriff actually levies and takes possession of the property. In these states, the judgment
creditor does not become a "lien creditor" unless and until the sheriff levies, but on levy
the lien relates back to the delivery date. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.E.2.
116. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.E.2.
117. See supra n. 103, and accompanying text.
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the law of the District of Columbia.
b. A Case Study - California
An example illustrating this approach is California. It adopted
Revised 9 in 1999."8 The implementing legislation also made a
number of changes to the state's judgment and pre-judgment
enforcement laws, often to conform to the new terminology of
Revised 9. Since California has a comprehensive (and convoluted)
law in this regard, it might be useful to examine in detail how it would
implement Revised 9-307(c).
Judicial Lien Creditor: The starting point is the "lien creditor by
attachment or levy." This requires looking at whether a creditor on a
simple contract can obtain a lien superior to an unrecorded security
interest in intellectual property without proceeding to judicial sale. In
California, it appears not.
Pre-Judgment Attachment: The California Attachment Law is
codified in the Code of Civil Procedure §§ 481.010 et. seq."9 CCP §
487.010 lists the property subject to attachment, and it "... make[s]
clear that property for which a method of levy is not provided is not
subject to attachment, e.g. copyrights and patents."'"2 Presumably this
would also include trademarks. CCP § 488.370 does allow an
attachment on "an account receivable" by service of a writ of
attachment on an "account debtor." The implementing legislation
amended the definitions in CCP § 481.020 ("account debtor") and
CCP § 481.030 ("account receivable") to correspond to those in
Revised 9-102(a)(3) ("account debtor") and Revised 9-102(a)(2)
("account"). Since royalties under information licenses are now
"accounts" under Revised 9, at first blush this would allow an
attachment on royalties but not on the rights. But not so fast. An
account debtor is not a debtor. An account debtor is a person
obligated on a general intangible, e.g. the licensee. Thus, a creditor
cannot get an attachment on intellectual property owned by a debtor,
nor on royalties once paid to the debtor. It could try to "attach"''
royalties payable from -third party licensees by the classic "notice
financing" method of giving notice to account debtors. However,
118. Cal. Stats., c. 991 (West 1999).
119. 6 B.E. Witkin, California Procedure, Provisional Remedies, vol. 6 §§ 34 et seq.
(3rd. ed. 1985).
120. Legislative Committee Comments to C.C.P. § 487.010, reprinted in West's
Annotated California Codes (West 2000); see also Witkin, supra n. 119, Provisional
Remedies § 72.
121. Technically, this is really a garnishment.
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although an attachment creates a lien under CCP § 488.500, the
implementing legislation also amended CCP § 488.500(b) to make the
lien subject to CCP § 697.740. As we will see, this makes any
attachment lien ineffective against prior bona fide encumbrancers
without notice. Thus, no attachment is possible on right or royalties of
the debtor, and an attachment lien against royalties payable by a
licensee to the debtor would be junior to a prior unfiled security
interest in good faith and for value that had previously attached to
them.
Post-Judgment Enforcement: The California Enforcement of
Judgments Law, Code of Civil Procedure §§ 680.010 et seq., creates an
array of judgment enforcement procedures. While several of these
procedures create a lien, where information is concerned, they are all
junior to prior unfiled bona fide security interests without notice:
(1) CCP § 697.510 authorizes a judgment lien on personal
property by filing with the Secretary of State. Under CCP § 697.530,
however, this is not available for intellectual property rights. CCP §
657.530(a) does allow such a lien on "accounts receivable," which
now means an "account" consistent with Revised 9-102(a)(2).
However, California has a non-uniform definition of "lien creditor" in
Cal. Com. Code § 9-102(a)(52)(B), which says that a creditor utilizing
this procedure is not a "lien creditor." Thus it cannot create a lien on
rights or royalties.
(2) CCP § 699.710 allows a writ of execution on "all property
subject to enforcement of a money judgment." However, CCP §
695.030 says property that is not assignable or transferable is not
subject to enforcement of a money judgment. As discussed below,122
under federal law, interests under federal trademark licenses, and
interests under non-exclusive patent and copyright licenses, are not
assignable without consent of the information owner. Prior California
case law held that patent ownership interests were not subject to levy,
i.e., forced assignment at law. 3 Instead, a creditor had to appoint a
receiver after a fieri facias was returned nulla bona.24 The Legislative
Comments indicate this remains the appropriate procedure "where a
writ of execution would not reach certain property.' '125 It would also
be mandatory under signature requirements of federal law 126 If
122. See text accompanying notes, infra.
123. Peterson v. Sheriff, 115 Cal. 211 (1896).
124. Pac. Bank v. Robinson, 57 Cal. 520, 522 (1881).
125. Legislative Comment C.C.P. § 708.610, reprinted in West's California Codes
Annotated (West 2000).
126. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.E(6).
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nonetheless California does allow a writ of execution on federal
information, then CCP § 697.710 provides that service of the writ of
execution on the judgment debtor creates an execution lien." But this
lien is subject to CCP § 697.740.
(3) California also provides for a examination proceeding in CCP
§ 708.110. Under CCP § 708.110(d), service of the order to appear
creates a lien on the personal property of the judgment debtor, and
under CCP 708.120 a lien is created on the debtor's personal property
in the hands of a third party when the third party is served with a
notice to appear., California also recognizes a creditor's bill in CCP §
708.210. Service of a summons in the creditor's bill creates a lien on
the property of the judgment debtor that is subject to the bill under
CCP § 708.250. However, CCP § 697.920 also makes these liens
subject to CCP § 697.740.
(4) CCP § 607.740(a) says that, if personal property "not in the
custody of the levying officer" is "transferred or encumbered," then
any lien is ineffective against "a person who acquires an interest in
the property under the law of this state for reasonably equivalent
value without knowledge of the lien." In other words, for property
not in physical possession of the sheriff, i.e., intellectual property, the
"lien" in effect orders priorities among competing creditors, like the
traditional equitable lien created by the creditor's bill." It would not
127. CCP § 700.010 says that levy may be made on a general intangible by service of
writ of execution on an account debtor. Prof. Paul Heald, Resolving Priority Disputes In
Intellectual Property Collateral, 1 Ga. J. Int. Prop. L., 135, 144-145 (1993), argues that this
means California has authorized levy on a general intangible by service of a writ of
execution on the judgment debtor. I suggest this is incorrect. An account debtor is a person
obligated on a general intangible, e.g. a licensee. C.C.P. § 700.010 is merely saying that
service of the writ on a third party who owes money to the judgment debtor creates a lien
for that payment. This is the traditional method of perfecting in an account (payment
obligation) - by giving notice to the account debtor. See Federal Financing, supra n. 33, §
III.B(2).
128. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.E(3). In re Hilde, 120 F.3d 950 (9th Cir.
1997) involved a case where a bank had commenced an examination proceeding by
serving a debtor, but the debtor declared bankruptcy before the bank obtained a turnover
order. The trustee argued that the lien was not perfected against the trustee as a
subsequent lien creditor for items of tangible personal property. The Court disagreed,
noting that the statute does not require the examination lien to be "perfected" after its
creation. Upon creation it had the same effect "as service of an execution lien where
property is not in custody of the levying officer" on all property of the debtor. Id. In effect,
this treated the examination lien as operating like the lis pendens effect of the older
creditor's bill. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § II.E(3). Thus, the examination lien had
priority over the subsequent lien accorded a bankruptcy trustee. However, the court noted
that the execution lien would be ineffective against parties listed in CCP § 697.940, e.g.
prior bona find encumbrancers without notice, but held that the trustee did not fall in this
class for the subject property. Id. at 954.
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prime a bona fide security interest without notice. The Legislative
Comments say the section is intended to cover "intangible personal
property such as accounts receivable and general intangibles" by
establishing a rule consistent with prior state law "governing the
effect of equitable liens."'29 In California, an equitable lien is
ineffective against innocent purchasers or encumbrancers for value
and without notice. 3' The procedure to prevent transfer of property
by the debtor to third parties without notice is to seek a court order
prohibiting transfer under CCP § 708.180 (supplemental proceeding),
CCP § 708.240 (creditor's bill) or CCP § 708.520 (general procedure).
The implementing legislation amended other parts of CCP § 607.740
to conform to Revised 9. However, CCP § 607.740(a) was left
unchanged.
(5) CCP § 701.040 says that "except as otherwise ordered by the
court upon a determination that the judgment creditor's lien has
priority over the security interest, if property levied upon is subject to
a security interest that attached prior to levy, the property or
obligation is subject to enforcement of the security interest without
regard to the levy unless the property is in the custody of the levying
officer." This section confirms that in California a security interest
has priority against a levying creditor when it attaches, unless the
court finds some reason to give priority, such as the sheriff taking
possession. In California, priority would evidently require proceeding
129. Legislative Comments to CCP § 697.740, reprinted in West's Annotated
California Codes. The California Law Revision Commission explains the reason for the
exception thus: "If a lien is created on personal property pursuant to a levy of execution,
but the property subject to a lien is not in possession of the levying officer, the interests of
bona fide purchasers or encumbrancers are not effected by the lien because the process
that creates the lien is not sufficient to provide constructive' notice. Accordingly, the lien
does not follow the property when it is transferred to a transferee or encumbrancer who
gives fair consideration without knowledge of the lien." 16 Cal. Law Revision Coin. Rep.
(Dec. 1982) at 1052 (emphasis added).
130. Moore v. Schneider, 196 Cal. 380 (1925) (equitable lien ineffective against prior
bona fide purchaser of real property without notice); Schut v. Doyle, 168 Cal. App. 2d 698,
703 (1959); Jud Whitehead Heater Co. v. Obler, 111 Cal. App. 2d 861, 873 (1952) (personal
property; rule stated but held inapplicable since defendant had not given value); Wagner v.
Sariotti, 56 Cal. App. 2d 693, 698 (1943) (rule stated but held inapplicable because
defendant had knowledge); 42 Cal. Jur. 3d, Liens § 40. As the California Law Revision
Commission explains: "[Tihe courts have held that liens created by service of an order in
supplemental proceedings or by commencement of a creditor's suit are not effective
against a subsequent transferee of the property subject to the lien who gives fair
consideration for the property without notice of the lien. The proposed [Enforcement of
Judgment] law includes provisions specifying the effect of the lien created in examination
proceedings, a creditor's suit or charging order proceedings. The lien is given the same
effect as an execution lien where the property levied on is not in custody of the levying
officer." 16 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (Dec. 1982) at 1052.
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to judicial sale where information is concerned. Under CCP §
701.630, the judicial sale extinguishes lien under which the property
was sold and "any lien subordinate thereto." Currently, the judicial
sale purchaser without notice could take advantage of any recording
act, including original Article 9-301(1)(d). If Revised 9-371(d) has
eliminated the ability of an executory assignee to prime an
unrecorded security interest, and if a judicial sale is treated as an
executory assignment, then in California a judicial sale purchaser may
no longer prevail over an unfiled information security interest. For
federal information, however, the purchaser could rely on the
recording provisions in federal law.
(6) California has another enforcement procedure where
intellectual property is concerned: the assignment order. Before any
execution on intellectual property, CCP § 701.520 accords the
judgment debtor a right to noticed hearing to determine if an
assignment order is more appropriate than forced sale. If the debtor
does not timely file objection, then under CCP § 701.520 the levying
officer can execute a certificate of sale, CCP § 701.650(2). Otherwise,
if the debtor does object and the court finds under CCP § 701.520(d)
that a forced sale is unlikely to realize full value, it can order that
royalties be assigned to the judgment creditor pursuant to CCP §
708.510. However, under CCP § 708.530 the assignee is deemed a
bona fide assignee for value under Civil Code § 955.1, not a lien
creditor.
Insolvency representatives:
Receiver: California Code of Civil Procedure § 708.610 allows the
appointment of a receiver to enforce a judgment. CCP § 708.620 has
eliminated the prerequisite of a writ of execution returned
unsatisfied, and instead allows appointment where a receiver is "a
reasonable method to obtain fair and orderly satisfaction of the
judgment." The Legislative Comments indicate this is the preferred
method where "a writ of execution would not reach certain
property."13' California follows the general rule that a receiver merely
takes the title of the debtor.' However, it also follows the usual
exception allowing a receiver to attack prior unrecorded chattel
mortgages.'33 This power is likened to that of a sheriff under a writ of
execution.3 4 However, the mere act of appointment does not vest a
131. Legislative Comments to CCP § 708.620, reprinted in West's Annotated California
Codes (West 2000).
132. 55 Cal. Jur. 3d, Receivers § 40.
133. Camerer v. Cal. Savings & Comm. Bank, 4 Cal. 2d 159 (1935).
134. 55 Cal. Jur. 3d, Receivers § 39.
receiver with ownership or possession sufficient to invoke this
power.135 The receiver has no lien until taking possession, directly or
under court order,136 although under Article 9 the receiver's interest,
when perfected, relates back to the date of appointment. To reach
intellectual property requires a court ordered assignment to the
receiver.'37
Assignee for the Benefit of Creditors: At one time, California had
two methods for making an assignment for the benefit of creditors: at
common law or by statute."8 The statutory alternative procedure was
rarely used and was repealed in 1980, so that California only
recognizes common law assignments, subject to limited statutory
guidance.'39 The common law right derives from California Civil Code
§ 22.2, which says: "The common law of England, so far as it is not
repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United
States, or the Constitution or law of this State, is the rule of decision
in all courts of this State."'40 Initially, California followed the common
law rule that choses in action were not assignable. 4' Under older
authority, this meant that intangibles did not pass to an assignee for
the benefit of creditors.' But in 1872, California, by statute, made all
species of property transferable, including intellectual property.
43
Thus, despite the common law infirmities, intellectual property
should be assignable for the benefit of creditors under California
common law. Under CCP § 493.010, the assignment must cover all
non-exempt assets and treat all creditors without preference.
California follows the common law rule that the assignee merely
135. Finnegan v. Finnegan, 64 Cal. App. 2d 109, 112 (1944) ("The mere appointment
of a receiver does not itself vest in him title to the patents."); accord Zanetti v. Zanetti, 77
Cal. App. 2d 553 (1947); 55 Cal. Jur. 3d, Receivers § 42.
136. Bank of Woodland v. Heron, 120 Cal. 614, 620 (1898) (crop mortgage); Miller v.
Super. Ct., 63 Cal. App. 1 (1923) (receiver appointed after sheriff took possession could
not claim property).
137. Pac. Bank v. Robinson, 57 Cal. 520, 522 (1881) (patent).
138. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3449- 3473 (repealed 1980, chpt. 35, § 3).
139. Credit Managers Assoc. v. Natl. Indep. Bus. Alliance, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1166, 1170
(1984).
140. Id. at 1169-70.
141. See Staff v. Maders Canal & Irrigation Co., 34 Cal. App. 41, 46 (1917) (citing rule,
but noting change by statute).
142. See 4 Am. Jur., Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors § 26 (1936) (cases cited).
This is the 1936 edition.
143. Cal. Civ. Code § 1044; Loew's v. Super. Ct., 18 Cal. 2d 419 (1941) (common law
copyright); Johnston v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp. 82 Cal. App. 2d 796 (1948)
(same).
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takes the title of the debtor.' 4 Absent statutory authority, the
assignee does not take title to property previously conveyed or
encumbered by the assignor, even if in fraud of creditors.'
California's version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act allows
the assignee to avoid fraudulent transfers that render the debtor
insolvent the same as any other creditor.46 Code of Civil Procedure §
1800 also allows the assignee authority to avoid preferential transfers
among creditors, analogous to Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code.'
4 7
As to prior security interests on intellectual property, CCP § 1800(b)
allows the assignee to recover any security transfer of property unless
an exception applies. CCP § 1800(c) excepts security interests that
allow the assignor to acquire property so long as they are "perfected"
within 20 days of attachment. CCP § 1800(e)(1)(B) says a security
interest in intellectual property is perfected "when a creditor on a
simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the
interest of the transferee." A "judicial lien," per CCP § 1800(a)(4),
means "a lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other
legal or equitable process or proceeding." As discussed above, in
California, a creditor on a simple contract cannot obtain a judicial lien
on intellectual property by levy, and the equitable lien is ineffective
against third parties without notice. Thus, the mere appointment of
an assignee, does not set aside a prior, unrecorded information
security interest if it is bona fide. The assignee must obtain a court
ordered transfer and, for federal information, record federally.
Although this analysis is detailed, it is now what Revised 9
apparently requires for information collateral held by a covered
debtor in each state. It is certainly required for information. Looking
at the California statutes, most of which were specifically addressed
by the Legislature in the legislation enacting Revised. 9, it appears
quite certain that security interests in information held by a California
covered debtor must be perfected under the laws of the District of
Columbia.
144. Moore v. Schneider, 196 Cal. 380, 385-386 (1925) (absent statutory authority,
assignee can not recover title conveyed in fraud of creditors); 16 Cal. Jur. 3d, Assignment
for the Benefit of Creditors.§ 37 (1983).
145. Moore, 196 Cal. at 385-386 (real property); Francisco v. Aguirre, 94 Cal. 3d 180,
182 (1982) (assignee took subject to unrecorded chattel mortgage even though in fraud of
creditors).
146. Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.01(c) (including assignee for the benefit of creditors in
definition of "creditor").
147. See Blonder v. Cumberland Engr., 71 Cal. App. 4th 1057, 1061 (1999).
c. Circular Renvoi and Other Conflicts Confusion
Under Revised 9-307(c), for information collateral, a covered
debtor will typically be located in the District of Columbia. Under
Revised 9-301(1), District law will then govern the effect of perfection
and the priority of security interests. As of this writing, the District
has only enacted original Article 9, not Revised 9.148 Unless and until
it does, the conflict rule in the District's version of original Article 9-
103(b) will determine the applicable law. It requires looking to the
law - including the conflict of law rules - of the jurisdiction where the
debtor is "located" per original Article 9-103(d). This will often, but
not always, be the jurisdiction that referred the matter to the
District.'4 9 If it is the referring state, then its conflict rule - Revised
9-307(c) - sends us back to the District, which refers us back to the
referring state, which refers us back to D.C. - and so on. Revised 9
has implanted a circular renvoi in the heart of the critical question for
every secured creditor: "Where do I file?"
One may think a practical solution is simply to file in all possible
locations, but that is no answer. At a minimum, multiple filing means
multiple searching. And what happens if the searches reveal a
conflict? Assume that a creditor files in the referring state on Day 1
and in the District on Day 3. An intervening transfer or lien occurs on
Day 2. Is the secured creditor perfected against it or not, and under
whose law? The searching question is actually more pronounced than
this. Intellectual property, as an intangible, has no fixed situs. It is
simultaneously everywhere, and thus is subject to judgment execution
remedies"' in any state that obtains in personam jurisdiction over the
debtor. 5' This means that an intervening transfer could arise
anywhere in the country. So where does one search or file?
This resurrects one of the thorniest of the pre-Code conflicts
problems, the priority of a security interest filed in one state against a
judgment creditor in another.'52 A state is not required to recognize
the effectiveness of a security interest filed in another state, but can
148. See D.C. Code § 28-9:101 et seq. (1981).
149. Since there are differences between original Article 9-103 and Revised 9-307(b),
District law may refer to the law of yet a third state. See Cohen & Smith, supra n. 103, at
1194-1199.
150. As discussed in Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § IlI.E, the remedies would be
equitable execution by judicial sale on noticed hearing, not attachment or levy.
151. See e.g. Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
152. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Nonpossessory Security Interests In Am. Conflicts Law,
84 Commercial L.J. 63 (1979); David H. Vernon, Recorded Chattel Security Interests In
The Conflict of Laws, 47 Iowa L.R. 346 (1962); 11 Am. Jur. Conflict of Laws § 74 et seq.
(conflicts problems under prior chattel mortgage acts).
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do so as a matter of comity."3 During the Depression many, but not
all states recognized out of state filings where the collateral was
removed from the first state without the secured creditor's consent.
Since federal information is simultaneously everywhere nationwide, it
would not fit within this exception. This is the problem the Supreme
Court identified in Stevens v. Gladding"' It was one of the reasons
Congress enacted national information filing systems."'
There may be one escape hatch. If the District has not adopted
Revised 9, then the better approach is not to use original Article 9-
103(3)(b), but rather the deferral to federal law in original Article 9-
104(a) or at least the deferral to the priority rules in original Article
9-302(3). In that case, District law would direct that security interests
in federal information be filed in the appropriate federal filing offices
in the Capitol, a far more rational result all around.
d. Analytical Checklist
A secured creditor looking where to file to perfect a security
interest in information collateral under Revised Article 9 might
consider the following checklist:
Step 1: Determine the type of information involved. Does it
involve state information or federal information, and if so, what type?
If federal law does not preempt the Revised 9 filing rules, proceed to
Step 2.
Step 2: Decide the state where the debtor is located under either
Revised 9-307(b) or, if the debtor is a registered organization, under
Revised 9-307(e).
Step 3: Look to the state determined under Step 2 to determine
whether it has enacted Revised 9. If the state has not enacted Revised
9,skip to Step 6. If the state has enacted Revised 9-307 then look if it
has enacted any non-uniform provisions. Determine whether the
debtor is a "covered debtor" subject to Revised 9-307(c) as enacted in
the state. If the debtor is a registered organization, determine how the
state resolves the apparent conflict between Revised 9-307(c) and
9-307(e).
Step 4: If the debtor is a covered debtor under the law of the
state found under Step 3, then examine this law further to determine
how it would apply the "against a lien creditor" and the "generally
153. See e.g. Atha v. Brockius, 39 Cal. 2d 635 (1952); 3 CJ.S. Executions § 140.
154. See Vernon, supra n. 152 (discussing case law).
155. 58 U.S. 447,452 (1855).
156. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, III.E(5).
requires" tests to the information collateral. This should include
examining whether the state has a filing system for the information
that supplants Revised 9, and testing how the state enforcement of
judgment and debtor/creditor laws deal with the creating an
involuntary lien, if at all, on the information collateral
Step 5: If the covered deemed is deemed located in in the District
of Columbia, examine its law to determine whether it has enacted
Revised Article 9.
Step 6: If the state determined under Step 3 or the District has
not enacted Revised 9, then determine where its law would require
the security interest to be filed under original Article 9-103. This
could be some' third state.'57 If the third state has adopted Revised 9,
repeat Steps 4 through 6. If circular loops (renvoi) appear then search
all possible locations. If the searches reveal a conflict, spend some
time reading the disparate case law and scholarly debate about the
appropriate choice. of law rules when. security transfers in different
states conflict.
Step 7: If the District has adopted Revised 9, determine whether
is it has enacted any non-uniform provisions. If not, decide how a
court in the District will deal with the, provisions in Revised 9
discussed elsewhere in this article.
Lenders who believe they have perfected an information security
interest under Revised 9 simply by filing in a debtor's state of
incorporation or principal "place of business" could be in for a
surprise.
D. R 9-311(a): Filing Rules - Federal Information
1. Original Article 9
Original Article 9 contains two rules for deferring to federal
intellectual property recording systems:
Current 9-104
This Article does not apply
(a) To a security interest subject to any statute of the United
States, to the extent that such statute governs the rights of the
parties to and third persons affected by transactions in
particular types of property;
Current 9-302
157. See e.g. Walter E. Heller, Canada, Ltd. v. Buchbinder, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 192
(D.C.App. 1979) (when an account debtor is located in the District, a sale of accounts in
Canada is still a security interest which must be perfected under District version of Article
9; since debtor located in Canada, filing properly made in Canada).
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(3) The filing of a financing statement otherwise permitted by this
Article is not necessary or effective to perfect in property subject
to:
(a) a statute or treaty of the United States which provides for a
national or international registration ... or which specifies a
place of filing different from that specified in this Article for
filing of the security interest;
(4) Compliance with a statute or treaty described in subsection (3)
is equivalent to the filing of a financing statement under this
Article, and a security interest in property subject to the statute or
treaty can be perfected only by compliance therewith except as
provided in Section 9-103 on multiple state transactions. Duration
and renewal of perfection of a security interest perfected in
compliance with the statute or treaty are governed by the
provisions of the statute or treaty; in other respects the security
interest is subject to this Article.
Pre-Code case law held that, for federal information, state law
determined the method of creating and foreclosing a security transfer,
while federal law set the priority and consequent perfection rules."158
Thus, as far as Article 9 was concerned, the "full step-back" in Article
9-104(a) did not apply to federal information, although the "limited
step-back" in Article 9-302(3)(a) did. Prof. Gilmore was emphatic
that this was the correct reading:'59
There can be no doubt that both the copyright and patent statutes
were meant to be within the description of § 9-302(3)(a).... There
is nothing in the language or background of either statute to
suggest that some types of security transactions were to be subject
to the recording provisions while other types were not. Insofar as
there is any room for doubt that the copyright and patent recording
systems are, as a matter of federal law, exclusive of state filing
systems, both of these systems should be held to fall within
subsection (3)(a), with the result that compliance with the federal
statute becomes the exclusive method of perfection under
subsection (4).
2. Revised Article 9
Revised Article 9 adopts a more restrictive approach in deferring
to federal intellectual property law:
Revised 9-109(c)
(c) This division does not apply to the extent that...
(1) A statute, regulation, or treaty of the United States
preempts this division.
Revised 9-311
158. See Republic Pictures Corp. v. Security-First Natl. Bank, 197 F.2d 767 (9th Cir.
1952) (holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction to foreclose a copyright chattel
mortgage); Gilmore, supra n. 4, § 19.9, at 545.
159. Gilmore, supra n. 4, § 19.9, at 545.
(a).. .the filing of a financing statement is not necessary or
effective to perfect a security interest in property subject to any of
the following:
(1) A statute, regulation, or treaty of the United States whose
requirements for a security interest's obtaining priority over
the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the property
preempt subdivision (a) of Section 9-310.
Revised 9-311(a)(1) has little application to federal information.
The federal statutes apply to bona fide purchasers, not lien creditors.
Thus, the relationship between Revised 9 and federal law must be
measured by the "to the extent preempted" standard in Revised 9-
109(c).
3. Detailed Analysis
a. Omission of the Bona Fide Purchaser - Again
Under Revised 9-310(a), a financing statement must be filed to
perfect a security interest unless an exception applies. Revised 9-
311(a)(1) says an exception exists for a security interest "in property
subject to a statute, regulation, or treaty of the United States whose
requirements for a security interest's obtaining priority over the rights
of a lien creditor with respect to the property" preempts Revised 9's
filing requirements. Once again, Revised 9 omits the bona fide
purchaser.
Unfortunately, the courts have made a hash of where to perfect a
security interest in federal information."6 The federal statutes are all
functionally identical, acting like real property recording acts.6
Nonetheless, the copyright cases, typified by Peregrine,162 hold a
security interest must be perfected against all parties by filing in the
Copyright Office. For patents, Transport Design says a security
interest can be perfected against a lien creditor by a state filing,63
while Otto Fabric says that no filing at all is required."6 Both agree
filing in the PTO is needed against a bona fide purchaser. The
trademark cases, led by Roman Cleanser'65 and Together Corp.,166
claim security interests in federal trademarks can be perfected against
160. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § 11I.G.
161. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.C(1).
162. In re Peregrine Enter., Ltd. 116 B.R. 194, n. 19 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990).
163. In re Transportation Design & Tech. Inc., 48 B.R. 635 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985).
164. City Bank & Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric, Inc., 83 B.R. 780, 782 (D. Kan. 1988).
165. In re Roman Cleanser Co. 43 B.R. 940 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984), affd 802 F.2d
207 (6th Cir. 1986).
166. In re Together Dev. Corp., 227 B.R. 439 (Bankr. D.Mass. 1998).
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all parties only by a state UCC filing. As suggested in the companion
article, only the copyright cases make coherent sense.
Revised 9 looks to engraft the results in Otto Fabric and Roman
Cleanser into its deferral rule. Revised 9-311(a)(1) says that a secured
creditor should not have to file in any federal office to perfect against
a bankruptcy trustee since neither the Copyright Act, the Patent Act
nor the Lanham Act expressly require it. If the trustee objects, the
lender can claim that under Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code,
lien creditor status and consequent perfection is determined by state
law. Since Revised 9-311(a)(1) eliminates a federal filing to perfect
against a lien creditor as a matter of state law, under this reading a
floating lien should be good against a bankruptcy trustee for federal
information.
This approach, however, misreads both federal intellectual
property law and bankruptcy law. Under federal law, a judgment
creditor cannot obtain an involuntary lien on intellectual property as
this would violate the federal writing requirement.'67 Such a creditor
must perfect by commencing equitable proceedings and acquiring a
court ordered transfer, qualifying under the federal statutes as a bona
fide purchaser. Under Section 544(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, for
intangible information, the trustee should be treated as an unsatisfied
execution creditor who has obtained a judicial deed and recorded it in
the relevant federal filing office. 68 This means a creditor must file in
the appropriate federal filing office to perfect against the bankruptcy
trustee, even under Revised 9's more stringent "to the extent
preempted" test.
b. Effect of Federal Preemption
Whatever Revised 9 might say, it is federal law, not state law,
which sets the preemption test. The federal courts recognize three
types of preemption.6 9 "Express" preemption occurs where an
explicit statutory command replaces state law. "Field" or "implied"
preemption arises when federal law so thoroughly occupies a
legislative field as to leave the reasonable inference that Congress left
no room for the states to supplement it. "Conflict" preemption exists
when state law conflicts with federal law in a way that makes it
impossible to comply with both, or stands as an obstacle to
167. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.E(5).
168. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.F.
169. See Orson v. Miramax Film Corp., 189 F.3d 377, 381 (3rd Cir. 1999) (explaining
different types of preemption); accord Allis-Chalmers Corp. V. Luek, 471 U.S. 202, 209
(1985) (describing tests); Lear v. Atkins. 395 U.S. 653 (1969) (patent law).
accomplishing the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' 70
c. Chart: Conflicts with Federal Law
An evaluation of every possible preemption challenge is beyond
the scope of this article. The following chart, however, lists specific
areas in Revised Article 9 that appear facially inconsistent with
federal intellectual property laws:
170. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
Revised Article 9 Conflicting Federal Law
R 9-102(a)(44): "embedded software" is a Copyright Act § 202: "embedded software"
"good" cannot be a "good"
R 9-102(a)(1 1): software licenses as Copyright Act §§ 204, 205; licenses are at
"chattel paper" best prima facie evidence of transfer;
recording establishes priority
R 9-103: denies "purchase money" status Copyright Act § 205(c); Patent Act § 261;
to copyrights or patents so that licenses Lanham Act 1040(a); prior state filed floating
become immediately subject to prior lien would conflict with later federal filing
floating liens identifying work, invention or mark
R 9-108: collateral can be described in Copyright Act § 205(c); Patent Act § 261;
general terms Lanham Act 1040(a); requires identifying
work, invention or mark
R 9-204: security interest effective in Copyright Act § 205(c); Patent Act § 261;
after-acquired collateral Lanham Act 1040(a); requires identifying
work , invention or mark
R 9-207(d): Validates "secret liens" Copyright Act § 205(c); Patent Act § 261;
against later executory information secret liens invalid against later filing BFPs;
assignments Lanham Act § 1040(a)?
R 9-301: Law where debtor "located" Copyright Act § 205; Patent Act § 261;
governs questions of priority and Lanham Act § 1040(a); federal law
perfection determines priority regardless of. location of
debtor
R 9-307(c): Debtor located in District of Copyright Act § 205; Patent Act § 261;
Columbia for copyright, patent and Lanham Act § 1040(a) federal law
trademark priority questions in U.S. determines priority question regardless of
location of debtor
R 9-307(c): Filing in District of Columbia Berne Convention art. 5(2) (law of protecting
perfects for copyright patent and country decides for copyrights); Patent Law
trademark interests outside U.S. Treaty art. 14 (patent security interests must
be filed in national patent office); Trademark
Law Treaty art. 11 (trademark interests must
be filed in national trademark office)
R 9-310(a): Security interest perfected by Copyright Act § 205 (Copyright Office for all
filing in state UCC registers interests); Patent Act § 261 (Patent Office for
security interests); Lanham Act § 1060: state
filing only?
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R 9-311 (a)(1): Federal law only preempts Federal law sets preemption standards;
Revised 9 if it requires filing for priority express, field and conflict preemption
over a lien creditor
R -9-316(a): Security interest in Copyright Act § 205 & Patent Act § 261:
information only endures for one year Once filed, mortgage continues for its entire
unless refiled against transferee term; Lanham Act § 1060: state filing rules
apply?
R 9-317: Exclusive licensee takes free of Copyright Act § 205 & Patent Act § 261:
security interest if license gives value Allows a grace period after federal recording
without knowledge before security before 'priority applies.
interest is perfected.
R 9-321: "Licensee in ordinary course" Copyright Act § 506: knowing continued use
can continue using information even if it a felony. Patent Act 285: patent
knows licensor's interest foreclosed out counterfeiting. 28 U.S.C. § 2003 - knowing
continued use felony trademark
counterfeiting.
R 9-408(a): Contractual prohibitions on Nonexclusive copyright and patent licenses
assignments of rights or royalties under not transferable without consent of licensor
information licenses unenforceable under federal law; trademark licenses not
assignable without consent
R: 9-509: Secured creditor can file Copyright Act § 204; Patent Act § 261;
financing statement without debtor's Lanham Act § 1040(a); federal law requires
signature signature of the debtor-owner of the work,
invention or mark
R 9-102(a)(2) & 9-610: Assignments and On cancellation, copyright, patent and
exclusive licenses are now security trademark licenses end, making further use
interests that must be "foreclosed" to an infringement
terminate a licensee's interest on default
Original Article 9 allowed federal law to set the priority scheme,
using state law to fill the gap with attachment and foreclosure rules.
Revised Article 9, however, both in basic philosophy and statutory
mechanics, conflicts with the federal scheme. The resulting litigation
will be extensive, intense and, but for Revised 9, wholly unnecessary.
E. R 9-307(c): Filing Rules - International Information
1. Original Article 9
Intellectual property has become America's leading national
export.171 American creators increasingly rely on export earnings to
fund new creations, and financing export licenses has become a
substantial business. To obtain financing, a creator needs to assure a
lender that at a minimum it can perfect its interest in royalties once
they are repatriated to the United States. Original Article 9 allows a
convenient system to do so: traditional notification financing.17 2 This
happens because of the limited scope of the definition of "account":
Current 9-106
"Account" means any right to payment for goods sold or leased or
-171. See Stephen E. Siwek & Gale Mosteller, supra n. 1.
172. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.B.
for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument of
chattel paper, whether or not its has been earned by performance.
Due to this provision, royalties due under intellectual property
licenses, at least when they are remitted to the United States, are not
"accounts" and therefore can be financed under the law of
assignment, using notice, to the licensees overseas to perfect the
lender's security interest, at least against creditors of the licensor in
the United States.
2. Revised Article 9
Revised Article 9 again, changes the rules for intellectual
property export financing with the following sections:
Revised 9-102(a)(2)
"Account", except as used in "account for", means a right to
payment, whether or not earned by performance, (i) for property
that has been or is to be sold, leased, licensed, assigned, or
otherwise disposed of...
Revised 9-102(a)(28)
"Debtor" means any of the following:
(A) A person having an interest, other than a security interest
or other lien, in the collateral, whether or not the person is an
obligor.
Under these provisions, to perfect a security interest in a
licensor's royalties remitted from licensee's overseas it appears that
the lender must now file in myriad national intellectual property
registers around the world at enormous expense.
3. Detailed Analysis
a. Export Financing Overview
Information transfers involve both the intellectual property
interest (the "rights") and the contractual right to receive payments
(the "royalties"). A creditor loaning against the security of such a
transfer must therefore consider how to perfect in both rights and
royalties against both its immediate owner-debtor and transferees
from its debtor. With regard to rights, the territorial principal applies.
This means that the laws of each protecting country determine the
scope of protection.173 There is no such thing as a "foreign" copyright,
173. For discussion, see Paul Edward Geller & Melville B. Nimmer, International
Copyright Law and Practice, Introduction (2000 ed) ["Geller"](copyrights); Nimmer &
Nimmer, supra n. 47, at § 17.02 (copyright); McCarthy Trademark, supra n. 44, § 32:1
(trademarks); Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 14.01 (2000 ed.) ["Chisum"]
(patents); also Gretchen Ann Bender, Clash of the Titans: The Territoriality of Patent Law
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patent or trademark; rather there is a separate, national copyright,
patent or trademark in each protecting country. On the other hand,
when dealing with the contract interest, conflicts law uses a unifying
approach that tries to apply the same lex contractus wherever the
contract is enforced.74
How can a lender perfect a security interest in transfers by an
American information creator to other countries? For example,
assume a Producer makes an exclusive license of various rights in a
motion picture to a French company. 7' The French company will
remit to the U.S. Lender royalty payments derived from exploiting
the rights in France. A U.S. Lender making a loan secured by such a
license needs to obtain priority over: (i) French creditors, i.e.,
creditors of the French licensee that may take priority over the
copyright interest granted to the licensee in France or the royalty
payments to be remitted by them; and (ii) U.S. creditors, i.e., creditors
of the Producer that may take priority over the license payments once
remitted to the U.S. (We can assume the lender has assured itself of
priority in the rights in the U.S.) For the French creditors, the Lender
will need to perfect against them, if at all, under French law, since it
will govern the copyright interest in France. Neither Original nor
Revised Article 9 can change that. With regard to U.S. creditors,
however, U.S. law, including, as applicable Article 9, will govern. This
follows not only because the collateral - the royalty payment - will be
remitted to the U.S., but because the contract interest - the right to
payment - will presumably be governed by the contract law of a U.S.
jurisdiction. For the Lender, securing the right to collect this royalty
payment for the international licensees, especially against a
bankruptcy trustee of the Producer, will be of paramount concern.
b. How Current Law Works
Under Original Article 9, perfecting in the licensor's
international royalties is straightforward. A Lender sends each
licensee a Notice and Acknowledgement. The Notice notifies the
licensee that all payments due under the license have been assigned
vs. The European Union, 40 Idea 49 (2000). U.S. courts have affirmed the territorial
principle as the U.S. copyright conflicts rule. See e.g. Twin Books v. The Walt Disney Co.,
83 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1996); Subafilms Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Comm. Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1095
(9th Cir. 1994) (U.S. copyright law has no extra-territorial effect); Totalplan Corp. of Am.
v. Colborne, 14 F.3d 824 (2nd Cir. 1994) (U.S. trademark law dos not apply in Japan);
Person's Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("[T]rademarks exist within each
country solely according to that country's statutory scheme.").
174. See Geller, supra n. 173, Introduction at § 6.
175. This hypothetical is further elaborated in § III.A, infra notes 378-381.
to the Lender. The Acknowledgement requires the licensee to
acknowledge the assignment and typically to verify the amount owed
and to waive set-off rights. It may also create a legal right for the
lender to pursue the licensee in case- of failure to pay, although its
economic value can be problematic.176
In any case, this notification procedure perfects the Lender's
interest against the Producer's creditors -in the United States,'
especially in the royalty income once repatriated. Under original
Article 9-106, an "account" only means a right to payment for "goods
sold or leased or services rendered." It does not include royalties
arising from a license of intellectual property, which are general
intangibles.1 ' Thus, as far as U.S. law goes, the assignment to the
lender of the Producer's right to receive royalties under the
international licenses is perfected by the applicable law of assignment,
not by the filing rules in Original Article 9. American states utilize
one of three different perfection rules in this case: the American rule
of strict first in time; the English rule of first to notify the account
debtor; or the Restatement's "four horsemen" rule.178 Under all - of
these rules, notice to the account debtor - the Notice and
Acknowledgement sent to the international licensees - has always
been sufficient to perfect. This means if a U.S. Producer files for
bankruptcy in the U.S., the Lender has a perfected interest against
the U.S. bankruptcy trustee in the royalty payments under the
international licenses.'79
There can be a. variation on the theme. In some cases, the
Producer will license all rights outside the United States to a master
distributor in another country, and that distributor will in turn make
sublicenses to territorial licensees. This is often done to take
176. The licenses typically provide that no exploitation materials are delivered until
payment of the Minimum Guarantees, limiting the ability to meaningfully exploit the
rights. The lender takes the credit risk for later overages.
177. E.g. South Bay Enter., 957 S.W.2d at 289 (royalties under technology license not
an account); In re Lady Madonna Indus., Inc., 99 B.R. 536, 541 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(trademark license not an account);. In re Specialty Foods of Pittsburgh, Inc. 98 B.R. 734,
736 (Bankr. W.D.Pa. 1989) (security interest in "rights to payment of money" from
general intangibles did not cover trademark license); Morrison v, Helms 28 UCC Rep
Serv. 172 (Tenn. App. 1979) (royalties from license to reproduce and distribute sound
recordings not an account); generally 6 Am. Jur. 2d Attachment and Garnishment § 502
(1999) (As to intangible property... an assignment prior to an attachment or garnishment
is all that is necessary to preserve the lien priority of the assignee."); but see In re C Tek
Software, Inc., 117 B.R. 762, 771 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990) holding that software source code
is an "ordinary good" for perfection purposes, a result that is plainly wrong.
178. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.B.2.
179. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § IIJ.B.3.
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advantage of applicable remittance tax treaties. In this case, the
distributor will often execute an Inter-Party Agreement with the
Producer and the Lender in which the distributor acknowledges the
priority of the Lender's security interest and agrees to require each
sublicensee to execute a Notice and Acknowledgement directing their
payments to the Lender. Original Article 9 also easily accommodates
this structure in the following provision:
Current 9-103(3)(c)
In the alternative, if the debtor is located in a jurisdiction which is
not a part of the United States or Canada and the collateral is
accounts or general intangibles for money due or to become due,
the security interest may be perfected by notification to the account
debtor.
Under this provision, the Notice and Acknowledgement
procedure also perfects the Lender's interest in the payments from
the sublicensees of the non-U.S. distributor.
Prof. Gilmore describes the reason for these rules in some
detail."' During the drafting process for the original statute, New
York lenders argued that under the proposed language in Article 9-
103(1), a bank loaning on a foreign debtor's receivables was required
to look to the law where the debtor's records were kept to determine
validity and perfection. In that case:
Obviously, if a New York Bank makes a loan to a Congolese
corporation and, on default, has to go into the Congo to realize on
its security, it must take its chances on whatever state of law it must
find there. On the other hand, is for example, remittances are made
to New York and bank accounts are kept in New York, it is not
unreasonable to say that New York courts should apply New York
law to litigation which arises in New York.
81
In such a situation, "a moments reflection makes it clear that if
the underlying transaction is a loan by a New York bank against the
security of Congolese receivables, it makes no sense whatsoever to
require filing in New York."182 Original Article 9-103(3)(c) thus
allowed perfection - at least with regard to the receivables - by the
classic method of notice to the account debtor. New York evidently
decided not to bother with notification at all but to let the security
interest achieve perfection when it attached."' Revised Article 9 does
the opposite.
180. See Gilmore, supra n. 4, at 330-332.
181. Id. at 330.
182. Id. at 331.
183. Id. at 332.
c. Impact of Revised 9
Revised 9-102(a)(2) expands the definition of "account" to
include a right to payment "for property that has been or is to be...
licensed, assigned or otherwise disposed of." This now sweeps in
royalty payments due under information licenses.18 ' This means that
an assignment of royalties is no longer perfected by notice to the
licensees. Under Revised 9-310(a), a financing statement must be
filed.
But filed where? Revised Article 9-301(1) says that the local law
"where the debtor is located" determines the necessary perfection
procedures. Revised 9-102(a)(28) now expands the definition of
"debtor" to include any person "having an interest, other than a
security interest or other lien, in the collateral, whether or not the
person is an obligor." According to the Official Comments, this picks
up "those persons who may have a stake in the proper enforcement of
a security interest by virtue of their non-lien property interest
(typically an ownership interest) in the collateral.... by including in
the definition of 'debtor' all persons with a property interest (other
than a security interest in or other lien on collateral), the definition
includes transferees of collateral, whether or not the secured party
knows of the transfer or the transferee's identify."'85 Under Revised 9,
a "debtor" thus includes assignees and licensees - transferees - of the
information, or a divisible part of it.
The problem with the expanded definition is that its creates a
confusing overlap where information transfers are concerned. A
transferee is now both a "debtor" and an "account debtor." A lender
loaning to an information transferor wants to ensure priority in the
transferor's right to receive royalties against other creditors of the
transferor, and in the transferee's obligation to remit payments
against other creditors of the transferee. Start with the transferor's
right to receive royalties. For these purposes, the transferee is an
account debtor and the lender perfects against other creditors of the
transferor by filing against the transferor-debtor.
But what of the transferee's obligation to remit royalties? For
184. See U.C.C. § 9-102, cont. 5(a) (Rev. 1998): ("The definition of 'account' has been
expanded and reformulated. It is no longer limited to rights to payment relating to goods
and services. Many categories of rights to payment that were classified as general
intangibles under former Article 9 are accounts under this Article.").
185. Id. at cmt. 2(a). See also Weise, supra n. 32, n. 6 ("Although the copyright is not
transferred by the [nonexclusive] license, the rights created by the license are 'property'
for Article 9 purposes, and can serve as collateral should the licensee grant a security
interest in them.").
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these purposes, the transferee now becomes a debtor and so the
transferor, or its lender, apparently must perfect against the
transferee as it would against any debtor. Under current law, the
Notice and Acknowledgement sent to the transferee is sufficient to
perfect. The legal theory is that the royalty payment has been
assigned to the transferor's lender, so that a lien against the transferee
does not attach to the transferor's right to royalties, or is junior to the
prior assignment to the transferor's lender in any case. 6 Revised 9
has changed this approach, now requiring separate perfection against
each transferee.
This has far reaching consequences. Assume a judicial creditor of
the transferor seeks to garnish the royalty obligation in the hands of
the transferee. If the judicial creditor is successful, it can take the
royalty payment from the transferee before it ever reaches the
transferor, and the security interest in royalties received is only
perfected in an empty bucket.87 Under current law the Notice and
186. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § II.B(3). The leading case is Septembertide
Publg., B. V. v. Stein and Day, Inc., 884 F.2d 657 (2nd Cir. 1989). An author granted an
exclusive license to a publisher, reserving a royalty from sublicenses. The publisher later
encumbered its assets with a floating lien. When the publisher went belly-up, the issue was
who was entitled to a large payment from a sublicensee. The lender argued that since the
author had not filed a financing statement, it was an unsecured creditor. The Court held,
however, that under Article 9-318(1)(a) the security interest was subject to "all the terms
of the contact between the account debtor and assignor," meaning that the security
interest only attached to publisher's right to net income after payment of the royalties.
Septembertide involved a security interest taken after the license. What if the licensee was
subject to a pre-existing floating lien? The same reasoning would seem applicable. The
first argument would be that since the licensed rights were transferred to the licensee
already net of royalties, the floating did not attach to the licensor's share. The second
argument would be that even if the floating lien did attach, at least as far as federal
information goes, a floating lien does not have priority unless it is recorded in the federal
filing offices with a specific description of the information, and obviously, such a recording
cannot take place until after the license is made. Prof. McDonnell argues that the
expanded definition of "account" in Revised Article 9-102(a)(2) is intended to reverse
Septembertide, requiring the author to file to perfect against the publisher, "[a] result
which might well surprise authors of the world." Coogan, supra n. 25, § 2B.07[5], at 2B-50.
187. This issue has arisen in a number of cases where a judicial creditor of a debtor
seeks to garnish payments owed by an account debtor to the debtor. There are two
situations to consider: garnishing creditor of a debtor versus secured creditor of the debtor:
and garnishing creditor of a debtor versus secured creditor of the account debtor. In the
first case, the garnishing creditor has priority in the account payments ahead of a debtor's
creditor who has failed to perfect against the debtor. Gen. Lithographing Co. v. Sight &
Sound Projector, Inc., 128 Ga. App. 304 (1973); Vittert Constr. & Inv. Co v. Wall Covering
Constr. Co., 473 S.W.2d 799 (Mo. App. 1971). In the second case, the garnishing creditor
has priority ahead of the account debtor's creditor who has failed to perfect against the
account debtor. Rocky Mountain Assoc. of Credit Mgt. v. Hessler Manuf. Co., 37 Colo.
App. 551, 533 (1976) (noting rule, but finding the creditor duly perfected); Welbourne
Dev. Co. v. Affiliated Clearance Corp., 472 P.2d 684 (Colo. App. 1970). An ominous
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Acknowledgement to the transferees for the royalties (which are not
accounts) would have been sufficient to perfect against the garnishing
judicial creditor. Under Revised 9, this approach is no longer
effective. Evidently, with the expanded definition of "debtor," and, as
discussed in the next section, the changes in the duration rules in
Revised 9-316, a lender must file against the transferor-debtor and
each new transferee-debtor as well, to ensure priority in the royalty
income against (garnishing) creditors of the transferor.
If an information transferee is now a "debtor," then under
Revised 9-301(a), a security interest must now be perfected where the
"debtor" is "located." Under Revised 9-307(c), a debtor is located in
a jurisdiction if it maintains a filing system for a security interest to
obtain priority over a lien creditor; otherwise the debtor is located in
the District of Columbia. The test applies both to domestic and
international debtors." Thus, it appears that a financier of royalties
under international information licenses must examine the laws of
each country where a licensee is located to determine whether it has a
filing system that meets Revised 9's "priority over a lien creditor"
test. Most do.
d. National Information Filing Requirements
Scores of countries require a local filing for nonpossessory
security interests to gain priority over creditors and insolvency
representatives. A leading source, Intellectual Property in the Global
Marketplace,'89 identifies the requirements in more than 20 countries
for security transfers in intellectual property. Many other sources
have long documented these systems, so we need only briefly review
them here.19°
decision, Stanley v. Fabricators, Inc. 459 P.2d 467 (Ala. 1969), held that a lessor's reserved
interest under a financing lease for personal property was superior to a garnishing creditor
of the sublessee but only because the garnishing creditor had knowledge of the security
interest, and the statute then required lien creditors to be without notice. Certainly, if any
judicial creditor can obtain priority by garnishment, then so could the bankruptcy trustee.
For further discussion of the international implications, see Spiro V. Bazinas, An Intl.
Legal Regime for Receivables Financing: UNCITRAL's Contribution, 8 Duke Intl. &
Comp. L. Annual 315, 345-353 (1998) (discussing proposed priority rules for international
receivables refinancing).
188. See U.C.C. § 9-310, cmt. 8 (Rev. 1998) "The Article applies the same choice-of-
law rules to all debtors, foreign and domestic.... This rule appears in Section 9-307."
189. Melvin Simensky, Lanning Bryer, Neil J. Wilkof, Intellectual Property in the
Global Marketplace (2nd ed. 1999) ["Global Intellectual Property"].
190. Sources include: Dennis Campbell, World Intellectual Property Rights and
Remedies (Oceana 2000) (country by country digest of patent, copyright and trademark
laws); Geller, supra n. 173 (copyright transfer requirements, including mortgages and
insolvency rules, discussed in § 4 for each country); McCarthy Trademark, supra n. 12, ch.
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The national information registers fall roughly into three classes.
The first class includes countries that require recording in a national
register for a security transfer to be valid. In these countries, an
improper or late filing invalidates the security transfer, even between
the parties. These include many Latin Countries, such as France,
Spain, Argentina, Colombia and Mexico, as discussed in the Notes
following the Chart below..
The second class involves countries in which an unfiled security
transfer is valid between the parties, but can been challenged by third
parties who take in good faith and without notice. Unfortunately,
there is scant indication in the treatises whether general creditors or
insolvency representatives are included in the protected class.
Whether such a law meets the "generally requires" test in Revised 9-
307(c) is anybody's guess.'91
Finally, some countries require security interests to be filed in
public registers other than the information systems. Most of the
British Commonwealth countries fit this mold. For example, the
United Kingdom requires every "charge," including a "mortgage," on
the goodwill or intellectual property of a company registered in
England or Wales to be filed with the Registrar of Companies in
London.' 9' "Intellectual property" includes any patent, trademark,
service mark, registered design, copyright or design right, including
any license under or in respect of such right.'93 Any such charge is
32; Morag MacDonald, Spyros Maniatis & Uma Suthersanen, Design and Copyright
Protection of Products (Street & Maxwell 2000); Lester Nelson, editor, Digest of
Intellectual Property Laws of the World, (Oceana 1998); Prof. Dr. Hendrick Vanhess,
editor, International Encyclopedia of Laws, Vol. 1, Intellectual Property (1997); Jerome
Gilson, Trademark Protection and Practice, ch. 10 (Lexis 2000). Copies of relevant laws
and treaties can be found in Paul Goldstein, International Legal Materials on Intellectual
Property (2000); UNESCO, Copyright Laws and Treaties of the World (Current through
1998); A. Leaffer, International Treaties on Intellectual Property (BNA 1997). A study that
will have new importance is J.H. Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on International Insolvency and
Bankruptcy (1986).
191. For an illustration of the problem, see Geller, supra n. 173, Spain § 4[2][d].
Spanish law provides what is in effect an evidentiary presumption of priority from a
recording in the copyright register. While this might seem not to meet the test in Revised
9, note that registration of a copyright under Section 410(c) of the Copyright Act is only
prima facie evidence of validity. Spanish law also prevents an author's rights from being
"attached."
192. Companies Act of 1985, ch. 6 § 396(1)(d); see Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone,
Halsubury's Laws of England, Co., 1299 (4th ed. Reissue 1998) ["Halsbury"]. For a copy
of the Companies Act, see Peter Allsop et al., Current Law Statutes Annotated (1985, vol.
1. pgs. 6 et seq.) ["Allsop"].
193. An enlarged definition of "intellectual property" was added by the Copyright,
Designs and Patent Act of 1988, § 303(1), ch. 7 para. 31(1) (1988). Halsbury, supra n. 192,
11299, n. 17. For a copy, see Allsop, supra n. 192,1988 vol. 4, at 48-306.
void against the liquidator or administrator (insolvency
representatives) or any creditor (including general creditors) unless
the prescribed particulars of the charge, together with the instruments
by which its is created, are received by the Registrar within 21 days of
its creation."' Company directors who fail to effect proper
registration are liable on conviction for severe fines.9 Nearly
identical requirements exist in Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong,
Singapore and Ireland.196 Canada has a system of provincial Personal
Property Security Acts modeled on Article 9, that could apply to
intangibles, as well as a federal system for recording interests in
intellectual property."
e. Filing Requirements for Information Chart
The following chart indicates filing requirements in various
countries. It is based on a brief review of the corresponding country
sections in Intellectual Property in the Global Marketplace and World
Intellectual Property Rights and Remedies. Several countries allow
different kinds of security transfers, such as a "pledge," "hypothec,"
"hipoteca," "mortgage," or "trust." If any of these require a filing, the
chart lists "required." The chart does not distinguish whether a filing
is necessary for validity against third parties or for mere effectiveness;
either one is listed as "required." It also does not indicate whether
security transfers in licenses are possible. The purpose of this chart is
not to provide definitive answers, but to indicate areas where further
investigation is prima facie warranted.
194. Companies Act § 395; Halsbury, supra n. 192, 1299; Allsop, supra n. 192, 1985
vol. 1 at 6-365.
195. Companies Act § 399; Halsbury, supra n. 192, 1309; Allsop, supra n. 192, 1985
vol. 1 Jt 6-369.
196. See Global Intellectual Property, supra n. 189, Australia § 31.3; New Zealand §
53.1; Hong Kong § 43.3; Singapore § 56.1; Ireland § 46.5(f). The Irish and Singapore acts
apply to licenses of patents and copyrights, although inexplicably trademark licenses are
not mentioned.
197. See Global Intellectual Property, supra n. 189, Canada.
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COUNTRY PATENT COPYRIGHT TRADEMARK
Argentina Required Required Required
Australia Required None Optional
Austria Required None Required
Belgium Required None Required
Brazil Required Some Required
Canada Required Required Required
Chile Required None None
China Required None Required
Colombia Required Required Required
Czech Republic Required None Required
Denmark Permissive None Permissive
Ecuador Required Required Required
Egypt Required None Required
Finland Required Required Required
France Required Some required Required
Germany Required None None
Hong Kong Required Required Required
Hungary Required None Required
India Required None None
Indonesia Required Required Required
Ireland Required Required Required
Israel Required Required Required
Italy Required None Required
Japan Required Required Required
Korea Required Required Required
Mexico Required Required Required
The Netherlands Required None None
Norway Required None Required
New Zealand Required Required Required
Peru Required None Required
Russia Required None Required
Singapore Required Required Required
South Africa Required Required Required
Spain Required Required Required
Sweden Required None Required
Switzerland Required None Required
Taiwan Required None Required
Thailand Required None Required
United Kingdom Required Required Required
Venezuela Required Required Required
Chart of Filing Requirements198
198. The following comments are derived from the corresponding country section in
Global Intellectual Property:
Argentina: Under the Argentine registered pledge procedure, a nonpossessory pledge of
information must be filed in appropriate patent, copyright and trademark registers or it is
void against creditors, including in bankruptcy.
Australia: Follows U.K. practice.
Brazil: Special recording requirements exist for computer programs. See Geller, supra n.
173, Brazil § 4[2][d].
Canada: Dual federal and provincial filing may be required.
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Chile: Chilean law is inadequate for pledges of copyrights or trademarks, but may be
amended by allowing national registration.
Colombia: To prevail against "third parties" a "pledge without dispossession" of a patent
or trademark must be recorded the with Superintendency of Industry and Trade, and of a
copyright in the Office of the General Director of Author's Rights.
Denmark: Filing in the information registers is permissive and confers no legal benefits.
However, a secured creditor can record at the court in Aarhus for priority against later
transferees, for a fee of 1.5% of the total value of the transfer. World Intellectual
Property, Denmark § C.ii.e, says that in Denmark that copyrights are not subject to
execution.
Ecuador: Information security interests must be recorded in the National Bureau of
Industrial Property or Copyright Office Of the Minister of Education to be valid.
Finland: All "floating charges" on intellectual property must be registered in appropriate
title registry for validity. Patent and trademark pledges must be registered on patent or
trademark registers or they are invalid against third parties, including the bankruptcy
trustee. The author believes copyright pledges are also invalid absent registration in the
pledge registry.
France: To be valid, pledges of patents must be recorded in the National Patent Register;
of trademarks in the National Trademark Register; and of industrial designs in the
National Register of Designs and Models. Security transfers for audiovisual works must be
filed in the National Center of Cinema to have validity against third parties. Geller, supra
n. 173, France § 4[3][a][i]. A "pledge without loss of possession" that operates as a
"floating lien" over the debtor's business must be filed in the registry office of the local
commercial court of the debtor's place of business within 15 days of the date the pledge ,is
signed or it is invalid.
Germany: Germany 'distinguishes a pledge from a sicherungsUbereingung (chattel
mortgage). A pledge of information does not extend to royalties; a separate pledge of the
royalties is required. A patent sicherungsiibereingung must be recorded in the Patent
Office. Copyrights may not be transferred for security, but licenses may with the licensor's
consent. No filing is required.
Hong Kong: Follows U.K. practices.
Hungary: Patents and trademarks must be'recorded for priority against a "buyer in good
faith," including a mortgagee.
Ireland: Follows U.K. practices.
Israel: To be effective against a third party, patent security interest must be registered on
Patents Register within 21 days after the security interest was granted; trademark and
copyright security interests must be registered in local districts under Pledges Law.
Italy: Patent and trademark security interests must by filed in respective registers. The
author questions whether a pledge of copyrights is even possible. In any case, foreclosure
only gives a right to royalties, not to use.
Japan: In Japan, a "pledge" operates more like a mortgage or security interest. It must be
registered in the patent and copyright registers for the creditor to "claim rights against
third parties." The cost is 4% of the amount of the credit covered by the pledge for filing
in each register. The high price makes security interests in information rare in Japan.
Intellectual Property in the Global Marketplace asserts that trademark filings are also
required. World Intellectual Property Rights and Remedies, Japan, § D.i.d. p. 22, however,
claims that the requirement of registering trademarks in the Patent Office was abolished
in 1996.
Korea: In Korea, the Korean Industrial Property Office must approve a pledge on
intellectual property before it can be filed.
Mexico: The law is uncertain on whether security interests in information are possible. If
so, the pledge law requires that pledges be registered in the "appropriate registry for the
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As this brief survey indicates, nearly every country requires a
filing for a patent security interest. This requirement has been
formalized in the recent Patent Law Treaty, which requires all
signatory countries to allow filing "security interests" in their national
patent registers.' 9 The United States has signed the treaty and it will
be submitted for Senate approval in 2001. Many countries also
require a filing for trademark security transfers due to the Trademark
Law Treaty, to which the U.S. has adhered."' Most countries make
title" to be valid. That would be either the Commercial Public Register, for commercial
loans in general, or more probably the specific Patent and Trademark Registry and
Copyright Registry.
New Zealand: Follows U.K. practices.
Russia: Russian pledge law is largely untested. However, pledge law does require
recording to establish priority over creditors.
Singapore: Follows U.K. practices.
South Africa: Security interests must be filed in the Patent office and Trademark Office to
get priority over creditors. A judgment creditor reaches a patent by recording the warrant
of execution or attachment in the register. Cinematographic films must be filed in a special
office for such purpose. Otherwise security transfers of copyrights apparently are
perfected by use of a Notarial Bond registered with Register of Deeds in the Deeds Office
Spain: Spanish law provides that "[t]he lack of registration of the mortgage or pledge in
the Register will deprive the creditor of the rights granted by this law." The law
specifically requires fling patent and trademark in the appropriate Spanish information
registers. Spanish law does not require an author's interest in a copyright to be "attached."
See Geller, supra n. 173, Spain § 4[3][d].
Sweden: Patent and trademark "pledges" (security transfers) must be filed in the
appropriate office for validity. Since there is no filing office for copyrights, the author
questions whether a copyright pledge is possible under Swedish law.
Taiwan:. With the abolishment of recording provisions, a copyright pledge is no longer
feasible.
United Kingdom: Security transfers of information must be registered under Companies
Act or they are void against liquidators and creditors. Patent and trademark mortgages
must be registered in the applicable patent and trademark registers.
Venezuela: A chattel mortgage without change of possession must be registered in the
Subalternate Registery Office for validity.
199. The Treaty was approved at the WIPO Diplomatic Conference in Geneva in
June, 2000. For the text of the Treaty, see the WIPO Web site, http://www.wipo.int/
treaties/ip/plt/treaty.html (visited.Dec 22, 2000). Note in particular Article 14 (registration
of security interests). To the extent federal law does not expressly preempt Revised 9 and
require all security interests be filed in the PTO, U.S. law will be incompatible with the
requirements of the Patent Law Treaty.
200. See McCarthy Trademark, supra n. 12, ch. 32. For the text of the Treaty, see the
WIPO Web site http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ip/trademark-law/articles.html#11 (visited
Dec 22, 2000). One may well ask whether Revised 9, allowing security transfers - and on
foreclosure ownership transfers - of trademarks to be effective without filing in the PTO
now puts the U.S. out of compliance with the Trademark Law Treaty. See Article 11(1)(a)
(required procedures for recording change of ownership in national trademark office), and
Article 11(4) (prohibiting filing requirements other than those in the treaty). Are these
consistent with the rules for transferring ownership of a trademark by filing a security
interest and conducting a foreclosure sale under state law? Arguably not.
375
information transfers void against any creditor, which would certainly
include lien creditors, unless filed in a local register.
So a filing in most countries will be required under Revised 9-
307(c) for information collateral. This will be expensive. Typically,
security transfers of a patent or a trademark cannot be filed unless the
patent or trademark is first registered. Extensive paperwork may also
be required. Speaking from experience, for cinematographic works
France requires filing the entire chain of title, including all contracts
for writers, directors and composers, each of which must be translated
into French by a certified translator whose translation must be
notarized, authenticated and consularized. Many countries also
charge high filing fees, such as in Japan, which charges 4% of the loan
amount for each register. Finally, one can politely say that in practice
the registers in many countries do not always operate with the
transparency indicated by the treatises.
f. The Reason for the Change
Why did Revised 9 adopt such a complex system? According to
Official Comment No. 8 to Revised 9-301, the former system of
notification financing was eliminated because it had "proved
unsatisfactory." There is no indication of to whom it proved
unsatisfactory, nor any examples of unsatisfactory results. Elsewhere,
some of the Drafters say that some financiers of international
accounts preferred non-notification financing because they found it
burdensome to give notice to each account debtor. 1 This would
certainly justify allowing an alternative procedure for traditional
accounts, while still allowing those parties that relied on notification
financing for non-account intangibles, such as intellectual property
royalties, to continue their practice. It hardly justifies eliminating
notification financing altogether.
In fact, it seems the Drafters had something else in mind. During
the floor debates on Revised Article 9, it was represented that a study
had found that, except for Canada, no other country used a filing
system like Revised 9 for nonpossessory personal property security
interests. Thus, the adoption of the location of the debtor rule in
Revised 9-307(c) was intended as something of a slight of hand. The
expectation was that, outside of Canada, international debtors would
be "located" in the District of Columbia."2 Filing in the District would
then become a convenient method for trumping the U.S. bankruptcy
201. See Cohen & Smith, supra n. 103, at 1198-1199.
202. See Cohen & Smith, supra n. 103, at n. 41.
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trustee in international financing transactions. When intellectual
property practitioners pointed out the scores of recording systems
around the world, the Drafters declined to make changes.
Many countries do maintain personal property filing systems.
Most Latin countries have pledge laws that may well require local
filing for nonpossessory personal property security interests. The
Commonwealth countries require filing under their Company Acts.
Whether these systems do, or will meet the "against a lien creditor"
test in Revised 9 will demand careful, case by case analysis. For those
that do, what Revised 9 has really done is internationalize the U.S.
bankruptcy trustee. Under Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code,
the trustee is given the power of any involuntary creditor under any
applicable non-bankruptcy law to avoid secret liens.2 3 For debtors
outside the United States, the trustee should have the avoidance
powers under the laws of the debtor's country. Lenders who believe
they can perfect a security interest in information against debtors
outside the U.S. by filing in the District may be disappointed.
g. More Filing Confusion
So far we have been looking at royalties remitted from
international licensees to a U.S. borrower. What happens if a
borrower located in another country wants to grant intellectual
property rights to a licensee in the U.S., and a U.S. based lender
would now like to perfect a security interest against the borrower? As
Official Comment No. 3 to Revised 9-307 tells us, "[u]nder the
general rules of this section, a non-U.S. debtor normally would be
located in a foreign jurisdiction and, as a consequence, foreign law
would govern perfection.
214
Depending on the type of intellectual property involved, in many
other countries there are filing systems. This means that, at least as
far as Revised 9 goes, a lender perfects a security interest in a patent,
trademark or copyright to be exploited in the United States against
an owner-debtor "located" in another country by recording - in the
other country. The filing systems in the Copyright Office and Patent
& Trademark Office are, absent federal preemption, displaced as
sources of public information about intellectual property interests in
this country. It seems bizarre to provide that one perfects a security
interest in a copyright, patent or trademark owned by a Japanese
203. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.F.
204. Licensees in other countries have been known to take umbrage at being called
"foreign." In their country, they are not "foreign." Americans are. We will therefore use
the preferred designation of "international" licensees.
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debtor but exploited in the United States in Tokyo rather than
Washington, D.C. Yet, absent federal preemption, Revised 9 so
provides.
Some countries prohibit security interests from attaching to
certain intellectual property rights. For example, Spain has a filing
system for copyrights, but by law prohibits a security interest from
attaching to an author's rights; it may only attach, if at all, to
royalties.05 Italy has a similar rule.2' Revised 9-301(1) says that one
looks to the law of the country where the debtor is located to
determine questions of perfection and priority. It does not mention
attachment. Can one argue that since the security interest could not
even attach under Spanish law, it certainly could not be perfected
under such law? Or would the security interest attach for purposes of
U.S. law but merely be unperfected - and unperfectable - because
there is no place in Spain to file such an unattachable security
interest? Revised 9 has no answer.
Revised 9 comes to this impasse because it ignores the national
policies for intellectual property that have long been set by Congress.
For several decades, the U.S. Government has been engaged in an
extraordinary effort to secure harmonization and improvement of
intellectual property protection worldwide. The result has been a
complex web of international obligations that bind the United States
as a single nation .2 ' The basic conflicts rule in the information treaties
is the territorial principle: the law of the protecting country
determines the scope of protection. 8 Questions of priority of
transfers are matters for the law of the protecting country under this
principle.2 9 Revised 9-307(c) instead resorts to a conflicts rule based
205. See Geller, supra n. 173, at Spain § 4[3][d].
206. See Getler, supra n. 173, at Italy § 4[3][e].
207. For discussion see Geller, supra n. 173, Introduction § 3[3]; Nimmer & Nimmer,
supra n. 47, ch. 18, World Trade; Lorin Brennan, The Copyright Wars: The WIPO Treaties
and the New Information Economy, 2 PLI Fourth Annual Institute for Intellectual
Property Law 623 (1998) on-line at Carol A. Kunze, A Guide to the Proposed Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act <http://www.2bguide.com/>; also Andrd Lucas,
Intellectual Property and Global Information Infrastructure, 32 Unesco Copyright Bulletin
3 (1998).
208. For example, Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, Paris Act, provides: "The
enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any formality; such
enjoyment and such exercise shall be independent of the existence of protection in the
country of origin of the work. Consequently... the extent of protection, as well as the
means of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively
by the laws of the country where protection is claimed." (emphasis added).
209. See Geller, supra n. 173, Introduction § 6[3][c], at INT-248 ("Professor Ulmer
concludes that each protecting country is free to fashion a rule of priority for transfers of
rights effective within the national territory in accordance with its perceptions of interests
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on the "law of the country where the debtor is located," a rule akin to
the widely discredited "country of origin" principle where intellectual
property is concerned. 210 The appropriate conflicts rule is that national
law in the United States, i.e., federal intellectual property law with its
requirement of a federal filing, should determine priority of security
interests in federal information in the U.S., regardless of the
nationality or "location" or the owner-debtor.
Revised 9-302(3)(a) does say that a state filing is not necessary
for property subject to a "treaty of the United States... which
specifies a place of filing different from that specified in this Article
for filing of the security interest.". Would the conflict rules in the
international treaties that adopt the territorial principle meet this
test? They do not specify "a place of filing" per se but do specify the
in regulating copyright commerce within that territory. Jurisdictions such as the United
States might and do choose to maintain systems of recordation because their territories
are so large, and copyright commerce so multifarious within national borders, that
recordation rather than common knowledge within' the local trade will best protect third
parties acquiring rights.").
210. For a thorough vetting of the "country-of-origin" principle as an erroneous
copyright-conflicts rule see Geller, supra n. 173, Introduction § 4[2][a][ii] (approach
"disfavored"). It has been widely rejected in U.S. practice in favor of the territoriality
principle embodied in the international conventions. See e.g. Twin Books v. The Walt
Disney Co., 83 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that since U.S. copyright law does not
have extra-territorial effect, publication of Bambi, A Life in the Woods in Germany
without requisite U.S. copyright notice did not inject work into public domain in U.S.);
Subafilms Ltd., 24 F.3d at 1095; Geller, supra, n. 173; Introduction § 3[1][a][i]; Nimmer &
Nimmer §. 17.02. Twin Books follows the earlier decisions in Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S.
424 (1912) (1909 Copyright Act) and United Dictionary Co. v. G & C. Merriam Co., 208
U.S. 260 (1908) (1870 Act). Unfortunately, two recent decisions, Radio Television
Espanola S.A. v. New World Ent. 183 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 1999) and Itar-Tass Russian v.
Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82 (2nd Cir. 1998) have confused the issue. Radio Television
decided that the U.S. Copyright Act determined whether a writing was required for
transfer of copyright interest in Spain because the works were "of U.S. origin," a plainly
spurious result. Itar-Tass believed that the question of copyright ownership necessary to
determine standing in the protecting country (the U.S.) should be determined by the law
of the country of brigin (Russia), a result criticized as a "detour and a frolic," and rightly
so. Geller, supra n. 173, Introduction' § 3[1][a][i], n. 11 & § 4[2][a][ii] (discussing
appropriate conflicts rules under international conventions). See also Paul Edward Geller,
Overcoming Insularity: Lessons from New British Books for Intl. Intellectual Property, 46
Journal of the Copyright Society 615, 625 (1999), using Itar-Tass as illustration of
analytical error of ignoring treaty requirements in determining choice-of-law rules. But see
Cohen & Smith, supra n. 103, at 1224-1226, acknowledging that a court may decline to
apply the law of another state that violates a fundamental public policy of the forum state.
The authors find it regrettable that a court in another country might on this basis decline
to recognize the anti-assignment rules in Revised 9 where the license agreement is
governed by the law of another country. They do not consider the case where the
informational property interest is governed by the law of another state, despite the lex
contractus. In any case, the territorial principle is a broader conflicts principle than the
odre public exception.
law that determines the place of filing. Application of such a rule to
the United States would seem to require looking to U.S. national law,
which would direct one to the federal filing offices for federal
information. Again, this is an open question for the courts to decide.
h. The Conflicts Analysis
Secured creditors seeking to loan against intellectual property
interests with an international component might consider the
following check-list:
For loaning against a debtor in the United States receiving
royalties from other countries:
Step 1: Identify the type of information involved, e.g. copyright,
patent or trademark.
Step 2: Determine whether each transferee has an "interest"
sufficient to be a "debtor."
Step 3: Identify the country where each transferee is located
under Revised 9-307(b). Examine its laws to see if it has a filing
system for the information identified under Step 1. If so, determine
whether it requires a filing to perfect a security interest in the
information against a creditor, including a "lien creditor." It probably
does, but obtaining an opinion from local counsel is advisable. If it
does not, examine the international conventions (e.g. WIPO
Copyright Treaty, Patent Law Treaty, Trademark Law Treaty) and
U.S. bilateral treaties to determine whether they have such a filing
requirement. If not, examine U.S. conflicts law to determine whether
federal law may preempt Revised 9 anyway and direct that the law of
such country determine perfection requirements. "
Step 4: Determine whether the territory includes countries other
than those identified under Step 3, e.g. the transfer has granted a
British company rights throughout Europe. If so, examine the
conflicts law of the country identified in Step 3 to see if it requires
reference to each country in the licensed territory to perfect, and, if
so, repeat Steps 1 through 3 for each one.2
Step 5: Repeat Steps 1 through 4 for each country for which a
transfer will be financed.
Step 6: After determining where to file, undertake the steps
necessary to do so. This could require translating the entire chain of
title into the local language, with the translation notarized,
211. See supra n. 173 and accompanying cases.
212. See Geller, supra n. 173, Introduction, § 6[1][b] (choice of law rules for acts
outside forum country).
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authenticated and counsularized. It may also require insuring that the
underlying work, invention or mark has already been registered. Be
prepared for significant fees.
For loaning against information in the United States with a
debtor in another country:
Step: Identify the type of information involved, e.g. copyright,
patent or trademark.
Step2: Determine where the borrower is located under Revised
9-307(b).
Step3: Examine the laws of this country to see if it has a filing
system for the information identified under Step 1. If so, determine
whether it requires a filing to perfect a "lien creditor." If it does not,
examine the applicable treaties to determine whether they have filing
rules. Then examine U.S. information law to determine whether it
would preempt Revised 9 and require filing in an appropriate federal
information office. Note the different court decisions for copyrights,
patents and trademarks . 3
Step_4: After determining where to file, undertake the steps
necessary to do so. This will mean searching a registry in another
country, often in another language, to determine priority. Undertake
the steps necessary to file, including translating, notarizing,
authenticating and counsularizing documents in the chain of title as
required, along with, registering the underlying work, invention or
mark.
If all this is too much, simply transfer the information to a debtor
located in another country and finance the transaction under its law.
F. R 9-316(a): Duration Rules
1. Original Article 9
How long does a perfected security interest remain perfected?
Where the collateral is information, original Article 9 addresses that
question in two sections.
Original 9-103(3)
(e) A security interest perfected under the law of the location of the
debtor is perfected until the expiration of four months after a
change of the debtor's location to another jurisdiction, or until
perfection would have ceased by the law of the first jurisdiction,
whichever period occurs first. Unless perfected in the new
jurisdiction before the end of that period, it becomes unperfected
thereafter and is deemed to have been unperfected as against a
213. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.G.
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person who becomes a purchaser after the change.
Original 9-302
(4) Compliance with a statute or treaty described in subsection (3)
is equivalent to the filing of a financing statement under this
Article, and a security interest in property subject to the statute or
treaty can be perfected only by compliance therewith except as
provided in Section 9-103 on multiple state transactions. Duration
and renewal of perfection of a security interest perfected in
compliance with the statute or treaty are governed by the
provisions of the statute of treaty; in other respects the security
interest is subject to this Article.
Under original 9-302(4), for copyrights, certainly, patents,
probably, and trademarks,, arguably, filing in the appropriate federal
office is the proper place to perfect. Once filed there a security
interest remains perfected because federal law does not provide for
lapse. This result should also apply to information interests outside
the U.S., since under national filing laws information security interest.
typically need not be refiled against transferees. 
214
2. Revised Article 9
Revised 9 takes a different approach, providing that a perfected
information security interest endures for no more than one year
unless refiled against each transferee. The relevant sections provide:
Revised 9-311:
(b) Compliance with the requirements of a statute, regulation, or
treaty described in subdivision (a) for obtaining priority over the
rights of a lien creditor is equivalent to the filing of a financing
statement under this division.... [A] security interest in property
subject to a statute, regulation, or treaty described in subdivision
(a) may be perfected only by compliance with those requirements,
and a . security interest so perfected remains perfected
notwithstanding a change in the use or transfer of possession of the
collateral.
Revised 9-316
(a) A security interest perfected pursuant to the law of the
jurisdiction designated in Section 9-301(1) ... remains, perfected
until the earliest of any of the following:
(1) The time perfection would have ceased under the law of
that jurisdiction;
(2) The expiration of' four months after a change of the
debtor's location to another jurisdiction;
(3) The expiration of one year after a transfer of collateral to a
person that thereby becomes a debtor and is located in another
jurisdiction.
214. Under original Article 9-306(2) a security interest continues notwithstanding
disposition of the collateral, unless the secured creditor consents to a release.
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(b) If a security interest described in subdivision (a) becomes
perfected under the law of the other jurisdiction before the earliest
time or event described in that subdivision, it remains perfected
thereafter. If the security interest does not become perfected under
the law of the other jurisdiction before the earliest time or event, it
becomes unperfected and is deemed never to have been perfected
as against a purchaser of the collateral for value.
These provisions change the duration rules significantly.
3. Detailed Analysis:
a. The Conflicts Issue
Buried in the duration rules are two distinct issues. The first is a
choice of law question: which law determines duration of a security
interest? The second is a timing issue: how long does a perfected
security interest endure under that law? Let us begin with the
conflicts issue. The operative language in the original and revised
statutes says (emphasis added):
Original 9-302(4)
Duration and renewal of perfection of a security interest perfected
in compliance with the statute or treaty are governed by the
provisions of the statute of treaty.
Revised 9-311(b)
[A] security interest in property subject to a statute, regulation, or
treaty described in subdivision (a) may be perfected only by
compliance with those requirements, and a security interest so
perfected remains perfected notwithstanding a change in the use or
transfer of possession of the collateral.
Under original Article 9-302, where a statute or treaty governed
perfection, it also governed all questions of duration and renewal. For
federal information interests within the United States, this meant that
the federal statutes did (or should) govern duration. For information
interests outside the United States, the local law of each protecting
country would govern duration because the international conventions
contain conflicts rules that refer to local law.15
Revised Article 9 changes both rules. For federal information
interests within the United States, Revised 9-311(b) only defers to a
federal statute that requires a filing for perfection against a lien
creditor. The federal information statutes cover bona fide purchasers,
not lien creditors, so Revised 9-311(b) is inapplicable to them. Absent
federal preemption, the law determining duration for U.S.
information licenses is Revised 9-316.
215. See supra n. 173 and accompanying text.
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For information interests outside the United States, the laws of
many countries require local filing to perfect against all creditors,
including lien creditors, so Revised 9-311(b) is facially applicable.
Revised 9-311(b) treats perfection differently from duration. Under
the first clause, perfection occurs by compliance with local national
law. Under the second clause, however, the duration of that
perfection only continues "notwithstanding a change in the use or
transfer of possession of the collateral." Neither an assignment nor a
license constitutes a "change in use;" they are transfers. Nor are they
a "transfer of possession" because intangible interests are incapable
of physical possession. Certainly, the local law of each protecting
country will determine the duration of an information security
interest against creditors in that country. For U.S. information
licensors, however, the real issue comes when the royalties are
remitted to the United States. A creditor lending against such
royalties wants to ensure priority over creditors of the U.S. licensor
when the royalties come home, and at that point Revised 9 would
apply. Since Revised 9-311(b) is inapplicable, Revised 9 will not look
to the law of the country where the royalties arose to test duration,
but instead use the rules in Revised 9-316. This result appears
intentional. Revised 9-311(b) refers to "transfer of possession of the
collateral," while Revised 9-316(a)(3) refers to "transfer of
collateral." Since Revised 9-311(b) is an exception to the application
of the duration rules in Revised 9, it evidently is drafted narrowly; the
rule in Revised 9-316(a)(3), since it applies within Revised 9, is
drafted broadly.
b. The Duration Rules
Now let us examine the duration rule. Compare again the
operative language (emphasis added):
Original 9-103(3)
(e) A security interest perfected under the law of the location of the
debtor is perfected until the expiration of four months after a
change of the debtor's location...
Revised 9-316
(a) A security interest perfected pursuant to the law of the
jurisdiction designated in Section 9-301(1) ... remains perfected
until the earliest of...:
(3) The expiration of one year after a transfer of collateral to a
person that thereby becomes a debtor and is located in another
'jurisdiction.
Under original Article 9-103(3), a security interest perfected
against a "debtor" remains perfected until a change in the location of
[23:313
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a "debtor." Since a transferee is not a "debtor" under original Article
9, a security interest perfected against a transferor would remain
perfected against a transferee under original Article 9-306(2) unless
the secured creditor consented to the transfer free of the security
interest.
Revised 9-316(a)(3) changes this result by adding a new rule that
a secured creditor must perfect within one year after "transfer of
collateral to a person that thereby becomes a debtor and is located in
another jurisdiction." "Collateral" certainly includes interests under
information licenses, and a "debtor" now includes transferees of
information. If the transferee is located in "another jurisdiction" than
that of the transferor-debtor, the secured creditor must perfect
against that transferee in its jurisdiction within one year of making
the transfer. If not, then under Revised 9-316(b), the security interest
is prospectively unperfected against all parties and retroactively
against any "purchaser of the collateral for value."
An initial question is what security interest becomes
unperfected? Recall that in information financing one security
interest can cover four items of collateral: the debtor-transferor's
rights; the debtor-transferor's royalty receipts; the transferee's rights;
and the transferee's royalty obligation: Since the lender in theory only
has one security interest, is it unperfected again all items of collateral
or only some? If only some, which ones? It certainly would appear to
be unperfected against the information interest conveyed to the
transferee and by the same token the royalty payment obligation of
the transferee. The problem is that Revised 9-316 seems to
contemplate transfer of a single item of indivisible collateral that can
only be in one place at a time, as opposed to divisible information
collateral. Again the courts will need to sort out these matters.
Prospective unperfection will certainly be a concern for lenders
to information owners who engage in customary transfers to exploit
their information. Such a lender typically wants to ensure it is
perfected in the information rights granted to the transferees as well
as the royalties payable from the exploitation of those rights. Under
Revised 9-316(b), such lenders must now ensure that every time the
information owner makes a transfer to a transferee in another
jurisdiction, the lender files against that transferee in that jurisdiction
within one year. If not, the lender could become prospectively
unperfected against any secured creditor of the transferee taking after
one year from the making of the transfer. Since Revised 9 prohibits
any restrictions on a transferee granting a security interest in its
rights, such a secured creditor could arise at any time. Moreover,
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since Revised 9 tries to categorize a transferor's reserved rights as a
security interest, the same filing burdens will apply to a transferor
trying to protect its right to collect royalties.
For information transfers outside the United States, the results
will also be severe. A transferee in another country will qualify as a
"person that becomes a debtor." Revised 9-316(b) is then explicit that
the secirity interest must be perfected "under the law of the other
jurisdiction," - i.e., the law of the country where the transferee is
located. Most countries have filing requirements for perfection
against a local licensee.26
Retroactive unperfection will be the real heartburn. It applies to
"purchasers for value," which includes buyers and secured creditors,
but not donees and lien creditors."7 This means if a transferor, or the
transferor's lender, fails to file within the one-year period, they will
becomes unperfected retroactively against any floating lienor of a
transferee who filed after they did.21
Then looms the bankruptcy trustee. As discussed in the
companion article, it is inaccurate to say that the trustee is merely a
lien creditor; the correct rule is that the trustee has the lien avoidance
power of any involuntary creditor under applicable non-bankruptcy
law, so that the U.S. federal information acts should be treated as
giving the trustee the avoidance powers of a bona fide purchaser.219
For information transfers outside the United States, most countries
provide that unfiled information security transfers are avoidable even
by general creditors, so the trustee must have that power as well.2
What this means to the lender of an information owner is significant.
If each transferee is now a debtor, the right to collect the royalties
payable by such a debtor must be perfected by filing in each country
where the debtor-transferee is located to gain priority against the
trustee. Filing merely against the transferor in the U.S. will not do,
since the trustee has at least three different grounds for seizing the
royalties from abroad before they ever reach the U.S. transferor in
case of that transferor's bankruptcy. The first is the plain language of
216. See supra n. 189.
217. U.C.C. § 9-316, cmt. 3 (Rev. 1998).
218. If the licensee is subject to a floating lien filed before the licensor's lender filed,
then R 9-322(a)'s first to file or perfect rule, the floating lien would have priority anyway,
absent, of course, any federal preemption.
219. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.F.1.
220. Another issue is how Revised 9 will work in case of transnational bankruptcies in
multiple countries. Recently, Congress proposed legislation to co-ordinate these matters, a
matter beyond the scope of this article. See In re Maxwell Comm. Corp., 93 F.3d 1036 (2nd
Cir. 1996) (discussing comity in transnational bankruptcies).
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Revised 9 that a transferee is a "debtor" and a security interest must
be perfected against a "debtor." The second is to claim that the
trustee is a garnishing creditor who must be deemed to have
perfected an appropriate lien on the royalty payments in each country
where a transferee is located. Such a garnishing creditor is now
superior to the lender who has failed to perfect against the garnished
transferee-debtor-account debtor. The third is to claim that under the
international intellectual property conventions the transferor-debtor
is located in each country with regard to its residual intellectual
property interest, including the right to royalties, and that the trustee
must be deemed to have perfected a claim against the debtor in each
country as to that interest.
c. Questionable Justifications
One of the Drafters of Revised 9 describes the reasoning behind
Revised 9-316 as follows:
221
Section 9-316 provides (in part) that when a debtor transfers the
"collateral" to a person "located" in another state, a security
interest perfected by the filing of a UCC financing statement in the
debtor's state becomes unperfected if the secured party does not
file a UCC financing statement in the second state within one year.
See R. 9-316(a)(3). Some concern has been expressed that a secured
party in a transaction would file a financing statement against 'an
owner of intellectual property in the state of the debtor's
location.... The owner of the intellectual property would then
enter into an exclusive license with a licensee in another state, and
concern was expressed that the license would trigger this rule as
involving the transfer of the copyright itself. If that were correct,
th6 secured paty would have to file a UCC financing statement in
the new state within one year for every license.. Some
intellectual property lawyers have expressed concern that, as a
matter of copyright law, under the Copyright Act, the grant of an
exclusive license transfers a "property" right to'the licensee.
Nimmer on Copyright analyzes the Copyright Act in a manner
, consistent with the Article 9 analysis. See 3 Melville B. Nimmer &
David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright §. 10.02[C][2] & n.51 (1999)
(commenting "there is never more than a single copyright in a work
notwithstanding the author's exclusive license of certain rights";
"an exclusive licensee owns 'separately' only 'the exclusive rights
comprised in the copyright' that are the subject of his license";
''particular 'exclusive rights under a copyright' do not in themselves
constitute a 'copyright"'; and "there is but one copyright in a work
regardless of whether and how many exclusive licenses of particular
rights thereunder have been granted.") Thus, for Article 9
purposes, the licensee's property interest is in it rights under the
license, not in the copyright itself. Nimmer makes clear that the
221. Weise, supra n. 32, at 1079-1080, n. 6.
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licensor remains the "owner of the copyright" and has not
transferred its property interest by entering into the license.
Accordingly, Revised Article 9 produces the same result as
copyright law - no filing is necessary by the secured party of the
licensor against the exclusive licensee because the copyright itself
has not been transferred to that person.
This reasoning, however, misses the mark for copyrights and fails
to consider the effect of Revised 9-316 on patents, trademarks, or
licenses outside the United States.
With regard to copyrights, as far as I am aware, no one ever
claimed an exclusive copyright license transferred the entire
copyright. The concerns with Revised 9-316(a)(3) come from the
definition of "collateral" and "debtor." Under the Copyright Act, a
divisible copyright interest under an exclusive license is a copyright
"ownership" interest.222 The question is whether a security interest
filed against the entire copyright endures against a divisible part
exclusively licensed in another jurisdiction. If a creditor has a
perfected security interest against three trucks in one jurisdiction, and
the debtor transfers one of them to a buyer not in the ordinary course
in another jurisdiction, must the creditor refile against the one moved
truck? It certainly seems So.223 Nothing in Revised 9-316(a)(3) says the
entire collateral must be transferred. Revised 9-316(a)(3) requires
refiling in the jurisdiction where the transferee-debtor is located if the
secured creditor wants to maintain its perfected position in the interest
transferred.
The assertion that "Nimmer makes clear that the licensor
remains the 'owner of the copyright' and has not transferred its
property interest by entering into the license" misreads Nimmer.
Although there is only one copyright, with the elimination of the
indivisibility doctrine, any of the exclusive rights comprised in a
copyright may be transferred and owned separately.12 This means
that a copyright owner has definitely transferred a property interest
when making an exclusive license or a partial assignment, not the
whole copyright, but a divisible part. To see the limitations in the
quoted analysis, assume a party has obtained an exclusive license to
broadcast a motion picture by means of free television in the United
States. This is certainly less than the entire copyright. The party now
grants a security interest in its rights under the exclusive license, and
222. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of ownership), § 201(d)(2) (divisibility of ownership
interests) (1994).
223. Gilmore, supra n. 4, § 10.10, at 328; see also Clark, supra n. 96, 9.04 (discussing
need to refile when certain collateral is moved to new jurisdiction).
224. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (1994).
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then proceeds to grant exclusive broadcast licenses to local television
stations around the country. This is just what the debtor did in
Peregrine. Is a security interest perfected against the exclusive license
also perfected against the sublicenses to the local television stations
under Revised 9-316(a)(3)? The quoted analysis is inapplicable here
because the collateral is not the copyright but a divisible ownership
interest.
The quoted analysis is also inadequate when dealing with
interests outside the United States. Nimmer is quite correct that there
is only one U.S. copyright. But there is also a separate national
copyright in each protecting country where the copyright is
recognized. Filing in the U.S. does not cover them. Assume a debtor
grants a lender a security interest its "worldwide copyright," i.e., in
each national copyright in every country where the work is protected.
Although most countries will recognize the effectiveness of the
transfer,225 their local law will determine its priority against other
transferees within their territory. This means that filing against the
copyright in the United States has no effect on the copyright in any
other country.
Finally, the analysis does not address what happens under the
Patent Act or the Lanham Act. Unlike the Copyright Act, the Patent
Act provides for recording of assignments and grants (partial
assignments), not licenses. The "single copyright reasoning" in the
quoted text is inapplicable to patent licenses. Apparently, for patent
licenses, a secured creditor must refile in each state where its debtor
makes a license in order to preserve its perfected status against each
licensee. The Lanham Act raises another problem. Since the courts
have held (erroneously) that a security interest in federal trademark
is perfected only under state law, Revised 9-316 would apply without
resort to any federal preemption argument. A lender to the owner of
a federal trademark would apparently need to refile against each
transferee in a new jurisdiction.
For a U.S. trademark, there could be a small escape hatch.
Revised 9-316(b) refers to the law of the jurisdiction where the
transferee is located. If that jurisdiction has adopted Revised Article
9, then under Revised 9-307(c) that new "debtor" could be "located"
in the District of Columbia with a new filing required under the
225. See Geller, supra n. 173, Introduction § 6[3][c], esp. INT-249, (discussing conflicts
issues involved in grant of a "worldwide" copyright interest. For example, in Germany a
copyright cannot be assigned for security or otherwise, although the security instrument
may be interpreted as an assignment of a right to royalties.); see also Geller, supra n. 173,
Germany § 6.
District's version of Revised 9, if adopted. Since all filings are now in
the same jurisdiction, would the original filing against the debtor-
transferor be enough, or must the creditor make a new filing naming
the new debtor-transferee? Revised 9 has no answer. In any case, it is
bewildering why Revised 9 would make the local UCC filing office, in
the District the national repository for information security interests
when the more experienced, better equipped and -higher funded
federal filing offices are just down the street.
d. No Escape through "Proceeds"
What about characterizing the royalties from transferees as
"proceeds" and seeking to perfect them separately?... Under Revised
9-102(a)(64), "proceeds" means "whatever is acquired upon the...
license.., or other disposition of collateral." Royalties from
transferees would qualify as proceeds. In that case, the following
provision rolls into play:
Revised 9-315
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this article...:
(1) A security interest or agricultural lien continues in
collateral notwithstanding sale, lease, license, exchange, or
other disposition thereof unless the secured party authorized
the disposition free of the security interest or agricultural lien.
(2) A security interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds of
collateral.
(c) A security interest in proceeds is a perfected security interest if
the security interest in the original collateral was perfected.
(d) A perfected security interest in proceeds becomes unperfected
on the 21st day after the security interest attaches to the 'proceeds
unless any of the following.. is satisfied:
(1) All of the following are satisfied:
(A) A filed financing statement covers the original
collateral.
(B) The proceeds are collateral in which a security interest
may be perfected by filing in the office in which the
financing statement has been filed.
(C) The proceeds are not acquired with cash proceeds.
(2) The proceeds are identifiable cash proceeds.
(3) The security interest in the proceeds is perfected other than
under subdivision (c) when the security interest attaches to the
proceeds or within 20 days thereafter.
Under Revised 9-315(a)(1), a security interest filed against the
transferor would attach to, and continue in the information collateral
transferred along with, per Revised 9-315(a)(2), the royalty proceeds.
226. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.B.3.
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Under Revised 9-315(c), a security interest in proceeds is
automatically perfected if the security interest in the original
collateral was perfected. That's the rub. Since the information interest
granted to each transferee-debtor constitutes collateral, Revised 9-
316(c) requires the lender to perfect against each transferee in their
collateral. For transferees located outside the U.S., this will typically
require perfection in the transferee's home country.
Even if this hurdle is met, under Revised 9-315(d), a security
interest perfected in proceeds because it was perfected in collateral
becomes unperfected within 21 days unless one of three listed
exceptions in Revised 9-316(d) applies. Inside the U.S., Revised 9-
315(d)(1) would be inapplicable under subpart B unless the filing
office for the information was the same filing office for the proceeds.
Washington D.C. could be such a place, if federal preemption directs
us to the national filing offices or Revised 9-307(c) directs us to the
local UCC office. Outside the U.S., however, to perfect in the
royalties from transferees a creditor will often need to file in the
transferee's home country. A filing against the transferor in the U.S.
would not be sufficient.
The alternative would be to perfect separately in the proceeds
under Revised 9-315(d)(3) when they were remitted to the United
States. For example, a lender could direct the royalties to be paid to a
lock box deposit account and perfect in it. A trustee of a U.S.
transferor-debtor, however, could still attack this lender's position as
a voidable preference if the royalties were received within the
preference period. The trustee could also argue that due to Revised 9-
316(b), the lender is retroactively unperfected in the royalties before
they reached the deposit account. In other words, the lender has
perfected in an empty bucket.
In sum, Revised 9-316 lays yet another trap for unwary
information creators and lenders, requiring extraordinary efforts on a
global scale to ensure continued perfection for royalties remitted to
the United States.
G. R 102(a)(2): Exclusive Licenses as Security Interests
1. Original Article 9
Is an assignment or an exclusive license of information a
"security interest"? No one has ever thought so before. U.C.C.
Article 1-201(37) says:
Current 1-201(37)
"Security interest' means an interest in personal property of
fixtures which secures payment of performance of an obligation."
The definition then contains elaborate provisions for what is and
is not a security interest, including whether a personal property lease
is a security interest. Under this definition, however, the obligation of
227
a party on a general intangible is not a security interest.
2. Revised Article 9
The Drafters of Revised 9 now claim that assignments and
exclusive licenses of information have become security interests due
to the expanded definition of account:
Revised 9-102(a)
(2) "Account" ... means a right to payment of a monetary
obligation, whether or not earned by performance, (i) for property
that has been or is to be sold, leased, licensed, assigned, or
otherwise disposed of, (ii) for services rendered or to be rendered
As one of the Drafters argues:
22
The broader definition of 'account' expands the scope of [Revised]
Article 9 by bringing into Article 9 more transactions through the
continued application of Article 9 to the sale of 'accounts' (as newly
defined).... The sale of a licensor's rights is a "security interest"
under Revised 9 because a licensor's rights under a license would
come under the expanded definition of "account."
.229This reasoning is elaborated in greater detail thus:
A licensor's right under a nonexclusive"f~1 license on default to
terminate the license is not a "security interest." [Fn: The analysis
might well be different for an "exclusive" license. There the
secured party of the licensee may have something of value to
dispose of on the licensee's default.] ... There are, to be sure,
transactions that the parties label a license that do constitute a
"security interest." For example, an agreement labeled an exclusive
"license" that functions as an outright transfer of the licensor's
intellectual property (e.g. a copyright) would likely constitute a
transfer of ownership and, if the transferee were paying over time,
a "security interest."
3. Detailed Analysis:
In treating a transfer of intellectual property rights as akin to the
"sale" of an "account," Revised 9 confounds the difference between a
security interest and a general intangible and between a sale and an
executory transfer. The justification given for doing so focuses
primarily on exclusive copyright licenses, so we can confine the
discussion to copyrights. For patents and trademarks, there will be
corresponding application for partial assignments.
227. Anderson, supra n. 99, at § 1-201:522.
228. Weise, supra n. 32, at 1087-1088.
229. Weise, supra n. 32, at 1083-1084.
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a. A Transferor's Retained Ownership Interests
In a sale of goods, any retention of "title" by the seller is
statutorily reduced to only a security interest. There is nothing the
parties can do to prevent this.230 Information does not work this way.
It has a chain of title. A transferee under an exclusive copyright
license, for example, certainly obtains an ownership interest within
the scope of the transfer.2 1 But the transferor nonetheless retains the
following ownership interests:
* A residual divisible interest in all copyright rights outside
the scope of the license;
232
* A statutory termination right with regard to the rights
granted allowing termination of the transfer and recapture
of the rights under certain conditions;
2 3
* A beneficial ownership interest in the rights transferred,
i.e., a right to sue for infringement as this may effect
royalties due;
2
11
* A reversionary interest with respect to the rights granted
allowing the transferor to reclaim the rights if the transfer
is cancelled for breach.235
The transferor's retained interests are true ownership interests
and not mere security interests. This means the transferor can
exercise its rights directly upon the happening of the triggering event
without the necessity of conducting a foreclosure sale to "recover" its
rights. A transferor can sue for any use by a transferee outside the
scope of the grant, i.e., for infringement of its divisible reserved
interest.2 6 As a beneficial owner who has transferred a copyright
ownership interest in exchange for royalties, the transferor has
immediate standing to sue for infringement if the transferee does not
230. Article 2-401; see Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.D.3.
231. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (definition of "transfer of ownership"); see Nimmer &
Nimmer, supra n. 47, at § 12.02[C]; for discussion of the concept of scope, see Article 2 and
Software, supra n. 60, at 490-491.
232. 17 U.S.C. 201(d)(2) (1994).
233. For pre-1978 works the right can arise if the author-assignor was an individual
who died before the copyright renewal term vested. Stewart v. Abend, 497 U.S. 207, 110 S.
Ct. 1750 (1990). See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 47, § 10.15[A]. For post-1977 works, a
statutory right is granted in 17 U.S.C. § 203. See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 47, § 11.02.
234. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1994); see Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 47, § 12.02[C].
235. See Schoenberg v. Shapolosky Publishers, Inc., 971 F.2d 926, 932 (2d Cir. 1992);
also Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 47, at § 10.15[A].
236. See Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp,, 188 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1999);
Schoenberg, 971 F.2d at 926; S.0.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989).
HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J.
act.237 The transferor's termination right, unlike a mere security
interest that would be lost to a foreclosing senior creditor, cannot be
contracted away prior to its vesting.28 Finally, if the transfer is
cancelled for material breach, the transferor may immediately pursue
all available remedies against the transferee for infringement without
the necessity of conducting a foreclosure sale.239
For none of these rights must the transferor accord the transferee
a right of redemption. Yet a right of redemption is the essential
characteristic of a security transfer. ' ° For an information security
transfer, mere cancellation of the debt instrument is not enough; one
also needs a reconveyance of the security transfer.241 In contrast, for
an ownership transfer cancellation of the instrument of transfer
immediately revests the rights in the transferor.2 At transferor's
reserved rights under an information ownership transfer are a general
intangible, not a security interest. 3
Certainly, a transferor can create a security interest in its
reserved rights. It is also possible for an instrument of transfer to be a
security interest if the parties so intend. But this does not mean that
every ownership transfer in which the transferor retains a right to
royalties is automatically a security interest - at least not under
current law.
237. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 159 (1976); see Wildlife Intl., Inc. v. Clements, 591 F.
Supp. 69 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 47, at § 12.02[C].
238. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2)(5) (1994) ("Termination of the grant may be effected
notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will to
make any future grant."). This limitation reflects a Congressional intent to protect authors
against unremunerative transfers. See Mills Music v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 173 (1985); see
generally Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 47, § 11.01[B].239. 17 U.S.C. § 503; e.g. Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton Broad., 106 F.3d 284
(9th Cir. 1997).
240. Sheldon v. McFee, 216 N.Y. 618, 111 N.E. 220, 221 (1916) ("The right to redeem is
the essential characteristic of a mortgage."); 5 C.J. Assignment § 6 (assignment not a
mortgage because no right of redemption).
241. Magnuson Indus., Inc. v. Co-Rect Prod., Inc., 213 USPQ 652, 657 (1981); Railex
Corp. v. Joseph Guss & Sons, Inc., 40 F.R.D. 119 (D.C. Col. 1966)
242. See e.g. Columbia Pictures Television, 106 F.3d at 284; Kama Krippa Music, Inc. v.
Schekeryk, 510 F.2d 837, 844 (2d Cir. 1975) (provision for automatic revesting for failure
to pay songwriter's royalties enforced); Frankel v. Stein and Day, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 209
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (provision that rights "shall automatically" revert on publisher's failure to
perform enforced).
243. See e.g. Newcombe v. Sundra, 274 Ill. App. 3d 590 (1995) (limited partnership
interest is a general intangible, not a security interest); Anderson, supra n. , § 1-201:522.
("The obligation of a debtor on a general intangible is not a security interest.") -
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b. Confusing Sales With Transfers
In 'equating an information transfer with a sale of accounts,
Revised '9 is collapsing two very different transactions. In account
financing, there are two contracts: the original one between the
assignor and account debtor; and the assignment from the assignor to
the assignee. It is possible for the assignment to be a "sale," i.e., non-
executory, While the original account contract remains executory. In
fact, Revised 9-102(a)(2) defines an "account" as "a right to payment,
whether or not earned by performance," thus contemplating
executory account contracts. 2" In information transfers, on the other
hand, there is only the one contract: the transfer agreement between
the owner and the transferee. As discussed above,4 5 it is quite
possible for information assignments and exclusive licenses to be
executory. Indeed, in a bankruptcy context, the courts have typically
classified exclusive licenses for limited rights or duration that require
the payment of royalties as executory contracts.246 The Drafters of
Revised Article 9 nonetheless treat these executory contracts as
executed "sales."
When original 'Article 9 was adopted, there was a significant
debate whether a "sale" of accounts - factoring -should be included in
the statute at all.247 It was eventually included because the financing
structures at the time had left little difference between factoring and
non-notification financing. Factoring was being done both on a non-
recourse basis, leaving the factor with the credit risk of bad accounts,
and on a recourse basis, leaving the debtor with the credit risk by
requiring a buy-back of bad accounts. The latter had the same
economics as non-notification or "security" financing." Since there
was little practical difference, the drafters elected to cover both with a
filing requirement.24 9 They did not, however, include executory
obligations and certainly not royalties under licenses of information.
Indeed, the original version of Article 9 did not even cover executory
accounts.250 The drafters recognized that it was inappropriate to treat
244. See Clark, supra n. 96, $ 11.01[1]. The original version of Article 9 defined
executory accounts as "contract rights." This category was removed an included in
"accounts" in the 1972 Amendments.
245. See supra n. 72 and accompanying text.
246. See supra n. 75 andcases cited therein.
247. See Plank, supra n. 64, at 410; see also Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.B.2.
248. Dan T. Coenen, Priorities in Accounts: The Crazy Quilt of Current Law and a
Proposal for Reform, 45 Vand. L.Rev. 1061, 1067 (1992).
249. Gilmore, supra n. 4, § 10.5.
250. This was not done until the 1972 amendments, merging the "contract rights"
category, which covered executory contacts, into the definition of "accounts." See Clark,
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information rights under executory contracts and their accompanying
royalties as akin to a "sale" (executed contract) of an "account" (fully
matured right to payment).
c. Impaired Cancellation Rights
The apparent reason for the changed treatment in Revised 9 is to
restrain a transferor from canceling an exclusive license or assignment
since this could reduce the value of the transferee's rights as
collateral. Instead, treating the transferor's reserved rights as "really"
a security interest forces the transferor to utilize the foreclosure rules
in Revised 9 to recover the rights. 5' A full discussion of the
foreclosure rules in Revised 9 is beyond the scope of this article.252
However, two rules are of particular interest:
Revised 9-610
(c) A secured party may purchase collateral at either of the
following:
(1) At a public disposition.
(2) At a private disposition only if the collateral is of a kind
that is customarily sold on a recognized market or the subject
of widely distributed standard price quotations.
Revised 9-625
(a) If it is established that a secured party is not proceeding in
accordance with this division, a court may order or restrain
collection, enforcement, or disposition of collateral on appropriate
terms and conditions.
(b) Subject to subdivisions (c), (d), and (f), a person is liable for
damages in the amount of any loss caused by a failure to comply
with this division.
Under Revised 9-611, a foreclosing creditor must give a debtor
prior notice of any disposition of the collateral. If an exclusive license
is "really" a security interest, then an attempted recapture of the
information rights by cancellation would be such a disposition. Under
Revised 9-610(c)(1), such a "repurchase" requires the transferor, or
rather "secured creditor," to conduct a public foreclosure sale. A
private disposition - recapture of rights by cancellation - is only
possible where "the collateral is of a kind that is customarily sold on a
recognized market or the subject of widely distributed standard price
quotations." This will rarely apply to information. Instead the
supra n. 96, 11.01[1].
251. See Weise, supra n. 32, at 1085 (arguing in the negative that if a reserved
termination right is not a security interest then a transferor would not have to comply with
the foreclosure rules in Revised 9).
252. For discussion see Donald J. Rapson, Default and Enforcement of Security
Interests under Revised Article 9, 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 893, 936-937 (1999) ["Rapson"].
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transferor must "sell" them to third parties at public auction. And if
the transferor fails to do so? Under Revised 9-625, the transferee - or
its lender - can sue to enjoin the cancellation as a "wrongful
foreclosure" and seek damages to boot.
Compare this approach with cases like Columbia Pictures
Television v. Krypton Broadcasting.53 Krypton was a broadcast
station that had licensed numerous television programs from
Columbia under exclusive broadcast licenses. For Krypton's failure to
make timely payments, Columbia canceled the licenses. When
Krypton continued broadcasting, Columbia sued for copyright
infringement. The Court affirmed, rejecting Krypton's defense that it
was still entitled to broadcast but was merely in default of payment.
Obviously, cancellation of an exclusive program license can impair
the collateral value of the broadcast station to its lender, but this is
necessary to protect the copyright owner's rights.
H. R 9-408(a): Anti-Assignment Prohibitions
1. Original Article 9
Are royalties under an information license assignable? Are
information rights [assignable]? Original Article 9 contains a narrow
rule on this issue:
Current 9-318
(4) A term in any contract between an account debtor and an
assignor is ineffective if it prohibits assignment of an account or
prohibits creation of a security interest in a general intangible for
money due or to become due or requires the account debtor's
consent to such assignment or security interest.
Prior to the adoption of Original Article 9, there was authority
for the proposition that an express contractual prohibition on the
assignment of an executed right to payment was enforceable.54 Case
law, however, had substantially eroded the practical effect of the rule
where the assignment was simply of money due or to become due,
and Article 9 adopted this approach. 5
253. 106 F.3d 284 (9th Cir. 1997).
254. The leading case was Allhusen v. Caristo Constr. Co., 103 N.E.2d 891 (1952). But
see Sillman v. Twentieth Fox Film Corp., 144 N.E.2d 387 (1957) (allowing assignment of a
right to payment under a motion picture distribution agreement despite the no-assignment
clause where the account debtor demonstrated a waiver of its requirements).
255. Prof. Gilmore argues that Sillman effectively declawed Alhusen, leading the
drafters of Article 9 to do the same. See Gilmore, supra n. 4, § 7.4.
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2. Revised Article 9
Revised Article 9 adds a new section that prevents any
restrictions on any assignment of rights or royalties arising from
general intangibles. It provides:
Revised 9-408
(a) ... a term in a promissory note or in an agreement between an
account debtor and a debtor which relates to a health care insurance
receivable or a general intangible, including a 'contract, permit,
license, or franchise, and which term prohibits, restricts, or requires
the consent of the person obligated on the promissory note or the
account debtor to, the assignment or transfer of, or the creation,
attachment, or perfection of a security interest in, the promissory
note, health care insurance receivable, or general intangible, is
ineffective to the extent that the term does, or would do, either of the
following:
(1) It would impair the creation, attachment, or perfection of a
security interest.
(2) It provides that the assignment or transfer or the creation,
attachment, or perfection of the security interest may give rise to a
default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination,
right of termination, or remedy under the promissory note, health
care insurance receivable, or general intangible.
(c) A rule of law, statute, or regulation, which prohibits, restricts, or
requires the consent of a government, governmental body or official,
person obligated on a promissory note, or account debtor to the
assignment or transfer of, or the creation of a security interest in, a
promissory' note, health care insurance receivable, or general
intangible, including a contract, permit, license, or franchise between
an account debtor and a debtor, is ineffective to the extent that the
rule of law, statute, or regulation does, or would do, either of the
following:
(1) It would impair the creation, attachment, or perfection of a
security interest.
(2) It provides that the assignment or transfer or the creation,
attachment,' or perfection' of the security interest may give rise to a
default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination,
right of termination, or remedy under the promissory note, health
care insurance receivable, or general intangible.
(d) To the extent that a term in a promissory note or in an
agreement between an account debtor and a debtor which rclates
to a health care insurance receivable or general intangible or a rule
of law, statute, or regulation described in subdivision (c) would be
effective under law other than this division but is ineffective under
subdivision (a) or (c), the creation, attachment, or perfection of a
security interest in the promissory note, health care insurance
receivable, or general intangible:
(1) is not enforceable against the person obligated on the,
promissory note or the account debtor;
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(2) does not impose a duty or obligation on the person obligated on
the promissory note or the account debtor;
(3) does not require the person obligated on the promissory note or
the account debtor to recognize the security interest, pay or render
performance to the secured party, or accept payment or
performance from the secured party;
(4) does not entitle the secured party to use or assign the debtor's
rights under the promissory note, health care insurance receivable,
or general intangible, including any related information or
materials furnished to the debtor in the transaction giving rise to
the promissory note, health care insurance receivable, or general
intangible;
(5) does not entitle the secured party to use, assign, possess, or have
access to any trade secrets or confidential information of the person
obligated on the promissory note or the account debtor;
(6) does not entitle the secured party to enforce the security
interest in the promissory note, health care insurance receivable, or
general intangible.
Given the complex drafting, the language for assignments of
intangibles is highlighted. Official Comment No. 2 to Revised 9-408
elucidates the statutory intent:
2. Free Assignability. This section makes ineffective any attempt to
restrict the assignment of a general intangible ... whether the
restrictions appears in the terms of the ... agreement between an
account debtor and a debtor (subsection (a)) or in a rule of law,
including a statute or governmental rule or regulation (subsection
(c)).
What was the reason for this change? As one of the Drafters says:
216
Section 9-408 permits a secured party to create and perfect a
security interest in a licensee's rights under a license despite
otherwise enforceable prohibitions in the license or under other law
against transfers. The Drafting Committee designed section 9-408
to make the value of otherwise nonassignable rights under a license
available to licensees so that they can obtain more credit (and be
more likely to pay their debts, including license fees).
So, the free transferability policy for industrial goods should now
apply to intellectual property.
3. Detailed Analysis
a. Scope of Current Law
Before looking at the changes brought about by Revised 9, a
256. See Weise, supra n. 32, at 1093-1094 (emphasis in original). See also Schwarcz,
supra n. 63, at 959: "An implicit rational [for nullifying anti-assignment clauses] however,
might be that the obligor on the account or general intangible is not prejudiced by the
assignment, whereas enforcing the anti-assignment clause would impair the free
alienability of property rights." (emphasis added).
brief review of current law is in order. There is a distinction between
an assignment of rights and a delegation of duties, but for purposes
here, we can treat both under the "assignment" rubric. There are two
cases to consider: (i) an express prohibition; and (ii) contractual
silence.
An express restriction on assignment is enforceable unless
prohibited by statute.2 17 Sometimes courts find the anti-assignment
clause was waived by conduct, or only applied to an assignment of
rights as opposed to a delegation of duties, or is inapplicable where
the obligations are no longer executory."' Outside these narrow
limits, however, anti-assignment provisions are routinely enforced,
absent statutory prohibition, as part of essential freedom of contract.
Indeed, in a contract for a sale of goods, UCC Article 2-210 allows a
delegation or duties or an assignment of rights unless otherwise
agreed. The only exception is once a party's entire obligation is no
longer executory, the party's contact rights may be assigned
regardless of an anti-assignment clause.259
Where the contract is silent, the general rule is that a contract is
assignable. An exception exists, however, for contracts that involve
"personal services." The common law rule, originating in the
venerable case of Lumley v. Wagner,26° is that a contract to supply
personal services is per se not assignable.261 As Justice Holmes put it:
262
257. See e.g. Delacroix v. Lublin Graphics, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 74 (D. Conn. 1997);
Rossetti v. City of New Britain, 303 A.2d 714 (1972); Paul v. Chromalytics Corp., 343 A.2d
622 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975) (anti-assignment provision in sale of business enforced; Article
9-318(4) inapplicable since case involved assignment of contract rights in sale of business);
cf Wandler v. Lewis, 567 N.W.2d 377 (1997) (stating rule, but noting that anti-assignment
provision waived); 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Assignments § 20 (1999); Anno. Validity of anti-
assignment clause in a contract, 37 A.L.R.2d 1251 (1999).
258. See e.g. Sillman, 165 N.Y.S. 498 (1957) (waiver by conduct); Delacroix, 993 F.
Supp. 74 (D. Conn. 1997) (anti-assignment provision applied only to delegation of duties);
6 Am Jur. 2d Assignments § 29 (inapplicable where rights no longer executory).
259. Thomas A. Quinn, Quinn's Uniform Commercial Code Commentary and Law
Digest, T 2-210[A][6] 92nd. Ed. 1991).
260. Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De G., M. & G. 604, 619 (ch. App. 1852) (contract to supply
services of opera singer).
261. Sally Beauty Co. Inc. v. Nexxus Prod. Co., Inc., 801 F.2d 1001, 1008 (7th Cir. 1986)
("When performance of a personal services contract is delegated, the trier merely
determines that it is a personal services contract. If so, the service is per se nondelegable.
There is no inquiry into whether the delegate is as skilled or worthy of trust or confidence
as the original obligor: the delegate was not bargained for and the obligee need not
consent to the substitution.") See also Am. Colortype Co. v. Continental Colortype Co., 188
U.S. 104, 107; James v. Whirlpool Corp., 806 F. Supp. 835 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (franchise
agreement); Miller Constr. Co. v. First Indust. Tech. Corp., 576 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1991)
(architectural services); Rossetti v. City of New Britain, 291, 303 A.2d 714 (1972)
(architectural services); Wired Music, Inc. v. Clark, 168 N.E.2d 736 (1960) (contract to
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"Service is like a marriage... [I]t may be repeated, but substitution is
unknown." An important reason is the lack of a meaningful remedy.
As the New York Court of Appeals explained in American
Broadcasting Companies v. Wolf'263 "Courts of equity have historically
refused to order an individual to perform a contract for personal
services.... Originally, this rule evolved because of the inherent
difficulties courts would encounter in supervising the performance of
uniquely personal efforts. During the Civil War era, there emerged a
more compelling reason for not directing the performance of personal
services: the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of involuntary
servitude. It has been strongly suggested that judicial compulsion of
services would violate the express command of that amendment. ....
For practical, policy and constitutional reasons, therefore, courts
continue to decline to enforce employment contracts."
The jurisprudence for determining when a contract involves
"personal services" is not entirely consistent.' 6' This led some courts
to replace the per se rule with a test that looks to whether the
assignment materially impairs the benefits expected by a party or
deprives the party of adequate assurances of performance" UCC
Article 2-210 adopts this approach for a sale of goods. Where the
contract does not prohibit assignment, Article 2-210 provides that a
party may perform through a delegate unless the other party has a
"substantial interest" in having its original promisor perform.
Similarly, where the contract is silent a party may assign its rights
unless the assignment would "materially" change the other party's
duties, increase its risks or burdens, or impair its chance of obtaining
performance. Courts have upheld express or implied prohibitions on
assignments in contracts for the sale of goods where these conditions
are met.
266
Where intellectual property is involved, express contractual
supply music); 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Assignments § 29 (1999).
262. Am. Colortype Co., 188 U.S. at 107.
263. 420 N.E.2d 363, 364 (1981) [citations omitted].
264. Larry A. DiMatteo, Depersonalization of Personal Service Contracts: The Search
for a Modern Approach to Assignability, 27 Akron L. Rev. 407 (1994).
265. Id. at 420-422 (providing examples of case law in this area).
266. See e.g. Sally Beauty Co. Inc., 801 F.2d at 1001 (holding that supplier of hair care
products could terminate exclusive distribution contract for assignment to direct
competitor under UCC 2-210(1)); Berliner Foods Corp. v. Pillsbury Co., 633 F. Supp. 557
(D.Md. 1986) (finding manufacturer of ice cream could cancel distribution contract when
distributor was bought by competitor); but seeBaxter Healthcare Corp. v. O.R. Concepts,
Inc., 869 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (anti-assignment provision not breached by
acquisition of stock of buyer, distinguishing Sally Beauty because the case involved a
nonexclusive license to supply products, not to sell them).
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prohibitions on assignment or sublicensing are routinely enforced.267
Where the contract is silent, intellectual property must be analyzed
under the "personal services" exception. The default rule is that an
assignee of a patent, or an assignee or exclusive licensee of a
copyright, may assign or sublicense its interest, since it is an "owner"
of the rights.26 However, a non-exclusive license of a patent or a
copyright is considered to be a personal privilege of the owner to be
held free from infringement claims, and hence, is not assignable
absent a specific provision in the license.269 This rule goes to the
essence of the rights granted under federal law, and thus, preempts
contrary state law rules.270
Trademarks involve a different calculus. Trademarks identify to
the public the source of goods or services. Uncontrolled or "naked"
licensing whereby a licensee can place the mark on any quality or
type of goods or services results in the mark ceasing to have any
267. See e.g. Delacroix, 993 F. Supp. 74 (D. Conn. 1997) (stating rule, but finding it
inapplicable on facts presented); In re D.H. McBride & Co., 132 F. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1904); cf
Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Intl., - Va. - 529; S.E.2d 80, 86 (2000) (since right to a
domain name involves non-assignable personal services under registration contract,
domain name not subject to garnishment).
268. See e.g. Nolan v. Sam Fox Pubg. Co., Inc., 499 F.2d 1394, 1397 (2nd Cir. 1974)
(involving a copyright assignee).
269. Patents: Oliver v. Rumford Chem. Works, 109 U.S. 75, 82 (1883) ("A mere
[nonexclusive patent] license to a party, without having his assigns or words equivalent to
them, showing that it was meant to be assignable, is only the grant of a personal power to
the licensee, and is not transferable by him to another."); Troy Iron & Nail v. Corning, 55
U.S. 193 (1852); In re Catapult Ent., Inc. 165 F3d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1999) (non-exclusive
patent license not assignable); In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir. 1996); PPG
Indus. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 597 F.2d 1090, 1093, (6th Cir. 1979); (under federal law,
patent licenses not assignable unless expressly made so); Unarco Indus., Inc. v. Kelly Co.,
465 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1972) cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929, 93 S. Ct. 1365, 35 L.Ed.2d 590
(1973); Radio-Craft Co. v. Westinghouse Electr. & Mfg. Co., 7 F.2d 432 (3rd Cir. 1924)
(non-exclusive patent license not transferable to company who bought stock of licensee;
"what the license does not expressly, or by fair implication, permit, it prohibits."); In re
Patient Educ. Media, 210 B.R. 237, 240 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1997); Anno. Assignment of
licensee's rights under patent license agreement, 66 A.L.R.2d 606.
Copyrights: See Harris v. Emus Rec. Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir. 1984) (non-
exclusive master use license not assignable in bankruptcy); Neva, Inc. v. Christian
Duplications Intl., Inc. 743 F. Supp. 1533, 1546, (M.D. Fla. 1990) ("Since the agreement
was that the narration would be used for the non-profit purposes of the Episcopal
Foundation, transfer to any entity that would exploit the narrations for profit of that
would have any other purpose other than the non-profit purposes of the Episcopal
Foundation would be improper."); Mills Music, Inc. v. Cromwell Music, Inc., 126 F. Supp.
54, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) ("The license agreement involved a "relationship of personal credit
and confidence."); Illyin v. Avon Publications, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 368,372 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
270. In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d at 679; Harris, 734 F.2d at 1334; see Reilly, supra n. 14,
("An encroachment on the patentee's right to block transfer of license rights to an
unauthorized user devalues the patent rights and reduces the incentives to innovate.").
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meaningand constitutes a fraud on the public. Under the Lanham
'Act a trademark owner, therefore, must exercise control over any
assignment of a license or risk losing its trademark rights.7
Restrictions on assignments of a trademark license, exclusive or
nonexclusive, have been repeatedly upheld as necessary to protect the
integrity of the mark.73
Unlike industrial commodities, if the law does not enforce
restrictions on unauthorized transfers of intellectual property, much
of the value is destroyed. In CFLC, Inc. explained why the state
policy of free transferability of goods is inappropriate for intellectual
property:
Allowing free assignability - or more accurately, allowing states to
allow free assignability - of nonexclusive patent licenses would
undermine the reward that encourages invention because a party
seeking to use the patented invention could either seek a license
from the patent holder or seek an assignment of an existing patent
license from the licensee. In essence, every licensee would become
a potential competitor with the licensor-patent holder in the market
for licenses under the patents. And while the patent holder could
presumably control the absolute number of licensees in existence
under a free-assignability regime, it would lose the very important
ability to control the identity of licensees. Thus, any license a patent
holder granted - even to the smallest firm in the product market
most remote from its own - would be fraught with the danger that
the licensee would assign it to the patent holder's most serious
competitor, a party whom the patent holder itself might be
absolutely unwilling to license. As a practical matter, free
271. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2nd Cir. 1959); see
McCarthy Trademark, supra n. 12, § 18:48; Anno. Granting of "Naked" or Unsupervised
License to a Third Party as Abandonment of Mark, 118 A.L.R. Fed. 211.
272 Super. Bedding Co. v. Serta Assoc., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1143, 1149 (N.D. Il. 1972);
U.S. Major League Baseball Promotion Corp. v. Colour-Tex, Inc, 729 F. Supp. 1035
(D.N.J. 1990) (unauthorized sublicense); Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308
F.2d 403, 409 (5th Cir. 1962) (trademark owner who fails to control licensees risks losing
mark); 87 C.J.S., Trade-Marks, Trade Names & Unfair Competition § 209; William M.
Borchard. & Richard M. Osman, Trademark Sublicensing and Quality Control, 70
Trademark Rep. 99 (1980).
273. See e.g. Hawkins v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 624 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1960) (franchise
agreement); Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co.. 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962);
Seligson v. Plum Tree, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 748, 753 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (upholding franchisor's
,right to consent to assignment of franchise, noting "[a] franchisor has a perfect right to
consider the character, stability, reputation, business ability, etc., of those to whom it will
trust its own good name, it mark and its products"); Hanigan v. Wheeler, 19 Ariz. App. 49
(1972) (restrictions on assignment of franchise agreement not against public policy); see
generally Anno., Validity, Construction and Effect of Clause in Franchise Contract
Prohibiting Transfer of Franchise or Contract, 59 A.L.R. 3d 244 (2000). Restrictions on
assignment may also be necessary to protect the trademark licensor from liability for torts
of its licensee, Gilson, supra n. 190, § 6.03[2] & [19], or against false advertising claims.
McCarthy. Trademark, supra n. 12, § 18:48, at 18-80, § 25:33.
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assignability of patent licenses might spell the end of paid-up
licenses as the one involved in this case. Few patent holders would
be willing to grant a license in return for a one-time lump-sum
payment, rather than for per-use royalties, if the license could be
assigned to a completely different company which might make far
greater use of the patented invention that could the original
licensee.274
b. Scope of Changes in Revised 9
Revised 9-406(d) already renders ineffective prohibitions on the
creation or enforcement of a security interest in an "account." Since
under Revised 9-102(a)(2) an account includes a right to payment
under a general intangible, Revised 9-406(d) already adopts original
Article 9-318(4). Revised Article 9-408 is unnecessary if its only
purpose is to continue current law. Instead, as the Official Comments
say, it is an entirely new enactment without prior antecedents. 5
Does Revised 9-408 prohibit any restrictions on assignment of a
general intangible or only on security assignments? Official Comment
1 to Revised 9-408 says: "This section makes ineffective any attempt
to restrict the assignment of a general intangible.., whether the
restrictions appears in the terms of the.., agreement between an
account debtor and a debtor (subsection (a)) or in a rule of law." This
is not limited to security assignments. Official Comment No. 4, in an
oblique double negative, says: "This section does not render
ineffective a restriction on assignment that does not create a security
interest." This Comment is not as narrow as it might appear. The
Drafters now maintain that a "security interest" under Revised 9
includes assignments and exclusive licenses of information, so an
"assignment that does not create a security interest," is narrow indeed.
The reader should examine the emphasized parts of Revised 9-408
quoted above to trace the provisions dealing with an assignment of a
general intangible to decide for himself or herself what the statute
says. It does not appear limited merely to assignments for security.
Curiously, the underlined words in 9-408(a)(2) & (c)(2) referring
to "assignment, transfer or" were added as Technical Amendments in
1999 after the Official Text was promulgated. The explanation is that
they "eliminate needless inconsistencies. ,276 Whatever the reason,
these additions seem to be quite specific that prohibitions on all
assignments are verboten. Otherwise, there was no need to add them,
274. In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d at 679 (emphasis in original).
275. Larry Laurence, Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code, vol. 10, § 948, 206-
207 (3d ed. West 2000).
276. See The New Article 9, supra n. 2, at 435-437.
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since Revised 9-408 as written already prohibited restraints on
security assignments. It appears that Revised Article 9-408 prohibits
any restriction on an assignment of both royalties and rights by
transferors and transferees, whether or not for security. 7
c. Assignments by Transferors
The reason for limiting any restrictions on assignments by
transferors was apparently to relieve lenders engaged in securitization
of their obligations of due diligence where information is concerned.
As one of the Drafters maintains:
In financing and capital market transactions, holders of performed
and unperformed rights to payment customarily finance and
securitize those rights. Lenders and investors financing
unperformed rights to payment account for the credit risk that the
account debtor will not perform its obligations to pay. But the
lenders and investors financing both performed and unperformed
rights to payment would not normally account for the risk, at least
without considerable due diligence and greater expense, that the
assignment of the right to payment itself is ineffective by virtue of
there being a material impairment.
278
Effective securitization of a transferor's informational rights is
certainly a legitimate interest. But many information transactions are
executory with unfulfilled obligations on both sides. As discussed
above, there are legitimate reasons why a transferee might restrict a
transferor's ability to assign its rights, especially for security, where
the contract is still executory.279 The risk that an assignment of
contractual rights might be ineffective due to a material impairment
exists today in the case of an executory contract for the sale of goods
under Article 2-210. Revised 9, however, despite repeated requests to
do so, does not adopt the same rule for information that Article 2
does for goods. In the world of Revised 9, every transfer of
intellectual property for royalties must be conceptualized as a "sale,"
277. See Thomas E. Plank, The Limited Security Interest in Non-Assignable Collateral
under Revised Article 9, 9 ABI L. Rev. 323 (2000) (discussing application of Revised 9-408
to "true" security interests as well as "sales" and other transfers of intangibles ).
278. Weise, supra n. 32, at 1090 (emphasis in original). After the quoted section, the
text continues: "There is no justification for applying a material impairment test that might
nullify a security interest in a licensor's fully earned right to payment under a license. Even
UCC Section 2-210(2) ... would permit the assignment of 'a right arising out of the
assignor's due performance of his entire obligation."' But Revised 9-406(d) already
prohibits creation of a security interest in a licensor's fully earned right to payment. The
argument is made to justify Revised 9-408, which prohibits restrictions on an assignment of
all rights, not just payment rights, even for executory obligations. Revised 9 does not
adopt for licensors of information what Article 2-210 accords sellers of goods.
279. See supra n. 14, and accompanying text.
i.e., a fully executed contact, since anything less would impose the
burden of due diligence on secured creditors. It is a curious policy
that deprives licensees of their rights because it is considered too
burdensome for lenders to conduct the professional due diligence
necessary to find out what they are.
Under current law, an exclusive license is. conceptualized as a
contractual undertaking, not to transfer the same information within
the same licensed scope to another party.2 Indeed, the bankruptcy
courts have found exclusive licenses to be executory precisely because
of the transferor's on-going contractual obligation to refrain from
granting the same information interest to others.28' Does Revised 9-
408 now mean that a transferor can make a security assignment of the
rights otherwise granted exclusively to the transferee, since it now
invalidates both rules of law and contractual provisions, i.e., the
promise of exclusivity, that would prevent the security transfer? Since
the statute treats information assignments and exclusive licenses as
"security interests," does Revised 9-408 now effectively invalidate all
exclusive information licenses by making the transferor's promise of
exclusivity unenforceable? Absent preemption, evidently so. Revised
9-408(d) contains an elaborate list of what a secured creditor may not
do with its security interest, but does not restrict the transferor.
Other questions involve the effect of Revised 9 on the traditional
law that rights under personal service contracts are not assignable. In
many cases, a transferee commissions a creator to create information,
such as an architect commissioned to design a building. The rights and
obligations under such contracts are traditionally non-delegabie.
Does the elimination of restrictions on "assignment or transfer" in
Revised 9-408 include a delegation of duties? What if the parties
intend a transfer of rights in the resulting work to the commissioning
party, such as in the case of a Work-made-for hire 'under the
Copyright Act? What happens to shop rights for patents? What
Revised 9-408 means in this regard, and how it comports with federal
intellectual property law, will be another matter for the courts
d. Assignments by Transferee
The Drafters justified Revised-9408's elimination of any
restriction on a transferee's assignment of both rights and royalties as
280. See I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, n. 8 (7th Cir. 1996) (an exclusive license is
leave to do a thing, and a contract not to give leave to anyone else to do the same thing).
281. Qintex, 950 F.2d at 1496; In re Select-A-Seat Corp., 625 F.2d 290, 291 (9th Cir.
1980) (exclusive software license); In re Biopolyrners, Inc., 136 B.R. 28, 29 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1992) (patent license).
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follows:
Existing law generally permits creation and perfection of security
interests in otherwise nontransferable rights. [Footnote: See e.g.,
U.C.C. § 9-318(4).] The Drafting Committee modeled is approach
on the law that applies to FCC licenses. Well-established law
permits the creation, attachment, and perfection of a security
interest in the licensee's rights under an FCC license and proceeds
of that right, subject to the FCC's control over the actual
enforcement of that security interest by the FCC's exercise of its
power to approve or disapprove the transferee. The law that
applies to FCC licenses permits the enforcement of the security
interest in the proceeds .... Surely, the public policy supporting the
interest of the FCC in supervising who acts under an FCC license is
no less worthy of protection than the interest of a software licensor
in supervising who acts under a software license.8 2
"Well-established law," however, does prohibit the creation,
attachment and perfection of a security interest in otherwise
nontransferable rights. Current Article 9-318(4) only prohibits
restrictions on a security interest "for money due or to become due."
It does not do so for contractual rights. Doing so confounds the
property interest under an intellectual property license - the rights -
with the monies arising from the exercise of those rights - the
royalties. Article 2-210 has long made this distinction in a sale of
goods, enforcing restrictions on an assignment of rights excepting only
when the contact is fully executed. Revised Article 9 eliminates a
comparable protection for transferors of information.
The invocation of public policy based FCC licenses is also
questionable. MLQ Investors, L.P. v. Pacific Quadracasting, L.P.283
upheld a security interest in a broadcast license because the FCC
itself had reversed its historic prohibition on them.' The Commission
did so by recognizing that a security interest in the proceeds from the
sale of a license does not give the creditor any interest in the license
itself. 5 MLQ Investors does not hold a security. interest can be
created absent such policy reversal.28 Certainly, if an information
licensor consents to a licensee security interest, of course the licensee
can and should be able to make one. This does not mean that "public
282. Weise, supra n. 32, at 1092-1093 (emphasis in original).
283. 146 F.3d 746, 748 (9th Cir. 1998).
284. Id. The Commission announced this policy in In re Cheskey, 9 F.C.C.R. 986, 987
(1994).
285. In re Cheskey, 9 F.C.C.R. at 987.
286. In In re Tak, 985 F.2d 916, 917 (7th Cir. 1983), the Seventh Circuit, in reliance on
what it believed to be the Commission's policy, held that a security interest could not
attach to a security interest in proceeds from the sale of a broadcast license. In re Cheskey,
9 F.C.C.R. at 987, n. 8, decided the Commission had no such policy.
policy" does or should eviscerate all contractual restrictions on
assignability for intellectual property where the licensor expressly
withholds consent.
Moreover, the public policy behind FCC licenses and intellectual
property is not the same. The purpose of the FCC is to regulate the
airwaves for the public interest.7 The FCC is not in the business of
licensing bandwidth in order to generate royalties necessary to create
new bandwidth. It has little interest in who gets the proceeds from
transfer of a broadcast license; it is concerned about who uses the
limited broadcast frequencies. For intellectual property, however,
collecting the royalties is an essential feature of what the law provides
to encourage new creation.' This distinction was discussed at length
in In re Ridgely Comminications, Inc.2 89 The court held that a secured
creditor could take a security interest in a broadcast license, solely as
necessary to confirm private rights against third parties, but not
against the F.C.C. as the provider of the license interest. "Prudence
dictates that the narrow holding of this opinion be emphasized. The
holding is not a recognition of a general right of creditors to take
blanket security interests in broadcast licenses.., rights of the
licensee vis-A-vis the F.C.C. may not be abrogated by private
agreement."2" A licensor of intellectual property is not a regulator of
a limited public commodity indifferent to who gets the money.
287. MLQ Investors, 146 F.3d at 748.
288. See e.g. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964), reh. den. 379 U.S. 985 (1965)
("A patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate with the
leverage of that monopoly."); Waterman, 138 U.S. at 260 ("The right conferred by letters-
patent for an invention is limited to a term of years; and a large part of its value consists in
the profits derived from royalties and license fees .... [T]he assignee of a patent by a
mortgage duly recorded, whose security is constantly wasting by lapse of time, must be
held (unless otherwise provided in the mortgage) entitled to grant licenses, to receive
license fees and royalties, and to have an account of profits or an award of damages against
infringers." (emphasis added)); Chem. Found., Inc., 29 F.2d at 600 ("Royalties to accrue
and damages and profits for future infringement are incident to and accompany the patent
unless separated by express reservation."); Crom, 46 F. Supp. at 405.
289. 139 B.R. 375, 376-377 (Bankr.D.Md. 1992).
290. Id. at 379. A consistent problem in Article 9 has been its tendency to use words
that have a common meaning in one context in an unanticipated way. An example is the
use of "security interest" to include a "sale" of accounts. See Plank, supra n. 64 criticizing
this tendency. Revised 9 does the same with "license." A "license" in the sense used in
MQL Investors means a governmental privilege to engage in certain conduct granted
pursuant to the police power. See 51 Am.Jur. 2d, Licenses and Permits § 14. This is not the
same as a private license that accords a privilege to be free from suit for infringement of
intellectual property rights that are granted to private parties under entirely different
constitutional authority.
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e. The Justification - Grabbing The Proceeds
The real reason for altering existing law is apparently to allow
transferees to use security interests to access all the income earned
from exploiting the intellectual property rights, including the share
payable to a transferor as royalties. As one of the Drafters explains:
Grabbing the Proceeds: Once the licensee's rights have been
transformed into money, the licensor no longer has an intellectual
property interest to protect. If the licensee does transfer its rights
(for example, with the consent of the licensor, pursuant to a
bankruptcy court order, or otherwise), the secured party is entitled
to enforce its security interest in the proceeds generated by the
transfer of the licensee's rights. That does not interfere with the
licensor's interest in controlling who uses the licensee's rights under
the license.29'
The Official Comments emphasize that "grabbing the proceeds"
is the goal of Revised 9-408. "By making available previously
unavailable property as collateral, this section should enable debtors
to obtain additional credit." This seems quite obvious. Transferees
can now direct royalties otherwise payable to their transferors to the
own lenders. The information was "previously unavailable" precisely
because intellectual property law allowed creators to make it
unavailable in order to ensure they could collect royalties for its use.
Buyers of goods could also use "previously unavailable property as
collateral" if they could be assured that use of a security interest
would enable them to direct the purchase price to their secured
creditors ahead of the seller. Example 5 in the Official Comments to
Revised 9-408 illustrates the result when assigning a franchise: The
franchisee's lender takes the proceeds of the transfer ahead of the
franchisor.
One of the ostensible reasons given for this approach is to deal
with the transferee's bankruptcy. As Official Comment No. 7
explains, "Bankruptcy Code § 552 invalidates security interests in
property acquired after a bankruptcy petition is filed, except to the
extent that the post-petition property constitutes proceeds of pre-
petition collateral." Royalties are proceeds that arise from the
information rights. Thus, the Drafters of Revised 9 considered it
essential to prohibit all restrictions on the creation of a security
interest in informational rights, as this could mean that they would
not have a perfected interest post-petition royalty proceeds in case of
the transferee-debtor's bankruptcy.
This argument, however, begs the question whether a creditor
291. Weise, supra n. 32, at 1096.
should be allowed to take a mandatory prior security interest in the
transferee's royalty receivables ahead of the transferor in the first
place. If the transferor consents to such a security interest, then it
attaches to the transferee's rights and resulting royalties and the issue
under Bankruptcy Code § 522 never arises. An issue only arises when
the transferor does not Consent. There are good reasons why a
transferor might withhold consent. If the transferee becomes
insolvent, who is entitled to the royalties from exploitation of the
information by the bankrupt's estate? Under current law, post-
petition royalties would be an obligation of the estate to which the
transferor is entitled as an administrative claim.2 For example, if the
television station in MLQ Investors became insolvent, the station
would have more value if it could continue broadcasting and earning
add revenue instead of going dark. But program suppliers would have
no incentive to allow the station to do so if they knew their license
fees would be seized by the station's pre-petition secured lender
without their prior consent. Bankruptcy Code § 522 intervenes to
allow administration of the estate for the benefit of all creditors by
providing that program suppliers who allow their works to be
broadcast can be paid for so doing, just like other trade creditors
dealing with the estate. Revised 9-408 is trying to award a transferee's
pre-petition secured creditor a windfall preference over other post-
petition information trade creditors by forcing a transferor to
dedicate its information to the estate solely for the secured creditor's
benefit regardless of objection by the transferor. This is contrary to
rehabilitation policy behind Section 522.
Revised 9-408(d) provides an elaborate list of what a secured
creditor allegedly cannot do in enforcing its security interest. As the
Official Comments say, with emphasis,293 "subsection (d) ensures that
these affected persons [e.g., licensors] are not affected adversely thereby
[i.e., by the licensee's security transfer]. That provision removes any
burden or adverse effects on those persons for which a rational basis
could exist to restrict the effectiveness of an assignment or to the
exercise of any remedies." Oh, really? What about the money? A
transferor does have a rational basis for objecting to a transferee's
security interest if it deprives the transferor of a meaningful chance
for payment. A significant part of the benefit conferred by intellectual
292 See In re DAK Industries, Inc., 66 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 1995) (post-petition
royalties under software license attributable to pre-petition commitment so unsecured).
For further discussion of DAK see Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § II.B.4.
293. U.C.C. § 9-408, cmt. 6 (Rev. 1998).
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property law is the ability to collect royalties.29" As Gilmore argued
with regard to allowing security interests in executory assignments of
unearned future intangibles:
Considerations of policy and common sense suggest that there must
be a limiting point somewhere. Borrowers should not be
encouraged or allowed to hypothecate all they own or might own in
the indefinite future in favor of a creditor who is willing to make a
risky loan now. A borrower's other creditors are entitled to know
what his true situation is ... And ways should be found to penalize
a lender who, after allowing his borrower to pile up an intolerable
weight of debt, then claims all the assets of. the insolvent estate,
leaving nothing to satisfy other claims.9
Taken to the extreme, Revised 9-408 ' could encourage
information transferees to engage in Ponzi schemes at the expense of
their transferors. Assume a licensee owes a royalty of 50% of
"profits". (however defined) to its licensor. In other words, if the
licensee makes $1,000 in "profits," it,owes $500 to the licensor. What
happens if the licensee wants to use 100%. of the profits as collateral?
Under current law, the licensor has several methods to ensure that
the licensee can only encumber its 50% share of profits. The licensor
can: (i) rely on a'contractual provision to restrict the licensee's ability
to assign its rights for security; (ii) treat the royalties as a general
intangible, not account, and claim that any security interest agains the
licensee could only attach to the licensee's share of net royalties
under the law of assignment; (iii) file a mortgage in the appropriate
federal office when the information was licensed for the reserved
royalty, claiming that this filing gave priority against any unfiled
security interest against the licensee; (iv) claim that it was entitled to
treat the reserved royalty as a "purchase money" interest, perfected
by an appropriate federal or state filing; or (v) reserve a right to
cancel the contract for nonpayment.
2%
Under Re'vised 9 each of these alternatives is systematically
stripped away. Under Revised 9-408, whether the license or
applicable law prohibits it or not, the licensor cannot prevent the
licensee from assigning its entire profits - including the 50% royalty
share payable to the licensor - to a third party for security. Under
Revised 102(a)(2), the right to royalties is now an account for which a
filing is now required, and such a filing will evidently be junior to a
294. See e.g. Waterman, 138 U.S. at 260 ("The right conferred by letters-patent for an
invention is limited to a term of years; and a large part of its value consists in the profits
derived from royalties and license fees.") (emphasis added).
295. Gilmore, supra n. 4, § 7.12, at 248-249.
296. See Federal Financing, supra n., § II.C.
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filing under a pre-existing floating lien against the licensee under
Revised 9-322(a)(1)'s "first to file or perfect" rule. Under Revised 9-
103, an information licensor, unlike any other creditor, has no
recourse to "purchase money" status to gain priority over such a pre-
existing floating lien. Under Revised 9-316, failure to file against the
licensee where it is located within one year of the transfer will make
the licensor's reserved royalty "security interest" unperfected
retroactively. By treating an exclusive license as a security agreement,
Revised Article 9 makes exercise of any cancellation right
problematical at best. Finally, if the license is non-exclusive, the
licensor's lender is prohibited from gaining any priority at all over the
"licensee in the ordinary course of business" under Revised 9-321(b)
in any case.
If there is little or nothing a licensor can do to ensure its right to
royalties, then it is rational for a licensee is encumber all of its assets,
including the royalties payable to a licensor, with a floating lien. That
way, the licensee can have immediate use of the licensor's royalty,
less, of course, the lender's vigorish. If the licensee's business is
booming, then the licensor's royalties will be paid, and no one will be
the wiser. But if the licensee is failing, then the licensee can use the
royalty it would have otherwise paid to the licensor to stave-off its
own the decline. Indeed, the most rational move for a failing licensee
would be to acquire even more information, since now it can force
licensors to commit their royalties to its business by using a pre-
existing floating lien. In order to obtain new licenses, of course, the
licensee must conceal its shaky financial state. It will do this by using
part of the loan proceeds from new licenses to pay past-due royalties
on prior licenses, giving the appearance of solvency - for a while. This
is the classic model for a Ponzi scheme.
Revised Article 9 promotes such schemes in a way unimaginable
in the goods world by its systematic treatment of intellectual property
as inferior to goods. Under Article 2-210, a seller of goods can include
an enforceable contractual restriction on a buyer's assignment of its
contractual rights, while the contract remains executory, thus limiting
the availability of contract rights as security. Revised 9 denies this
treatment to licensors. A seller of goods to a buyer of questionable
solvency can protect its right to receive payment with a purchase
money security interest. Revised 9-103 prohibits information
transferors from claiming "purchase money" status. A seller of goods
can demand cash on the barrel instead of payment over time. Given
the uncertainties in valuing intellectual property, such "paid up
licenses" are filled with risk for information licensors.
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f. Needed Federal Reforms
Official Comment 9 to Revised 9-408 says: "This section does not
override federal law to the contrary. However, it does reflect an
important policy judgment that should provide a template for future
federal law reforms." The Official Comments are right that federal
law reforms are imperative. The Reporters indicate the direction
those reforms should take:
Nonetheless, some restrictions on alienability'actually may promote
efficiency.... "[T]he familiar problems of externality control[,] ...
imperfect information, 'prisoner's dilemmas,' free rider problems,
and the cost of administering alternative policies" may each justify
appropriate restraints'on alienation.
297
Intellectual property is precisely such a case. Eliminating
restrictions on alienability that allows information markets to exist
and treating information as inferior to industrial goods are not
policies that should be endorsed. To the 'extent there is doubt about
the full scope of preemption, federal action is needed to correct what
Revised 9 has wrought.
I. R 9-321(b): The "Licensee in the Ordinary Course"
1. Original Article 9
Under UCC Article 1-201(9) a "buyer in the ordinary course"
means someone who buys in the ordinary course from "a person in
the business of selling goods." Article 9 does not contain a "license in
the ordinary course." Such an entity would be nonsensical, given the
basic differences between the "private goods" world of industrial
commodities and the "public goods" world of intellectual property.
2. Revised Article 9
Over strong objection by intellectual property practicioners the
Drafters of Revised 9 adopted the following provision:?
297. See Harris & Mooney, supra n. 23, at 2049.
298. One of the Drafters describes the origin of Revised 9-321(b) thus: "Some form of
this provision [Revised 9-321(b)] has been in every draft of revised Article 9 since 1996
and also in UCITA since the first draft of UCITA in January 1966 (it has been dropped
from UCITA as part of the removal of all secured financing provisions from UCITA). It
does not appear that anyone raised objection to it during the discussions of UCITA's
financing provisions during the meetings of the UCITA Drafting Committee." Weise,
supra n. 32, n. 90. Other participants had a different view of the process. The drafts
UCITA did not contained a "licensee in the ordinary course of business provision." There
were provisions in UCITA dealing with priority of transfers, some of which applied to
nonexclusive licenses. When early drafts of those sections were discussed there was
consistent objection from intellectual property practitioners that some provisions did not
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Revised 9-321
(a) In this section, "licensee in ordinary course of business" means
a person that becomes a licensee of a general intangible in good
faith, without knowledge that the license violates the rights of
another person in the general intangible, and in the ordinary course
from a person in the business of licensing general intangibles of that
kind. A person becomes a licensee in the ordinary course if the
person comports with the usual or customary practices in the kind
of business in which the licensor is engaged or with the licensor's
own usual or customary practices.
(b) A licensee inordinary course of business takes its rights under a
nonexclusive license free of a security interest in the general
intangible created by the licensor, even if the security interest is
perfected and the licensee knows of its existence.
This radical concept runs afoul of basic principles of federal
information law.
3. Detailed Analysis
a. Questionable Justifications
The Drafters of Revised 9 give two ostensible justifications for
this concept. The first, according to the Official Comments, is that
"[l]ike the analogous rules in Section 9-320(a) with respect to buyers
in ordinary course and subsection (c) with respect to lessees in
ordinary course, the new rule in subsection (b) reflects the
expectations of the parties, and the marketplace."'2 9  As one of the
Drafters adds, "[section 9-321] protects the reasonable expectations
of nonexclusive licensees (generally nonnegotiated transactions) that
their rights are not subject to termination as a consequence of the.
fully conform to the priority rules under intellectual property law, and a resulting
commitment from the Reporter to correct them. Not every section was dis6ussed in every
Drafting Committee Meeting, of course, so some provisions continued unchanged in
various drafts until it was their turn for discussion, but this never meant there was no
objection. During the drafting process for UCITA, NCCUSL had initially indicated that
the priority rules for information transfers would be established in UCITA. However, just
before the 1998 NCCUSL Annual Meeting where Revised 9' was slated for approval,
members of the Revised 9 Drafting Committee descended en mass on the UCITA
Drafting Committee and demanded that the priority rules for information transfers be
removed from'UCITA and'left solely to in Revised 9. This led to a flurry of objections,
including to Revised 9-321(b), especially since the prior NCCUSL policy had induced little
participation by intellectual property practitioners in the Revised 9 drafting process. The
initial draft of Revised 9-321(b) applied both to exclusive and nonexclusive licensees, and
to their credit, the Reporters of Revised 9, after hearing the criticisms, at least eliminated
the reference to exclusive licensees. They claimed it is was too late to make other changes,
however, and for various reasons the matter could not be discussed publicly.
299. U.C.C. § 9-321, cmt. (Rev. 1998).
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licensor's default.
'300
The second is a purported need for a "balancing test." The
Drafters say:
Section 9-321 seeks to balance two legitimate interests: (i) the
ability of a secured party to have recourse to its collateral, and (ii)
the ability of an ordinary course of business licensee of the
collateral to retain the licensee's rights without interference from
the secured party of the licensor. [Revised] Article 9 balances these
interests by protecting the customer when the customer is a direct
customer of the borrower.... [I]t is fair to protect the direct
customer of the secured party's borrower because the secured party
is in a position to oversee the activities of its borrower. Thus,
Article 9 imposes on the secured party the risk of its own
borrower's activities but not the risk of the activities of remote
persons.... This reflects a balancing of the interests, expectations
and burdens of the various participants.3
b. Conflict with Copyright Law
Copyright law rejects Revised 9's "reasonable expectations"
justification. If a license is cancelled for breach, continued exercise of
rights by a sublicensee is an infringement, regardless of whether the
sublicensee had a "reasonable expectation" that its sublicense could
continue or not." Fitzgerald Publishing Co., Inc. v. Baylor Publishing
Co., Inc.,33 for example,. held that a sublicensee's "reasonable
reliance" on the belief that it had a valid sublicense was no defense to
an infringement claim where its licensor's rights were terminated for
material breach. Copyright infringement is a strict liability tort; lack
of knowledge or innocent intent is simply not a defense? °  As Nimmer
explains:
Innocent intent should no more constitute a defense to an
infringement action than in the case of conversion of tangible
personalty. In each case, the injury to property is worthy of redress,
regardless of the innocence of the defendant. Moreover, a plea of
innocence in a copyright action may often be easy to claim and
300. Weise, supra n. 32, at 1101.
301. Weise, supra n. 32, at 1100-1101.
302. U.S. v. King Features Ent., 843 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1988) (where original license
invalid nonexclusive sublicensee an infringer as well); Fitzgerald Publg. Co., Inc. v. Baylor
Publg. Co., Inc., 807 F.2d 1110, 1113 (2nd Cir. 1986) (sublicensee's reliance on the terms of
its license ineffective where its licensor in material breach; intent or knowledge not an
element of infringement); Costello Publg. Co. v. Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035, 1045 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (if main license terminated, sublicensee also liable for infringement; ignorance no
defense); Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (sublicensee's reliance on
terms of its license no defense where editing program was material breach of original
license); Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 47, at § 11.02[B][1][b] & § 13.08 [and cases cited].
303. 807 F.2d at 1113.
304. Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 47, at § 13.08 [and cases cited].
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difficult to disprove. Copyright would lose much of its value if third
parties, such as publishers and producers, were insulated from
liability because of their innocence as to the culpability of the
persons who supplied them with the infringing material.
Furthermore, as between two innocent parties (i.e. the copyright
owner and the innocent infringer) it is the latter who should suffer
because he, unlike the copyright owner, either has an opportunity
to guard against the infringement by diligent inquiry, or at least the
ability to guard against liability for infringement by an indemnity
agreement from his supplier or by an "errors and omissions"
insurance policy.3 °5
A more serious problem withRevised 9-321(b) is its conflict with
the criminal penalties in the Copyright Act. Under Copyright Act
Section 506(a), a person who willfully infringes a copyright for
commercial advantage or private financial advantage commits an act
of criminal copyright infringement." Reliance on advice of counsel is
not a defense where the defendant willfully violates federal law."°
Revised 9-321(b) provides, nonetheless, that a non-exclusive
"licensee in the ordinary course of business" can knowingly ignore
the foreclosure of a prior security interest against its licensor and
continue exercising its licensed rights with impunity. One of the
Drafters maintains that "[tihe holders of 'off-the-shelf' non-exclusive
licenses likely have reasonable expectations that (as long as they
perform their obligations) they will continue to have the right to use
the license even if their licensor loses its rights as a result of a
foreclosure by the licensor's secured party. '3° Under the Copyright
305. Id. at § 13.08, 13-280 - 13-281.
306. See U.S, v. Larracuente, 952 F.2d 672 (2nd Cir. 1992) (bootleg movie videotapes;
defendant has burden of proving valid sublicense). Under the Copyright Act, "willfulness"
means a "voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty." Nimmer & Nimmer,
supra n. 47, at § 15.01 [A][2] [and cases cited].
307. See U.S. v. Heilman, 614 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 922. In
Heilman, the defendant made unauthorized copies of pre-1972 sound recordings.
Attorneys advised defendant that he would not be liable for infringement if he continued
paying compulsory license fees. The Justice Department, and several Circuit Courts,
repudiated this position, but defendant continued to sell "bootleg" copies in reliance on
the advice nonetheless. Reliance on wrong advice was not a defense to acts of willful
copyright infringement. See also U.S. v. Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 904 (holding held knowing sale of unauthorized copies of copyrighted motion
pictures for private gain without obtaining title to the copies was criminal). The Court held
Article 2-403, which allows a merchant entrusted with possession of goods to pass good
title to a buyer in the ordinary course, was inapplicable did not invoke a "first sale"
defense under federal law. Indeed, the defendant was not even entitled on an instruction
on the point to argue mitigation.
308. Weise, supra n. 32, at 1097 (emphasis in original). The author does not define an
"off-the-shelf" nonexclusive license. The author also claims, at n. 93: "[Ulnder the 'shelter'
doctrine, if a nonexclusive licensee did qualify for protection under § 9-321 from a
foreclosure conducted by a secured party of the nonexclusive licensee's licensor, any
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Act, however, a sublicensee who knowingly continues to exercise
rights under a nonexclusive copyright license for private financial gain
after its licensor is foreclosed out has only one reasonable
expectation: a long stay in a federal penitentiary."°
The Copyright Act also includes its own preemptive "balancing
test" for nonexclusive licenses contrary to that in Revised 9. Section
205(e) says that a nonexclusive license prevails over a later copyright
mortgage if the license is in writing and either taken before execution
of the mortgage or taken in good faith and without notice before its is
recorded.31 Otherwise, the duly recorded - perfected - prior security
interest against the licensor prevails. If the secured creditor
forecloses, its interest relates back to the recording date, prevails over
later nonexclusive sublicenses outside the statutory grace period, and
all further exploitation by the sublicensee, whether or not "in the
ordinary course" is a copyright infringement. Under Revised 9-321,
the Drafters aver that "[a] prudent secured party should 'police' its
own borrower against the borrower entering into nonexclusive
sublicenses .... If the secured party to the licensor does not want to
encourage nonexclusive licenses, it can, in its security agreement (or
elsewhere), require the borrower (the licensor) to place in all of the
nonexclusive licenses the borrower grants a provision that the
nonexclusive license will terminate if the licensor's secured party
forecloses." '' What this really does is impose on information the
person that had a sublicense from the nonexclusive licensee would be protected to the
same extent." Regretfully, the "shelter" doctrine applies to hard goods, not intellectual
property. A nonexclusive sublicensee who relies on this reasoning may wind up looking
down the barrel of an infringement claim, and from behind bars to boot.
309. In U.S. v. Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 904 the
defendant engaged in knowing sale of unauthorized copies of copyrighted motion pictures
for private gain without obtaining title. The Court held Article 2-403, which allows a
merchant entrusted with possession to pass good title to a "buyer in the ordinary course"
was simply inapplicable under federal law. Lawyers who advise such licensees to do so
knowingly should be aware that individuals who have the ability to supervise the
infringing activity and have a financial interest in it, or who participate in infringing
activity are personally liable for infringement even if ignorant that the activity was
infringing. See Southern Bell Tel. and Telegraph Co. v. Assoc. Tel. Directory Publishers,
756 F.2d 801, 811 (11th Cir. 1985); Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 47, § 15.01[A][2], at 15-10
("Persons who knowingly and willfully aid or abet copyright infringement are subject to
the same criminal penalties as apply to the principal.").
310. What about a conflict between a security interest in a nonexclusive license and an
authorized nonexclusive sublicense? In that case, both are "transfers" subject to Section
205(d), and the one first duly recorded within the statutory grace prevails. Some assume
Section 205(d) only applies to "transfers of ownership." This is incorrect. It applies to
"transfers," and thus covers conflicts between two nonexclusive licenses. Section 205(e)
only deals with conflicts between nonexclusive licenses and transfers of ownership.
311. Weise, supra n. 32, at 1101.
same excessive policing that was once required for pre-Code account
financing under the Benedict regime."' It would require a lender to
make excessive intrusions into its debtor's business, significantly
raising the costs for all parties, which is why federal law says this is
what a copyright financier need not do. As Nimmer makes clear, it is
licensees who have the burden of "looking up" and searching chain of
title. They get the benefit when they in turn become sublicensors.
c. Conflict with Patent Law
Patent law also rejects the reasoning in Revised 9. Patent
infringement is again a strict liability tort; intent to infringe, or
knowledge of the existence of the patent, is immaterial."' Rather,
intentional or knowing infringement of a patented invention allows a
court to assess treble damages.31' As a result, sale or use of a patented
article outside the scope of the license, or after the license is
terminated, is an infringement."5 The Supreme Court rejected an
"ordinary course" defense to a claim of patent infringement in
General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co.316 It held that a
party who obtained patented articles knowing that the use exceeded
the scope of the licensee's grant, could not be a "purchaser in the
ordinary course of trade," but was instead a patent infringer.3"7 Patent
law also contains its own "balancing test" where non-exclusive
licenses are concerned. A patent assignee takes subject to all existing
312. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.B(2).
313. 17 U.S.C. § 271(a); Thurber v. Fairchild Motor Corp., 269 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1959);
Guiberson Corp. v. Equip. Engr., Inc., 252 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1958) (intent to infringe
irrelevant); Freeman v. Friedman, 242 F.2d 364, 366 (4th Cir. 1957) (knowledge not
necessary).
314. 17 U.S.C. § 284 (1994); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 819 F.2d 1120, 1126
(Fed. Cir. 1987); State Ind. Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
Chaparral Ind. v. Boman Ind., Inc., 697 F. Supp. 1113, 1124 (C.D.Cal. 1988); see Chisum,
supra n. 173, at § 20.03[4][b].
315. See Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W Electr. Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938) (sale of
patented article outside of scope of license an infringement); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v.
Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (same); Intel Corp. v. U.S. Intl. Trade
Commn., 946 F.2d 821 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (sublicensee who manufactured articles not
authorized by license patent infringer); Straight Side Basket Corp. v. Kull, 24 F. Supp. 771
(D. Idaho 1938) (buyer of patented devices from licensee after license terminated an
infringer); Chisum, supra n. 173, at § 21.03[3]. Compare Intel Corp. v. ULSI System Tech.,
995 F.2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (an authorized sale of patented article under license
exhausts patent rights).
316. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp., 304 U.S. 175.
317. Id. at 180-181. ("The sales made by the Transformer Company to petitioner were
outside the scope of its license and not under the patent. Both parties knew that fact at the
time of the transactions. There is no ground for the assumption that petitioner was a
'purchaser in the ordinary course of trade."').
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licenses.318 This means a prior license would not be foreclosed by a
later perfected patent security transfer, but a subsequent license
would be.
A "nonexclusive licensee in' the ordinary course". who continues
to represent that a patented item is licensed with consent of the
patent owner after its license is foreclosed may also risk a charge of
criminal patent counterfeiting. Section 292 of the Patent Act provides
that anyone who, without the consent of the patentee, use the
patentee's name, the patent number, or the word "patent" with the
intent of counterfeiting the mark of the patentee, or deceiving the
public into believing that the thing was made or sold with the consent
of the patentee, is liable for a fine for each offense.319 Knowingly
continuing to use a patent under a nonexclusive sublicense where the
licensor's authority has been terminated can constitute a vioiation.3 2
d. Conflict with Trademark Law
• Revised 9-321 also puts state secured financing law on a collision
course with federal trademark law. As Prof. McCarthy explains:
Once a [trademark] license contract is terminated, there is no doubt
that the ex-licensee has no authorization or consent to continue use
of the mark. After the license has ended, the ex-licensee must stop
use of the mark. Continued use by an ex-licensee of the licensor's
mark constitutes a fraud on the public, since they are led to think
that the ex-licensee is still connected with the licensor. As the
Eleventh Circuit observed: "Common sense compels the conclusion
that a stronger risk of consumer confusion arises when a terminated
franchisee continues use of the former franchisor's trademarks."32'
If a trademark' license is cancelled for breach, continued use of
the mark on goods or services by a sublicensee is an infringement.
3 2
318. See Why Corp. v. Super Ironer Corp., 128' F.2d 539,541 (6th Cir. 1942); Keystone
Type Foundry v. Fastpress Co., 263 F. 99 (2nd Cir. 1920).
319. 35 U.S.C. § 292 (1994).
320. See Petersen v. Fee Intl., Ltd., 381 F. Supp. 1071 (W.D.' Okla. 1974); also' Chisum,
supra n. 173, at § 20.03[7][c][vii].
321. McCarthy Trademarks, supra n. 12, § 25:31, at 25-61 (quoting Burger Kingo Corp.
v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984)).
322. See Green River Bottling Co. v. Green River Corp., 997 F.2d 359 (7th CiL 1993)
(breach of license by sublicensor ended sublicensee's rights); El Greco Leather Prod. Co.,
Inc. v. Shoe World, 806 F.2d 392, 396 (2nd Cir. 1986) (retailer liable for trademark
infringement where its supplier had breached its license with manufacturer);
Stabilissierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser, Inc., 647 F.2d 200, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ('Courts
have long recognized that in patent, trademark, literary, property and copyright
infringement cases, any member of the distribution chain can be sued as an alleged joint
tortfeasor."); Major League Baseball Promotion v. Colour-Tex, Inc. 729 F. Supp. 1035
(D.N.J. 1990) ("A licensee who has materially breached its license has no rights to give to
a sublicensee."); Leventhal v. Ollie Morris Equip. Corp., 184 Cal. App. 2d 553 (1960)
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Knowledge is not a factor, since a trademark owner is entitled to
protection against both innocent as well as malicious infringers.323
Indeed, since the purpose of a trademark is to identify the source of
goods or services to the public, allowing a sublicensee to continue
using a mark after termination of its licensor's interest defrauds the
public and risks invalidating the mark.324 Use of a mark by a licensee
builds up no rights in the mark as against the licensor.32' Thus, the
remedy for an alleged wrongful termination of a trademark license is
an action for money damages, not for the continued use of the
mark.326 Indeed, once a license has been terminated, the licensor has a
duty to prevent further use of the mark by the licensee in order to
prevent customer confusion, or else the trademark will be forfeited.327
A licensor's case for an injunction to stop use by a terminated
licensee is therefore stronger than in an ordinary trademark
(trademark on patented article); see generally 87 C.J.S., Trade-Marks, Trade Names &
Unfair Competition § 212 (on termination of a license all rights to use the mark end); 2
McCarthy Trademark, supra n. 12, at § 18.15 (company must be able to prove a chain of
title extending back to the original user of the mark).
323. El Greco Leather Prod. Co., Inc., 806 F.2d at 396 (retailer's claimed lack of
knowledge of its supplier's trademark infringement, even if true, provides no defense);
Major League Baseball Promotion, 729 F. Supp. at 1035; Grocers Baking Co. v. Sigler, 132
F.2d 498, 502 (6th Cir. 1942) (common law trademark); McCarthy Trademark, supra n. 12,
at § 25:30 (and cases cited).
324. See e.g. Yamamoto & Co. (Am.) Inc. v. Victor United, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 968, 980
(C.D. Cal. 1982) (continued exploitation of mark by sublicensee after termination a fraud
on public, invalidating mark); McCarthy Trademark, supra n. 12, at § 18:48; Borchard and
Richard M. Osman, Trademark Sublicensing and Quality Control, 70 Trademark Rep. 99
(1980); Ann. Granting of "Naked" or Unsupervised License to a Third Party as
Abandonment of Mark, 118 A.L.R. F. 211.
325. See U.S. Jaycees v. Philadelphia Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134 (3rd Cir. 1981) ("Once a
license has expired, use of the formerly licensed trademark constitutes infringement. To
say that the licensee has acquired rights that survive legal termination of the license
destroys the entire concept of a license .... No rights are established by such use.");
McCarthy Trademark, supra n. 12, at § 25:31 [and cases cited].
326. See Green River Bottling Co., 997 F.2d at 362 ("Unauthorized use of a trademark
is an infringement, and we have held that the infringement of a trademark is not a proper
self-help remedy for a breach of contract"); Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River
Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 282 (7th Cir. 1992); S&R Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Intl., Inc.,
968 F.2d 371, 376 (3rd Cir. 1992); Burger King Corp. v. Hall, 770 F. Supp. 633, 638 (S.D.
Fla. 1991); McCarthy Trademark, supra n. 12, at § 25:31 [and cases cited].
327. See Gorenstein Enter. v. Quality Case-USA, 874 F.2d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 1989)
("The owner of a trademark has a duty to ensure the consistency of the trademarked good
or service. If he does not fulfill this duty, he forfeits the trademark .... If the owner of a
trademark has broken off business relations with a licensee he cannot ensure the
continued quality of his (e)-licensee's operations, whose continued use of the trademark is
therefore a violation of trademark law."); Oberlin v. Marlin Am. Corp., 596 F.2d 1322,
1327 (7th Cir. 1979) (trademark owner must supervise licensees at the expense of
abandonment of the mark); Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403, (5th
Cir. 1962).
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infringement case, since irreparable harm always flows from unlawful
use and confusion.
There are also potential criminal penalties. In 1984, Congress
enacted the Trademark Counterfeiting Act, making trafficking in
counterfeit trademarks a federal crime. 29 Continued and knowing use
of a trademark after termination of a license is a violation of the act.33°
Ignorance that trafficking in counterfeit goods is a crime is no
defense.3 31
Revised 9-321 is grim news for trademark owners. It endorses
continued knowing use of a trademark by a non-exclusive sublicensee
even after its licensor has been terminated by foreclosure. Such
continued use misleads the public into believing that the trademarked
goods or services are being made available with the continued
authorization of the new foreclosure sale purchaser and, unless
enjoined, invalidates the mark. Any trademark owner who grants a
security interest in a trademark, and then makes a non-exclusive
license, is at risk. Any trademark owner who grants a license
authorizing non-exclusive sublicensing is also at risk because under
Revised 9-408, the trademark owner cannot prevent the licensee from
granting a security interest. Since a licensor's right to royalties is now
conceptualized as an "account" within the ambit of Revised Article 9,
apparently, attempting to secure a right to royalties in a non-exclusive
trademark license can also trigger Revised 9-321. The "licensee in the
ordinary course of business" could conceivably invalidate a wide
swath of state trademarks.
With regard to federal trademarks, as discussed in the
companion article,32 several cases, led by In re Roman Cleanser Co., 33
have held that a security interest in federal trademarks are governed
by state law. If these cases remain standing, then Revised 9-321 risks
nullifying the Lanham Act as well. The owner of a federal mark has a
few courses to protect the mark. First, try a head-on assault on
328. See Church of Scientology Intl. v. Elmira Mission Church of Scientology, 794 F.2d
38, 43 (2nd Cir. 1986); accord S&R Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Intl., Inc., 968 F.2d 371, 376 (3rd
Cir. 1992).
329. Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stst. 1837, enacted Oct.12, 1984, 18 USCA § 2320 codified 18
USCA § 2320. The maximum penalties under the law were substantially increased in the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
See 4 McCarthy Trademark, supra n. 12, at § 30:114 et seq.
330. U.S. v. Bohai Trading Co., 45 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 1995) (also upholding
constitutionality of act).
331. U.S. v. Baker, 807 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1986).
332. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, at § III.G(3).
333. In re Roman Cleanser Co., 43 B.R. at 940.
Roman Cleanser by arguing that the Lanham Act does in fact
preempt state law, including Revised 9-321, for perfecting security
interests in federal trademarks. Second, argue that Revised 9-321 is
incompatible with U.S. obligations under various international
trademark treaties, that such treaties are self-executing, and their
requirements preempt Revised 9-321." Third, proceed under the
Trademark Counterfeiting Act for criminal misconduct. Neither
Roman Cleanser nor its ilk have considered either of these last two
contentions, so they are not foreclosed by precedent. Failure to act,
however, risks not merely continuation of the foreclosed out non-
exclusive license, but invalidation of the entire mark.
Official Comment 2 to Revised 9-321 says that the "licensee in
the ordinary course of business" rule is analogous to that for buyers
of goods. However, an invention is not analogous to a used car; a
copyright is not like a toaster; a trademark is not a tin can. The
market expectations for intellectual property are not those for
tangible goods. "Licensees in the ordinary course of business," who
rely on Revised 9-321 to knowingly exercise non-exclusive rights in
intellectual property after their licensors are foreclosed out, should be
aware of the consequences under federal law of so doing.
J. R 9-102(a)(44): "Embedded Software"
1. Original Article 9
Original Article 9 does not contain a separate definition of
"computer program." At the time Article 9 was drafted of course,
computer programs were in their infancy. Under original Article 9-
106 a computer program, as a copyrighted work, is a general
intangible.
2. Revised 9
Revised Article 9 has now included a new definition of an
"embedded" computer program:
Revised 9-102(a)
(44) "Goods" means all things that are movable when a security
interest attaches. ... The term also includes a computer program
embedded in goods and any supporting information provided in
connection with a transaction relating to the program if (i) the
program is associated with the goods in such a manner that it
334. A full analysis of this argument is beyond the scope of this article. For further
discussion of possible self-executing trademark treaties, see McCarthy Trademark, supra
n. 12, at § 29:33.
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customarily is considered part of the goods, or (ii) by becoming the
owner of the goods, a person acquires a right to use the program in
connection with the goods. The term does not include a computer
program embedded in goods that consist solely of the medium with
which the program is embedded.
One the Drafters describes the motivation for this eye-popping
definition:
Much equipment, e.g. motor vehicles, printing presses, and medical
equipment, usually utilizes software. Is the software subject to a
license agreement that, under other law, effectively limits the
secured party's enforcement rights? Revised Article 9 assists that
determination by distinguishing between "software" which is a
"type of general intangible" and, therefore, is subject to the
potential restrictions on enforcement and so-called "embedded
software" which, instead, is treated as "goods." . . . A secured.party
repossessing sophisticated equipment collateral will have to
expeditiously determine whether it can treat the equipment as
''goods" and exercise its enforcement remedy of foreclosure
without delay, or whether it has to be concerned with prohibitions
or restrictions in a license agreement that necessitate
communication with and gaining the consent of a licensor. These
problems, of course, exist under present law, but there has been little
focus on the issues and no guidance towards a resolution. Revised
Article 9 not only focuses attention upon the problem and potential
risks but also provides guidelines for dealing with them."'
While the question of "embedded software" is real enough, the
claim that before Revised 9 there was "little focus on the issues and
no guidance towards a resolution" is a fairy tale. The Copyright Act
has long addressed "embedded software" in express statutory
provisions.
3. Detailed Analysis
a. Copyright Act Provisions
Computer programs are copyrightable works.336 It is a
fundamental principle of copyright law that an intangible copyright is
separate and apart from its physical embodiment. Section 202 of
Copyright Act codifies this distinction:
Ownership of a copyright, or any of the exclusive rights under a
copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in
which the work is embodied. Transfer of ownership of any material
object, including the copy or phonorecord in which the work is first
fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work
embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does
transfer of ownership of a copyright, or any of the exclusive rights
335. Rapson, supra n. 252, at 936-937 (emphasis added).
336. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
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under a copyright, convey property rights in any material object.337
Congress put it succinctly: "The principle restated in section 202
is a fundamental and important one: that copyright ownership and
ownership of a material object in which the copyrighted work is
embodied are entirely separate things., 338 A copy is not a copyright.
Under prior law, in some states transfer of a physical object was
presumed to transfer the common law copyright.39  Section 202
obliterates this presumption.3" As a matter of preemptive federal law,
the transfer of a material object in itself transfers no right to use the
copyright.3 ' This applies regardless of whether the license is exclusive
or non-exclusive.342 As a result, when dealing with a security transfer
of a computer program one must distinguish the copyright from the
copy.
Begin with the copyright. An exclusive copyright license is
assignable absent contractual restrictions.343 A non-exclusive license,
however, being personal to the licensee, is not assignable without
337. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1994). For detailed discussion of the application of Section 202 to
state contracting rules, see Article 2 and Software, supra n. 60.
338. H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 124 (1976).
339. A chief exponent of this view was Pushman v. N.Y. Graphic Socy., Inc., 287 N.Y.
302 (1942), which held that an artist who sold a print master was presumed to convey the
common law copyright as well. For further discussion, see Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 47,
at § 10.09[B]. Note that this rule only applied to state common law copyright; it never
applied to federal statutory copyright. Many states did not follow this rule. For example, in
California mere possession of a print negative raised no presumption that the possessor
owned the common law copyright. Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304,
313 (1939).
340. H.R. Rpt. No. 94-1476, at 124. (1976): "[Tlhe bill would change a common law
doctrine.., authors or artists are generally presumed to transfer common law literary
property rights when they sell their manuscript or work of art, unless those rights are
specifically reserved. This presumption would be reversed under the bill."
341. E.g. Quintanilla v. Tex. Television, Inc., 139 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 1998) (paying for
video tape did not transfer copyright in recording); Saxon v. Blann, 968 F.2d 676, 680 (8th
Cir. 1992) (sale of manuscript did not transfer copyright in literary work); Harris, 734 F.2d
at 1334 (purchase of master tapes from bankruptcy trustee did not transfer non-exclusive
license to manufacture and distributor recordings); Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Natl. Assoc. of Fire
Equip. Distrib., 983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. I11. 1997) (purchase of diskette containing
copyrighted clip art did not allow downloading clip art onto Web page); Applied Info.
Mgt., Inc. v. Icart, 976 F. Supp. 149, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (no software license from transfer
of diskette); Design Options, Inc. v. Bellepointe, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 86, 91 (SDNY 1992)
(sale of sweater did not transfer rights in copyrighted fabric designs).
342. Saxon, 968 F.2d at 680 (exclusive license); Harris, 734 F.2d at 1334; Applied Info.
Mgt., 976 F. Supp. at 153 (nonexclusive software license); Marobie-FL, Inc., 983 F. Supp.
at 1167; Goldstein § 4.5.1(c).
343. See In re Patient Educ. Media, 210 B.R. 237, 240 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1997) (citing
I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 774-775 (7th Cir. 1996)); see generally Nimmer &
Nimmer, supra n. 47, at § 10.02[B][4].
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consent of the licensor.3" This is a matter of federal intellectual
property law, preempting state law transferability rules.345 This means
a security transfer of a licensee's interest under a nonexclusive
software license is ineffective without the consent of the licensor.
Moreover, no security interest even attaches to the copyright in a
computer program from mere ownership or possession of a copy,
regardless whether the computer program is "embedded" or not.
Now, look at the copy. Section 106(3) of the Copyright Act
grants the copyright owner the exclusive right "to distribute copies...
of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or otherwise." This
means that, in the first instance, the copyright owner has the right to
determine if copies of the work are sold at all. However, the "first
sale" doctrine in section 109 says that once the copyright owner duly
authorizes sale of a copy this exhausts this distribution right for that
copy, so its further transfer is not an infringement.3 6 Section 117
allows the authorized owner of a copy of a computer program to
make a new copy or adaptation if it is essential for the use of the
program. 7 The copy may then be leased, sold or otherwise
transferred, but only with the original copy and all of the original
owner's rights in the computer program.3" However, both of these
privileges only apply if the copyright owner authorized the initial sale
of a copy.4 9 Nothing in the Copyright Act requires a copyright owner
344. See Harris, 734 F.2d at 1334 (non-exclusive master use license not assignable); In
re Patient Educ. Media, 210 B.R. at 242-43 (non-exclusive patent license not transferable);
In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d at 679 (nonexclusive patent license not transferable); Neva, Inc.
v. Christian Duplications Intl, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 1533, 1546 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (nonexclusive
license not assignable under the 1909 Copyright Act); see generally Nimmer & Nimmer,
supra n. 47, at §§ 10.01[C][4], 10.02[B][4].
345. Harris, 734 F.2d at 1334.
346. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1994); see generally 3 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 47, at § 8.12.
The first sale doctrine only applies to the distribution right. Design Options, Inc., 940 F.
Supp. at 91 (§ 109 does not authorize reproduction); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F.
Supp. 741 (N. D. Ill. 1983) (or adaptation); Red-Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp.,
883 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1989) (or public performance).
347. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (1994).
348. 17 U.S.C. § 117(b) (1994).
349. Id. at § 109(d) ("The privileges prescribed by subsections (a) and (c) do not,
unless authorized by the copyright owner, extend to any person who has acquired
possession of the copy or phonorecord from the copyright owner by rental, lease, loan or
otherwise without acquiring ownership of it."); Id. at § 117(a)(1) (privilege applies to
"owner of a copy"); DSC Comm. Corp. v. Pulse Comm., 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 286 (1999), (section 117 applies only to the owner of a copy of a
computer program, not to one with mere possession); Allen-Myland v. Intl Bus. Mach.
Corp., 746 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (section 117 does not authorize the use of
microcode where the copy was not lawfully acquired); see generally Nimmer & Nimmer,
supra n. 47, at § 8.08.
to sell copies. To the contrary, as the DSC Communications Corp. v.
Pulse Communications court held, a copyright owner can place
restrictions on the initial disposition of copies in ways that vitiate the
first sale or computer use privileges.35 Nothing in state law requires
copyright owners to sell copies either. They could lease them under
UCC Article 2A, just as credit card companies rent their pieces of
plastic, public libraries lend copies of books, and video stores rent
copies of movies and games."' This means that if a licensee has not
become the authorized owner of a copy, a transfer of copies on
foreclosure of a security interest would be infringing if not separately
authorized by the copyright owner.352
350. DSC Comm. Corp. v. Pulse Comm., 170 F.3d 1354, 1361-1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999):
Not only do the agreements characterize the RBOC's as non-owners of •
copies of the software, but the- restrictions imposed on the RBOC's rights
with respect to the software are consistent with that characterization....
Each of the DSC-RBOC agreements limits the contractory RBOC's right to
transfer copies or to disclose details of the software to third parties. The
agreements also prohibit the RBOC's from using the software on hardware
other than that provided by DSC.... The fact that the right of possession is
perpetual, or that the possessor's rights were obtained through a single
payment, is certainly relevant to whether the possessor is an owner, but
those factors are not necessarily dispositive if the possessor's right to use the
software if heavily encumbered with other restrictions that are inconsistent
with the status of owner [of a copy].
Accord Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(restrictions on transferring software outside educational market in shrinkwrap prevented
the transaction from being a "sale" subject to the first sale doctrine); Stenograph v. Sims,
__ F. Supp. -, 2000 WL 964748 (E.D. Pa. July 12, 2000) ,(where original transfer
unauthorized, subsequent "gift" of software not protected by "first sale" doctrine).
351. A state law that purported to prohibit software vendors from renting copies could
be preempted in any case. In 1990, Congress amended Section 109 to allow the owner of a
computer program to control rental of a copy, even after a sale. Computer Software
Rental Amendment of 1990, Pub. Law No. 101-650, Sec. 801, 104 Stat. 5089 codified 17
U.S.C. § 109(b) (1994). This "rental right" was enacted due to fear that the ease of copying
would lead to wide scale piracy without restrictions on rental. It preempts state law. Adobe
Sys., Inc. v. Brenengen, 928 F. Supp. 616 (E.D.N.C. 1996); Central Point Software v. Global
Software & Accessories, Inc., 880 E Supp. 957,965 (E.D.N.Y 1995).
352. 17 U.S.C. § 109(d) (1994); CMAX/Cleveland, Inc. v. UCR, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 337,
356 (M.D. Ga. 1992) (when copy of software was transferred to creditors, the privilege to
continue using the copy under Section 117 ceased); accord Adobe Systems Inc. v. One Stop
Micro, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Stenograph v. Sims, - F. Supp. -, 2000 WL
964748 (E.D. Pa. 2000); The Walt Disney Co. v. Video 47, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Fla.
1996) (rental of counterfeit cassettes an infringement despite purchase of copy); Microsoft
Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Electronics, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208, 213 (E.D. N.Y. 1994)
(holding that the first sale defense was inapplicable because "Microsoft only licenses and
does not sell its Products"); Little Brown & Co. v. Am. Paper Recycling Corp. 824 F. Supp.
11 (D. Mass. 1993) (providing copies on consignment not a first sale). Similar reasoning
applies to patents. Compare Intel Corp. v. ULSI System Tech., 995 F.2d 1566 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (authorized sale of patented article under license exhausts patent rights) with Intel
Corp. v. U.S. Intl. Trade Commn., 946 F.2d 821 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (sale of articles not
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Apply these rules to a copy of software embedded in a motor
vehicle, printing press or medical equipment. If the software
proprietor has not authorized "embedding" (copying) the software
and reselling the copies, then the "embedded software" is infringing,
and there is nothing for the security interest to attach to in the first
instance. On the other hand, if the software proprietor has authorized
sale of a copy of the embedded software,. then under the first sale
doctrine and computer use privilege the owner of the copy can
transfer its ownership interest in the copy for security without consent
of the copyright owner. In case of a default, the copyright owner
cannot object to resale of the copy on foreclosure.353 However, the
sale of the copy transfers no license interest to use the copy beyond
the first sale, computer use or related privileges accorded to the
owner of a copy. Any attempted use of the copy of embedded
software beyond those privileges, or any attempted transfer of the
license, without express permission of the copyright owner, is
infringing."'
There is simply no need for the definition in Revised 9-
102(a)(44) to deal with the so-called "problem of embedded
software." Federal law already fully handles the matter consistent
with the policies of intellectual property law: Indeed, the definition in
Revised 9-102(a)(44) is nonsensical. There can never be a case where
an intangible computer program "is associated with the goods in such
a manner that it customarily is considered part of the goods" because
Section 202 of the Copyright Act specifically negates this result.
There can never be a case where "by becoming the owner of the
goods, a person acquires a right to use the program in connection
with the goods" since this was the old minority rule for common law
copyright that Section 202 preempts. The claim that Revised Article
9-102(a)(44) was needed because "there has been little focus on the
issues and no guidance towards a resolution" is, well, not accurate.
b. Turning First Sale into Forced Sale
The evident reason for including Revised 9-102(a)(44) was to
turn the "first sale" doctrine into a "forced sale" doctrine. Assume a
authorized by license is patent infringement).
353. What. about the software rental right in 17 U.S.C. § 107(b), which gives the
copyright owner the right to control rental of a copy of a computer program even after a
first sale? It does not apply to "a computer program which is embedded in a machine or
.product and which cannot be copied during the ordinary operation- or use of the machine
or product." 17 U.S.C. § 107(b)(1)(B). This is obviously far more limited that Revised 9's
"embedded software."
354. 17 U.S.C. § 107(b)(1)(B) (1994).
copy of "embedded software" is not sold but only provided on loan,
along with a nonexclusive license prohibiting transfer of the license or
the copy. For example, when the question of transferability was
discussed at the Drafting Committee Meetings for UCITA, the
medical imaging equipment industry asserted that their equipment
uses extensive software components. Since its use often demands
considerable expertise, transferability is restricted."' What if such a
machine, in effect a giant copy of software, is licensed to a medical
corporation subject to a floating against all its assets? In case of
foreclosure, could a secured creditor ignore the restrictions and
dispose of the machinery without regard to the license? Under federal
law, the software license could not be transferred absent consent of
the owner, and the copies could not be transferred because without a
"first sale" the transfer would violate the copyright owner's exclusive
distribution right.
These limitations, however, could prevent a secured creditor
from maximizing its collateral. Thus, Revised 9 purports to label
"embedded software" as a "good" in the hope of re-characterizing the
license as a "sale of goods." Since "title" to "goods" must pass to a
buyer in a "sale, 356 this would force a "first sale" whether the
copyright owner authorized one or not. Under state "free
transferability of goods" policies, once the embedded software is
converted to a "good," federal restrictions on transfer of a license can
also arguably be ignored on the pretense that now one is dealing with
"goods." Revised 9-102(a)(44) is thus attempting to transform the
federal "first sale" doctrine into a state mandated "forced sale" for
computer software.357
One of the Drafters confirms this intent: "In narrow
circumstances, software is included in the definition of goods (when
software is appropriately embedded or integrated into related
hardware). In those few circumstances, the obligations (and rights) of
355. See e.g. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 976 F.2d at 700 (sale of patented medical imaging
machines for use outside scope of patent license a patent infringement).
356. U.C.C. § 2-401(1) (1999).
357. The "embedded software" myth has been discussed repeatedly at NCCUSL
drafting sessions for UCITA, Revised Article 2 and Revised Article 9. The claims by
intellectual property practitioners that "software" cannot be a "good" under preemptive
federal law continues to be unpersuasive to traditional commercial lawyers. For example,
Prof. Jean Braucher of the American Law Institute claims that "[t]his attempt to
distinguish the disk from the software might not withstand challenge. This rather technical
distinction might be viewed as an unfair or deceptive practice under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act." Jean Braucher Some Basics of Software Contracting,
Without Draft UCC Article 2B, SD30 ALI-ABA 475, 480 (1998). Old ideas die hard.
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a secured party in possession of the hardware would encompass the
embedded software." '358 Federal information law, however, is exactly
the opposite. Where the secured party becomes the legitimate owner
of a copy upon foreclosure, then the "first sale" doctrine allows resale
of the copy of the embedded software.359 But where the secured party
did not become owner of a copy, transfer or exploitation of the copy
or the copyrighted software is infringing. 6 °
c. "Embedded Software" - Effective Public Notice?
The "embedded software" myth has been repeatedly debunked.
In CMAX/Cleveland, Inc. v. UCR, Inc. 36' a developer licensed
software to a retailer for use in tracking videocassette rentals and
sales. The retailer, without permission, embodied a modified version
of the software in a circuit board. A secured creditor foreclosed on
the retailer and transferred the circuit boards to a third party, who
began using them with the "embedded" software. The third party
argued this was non-infringing under Section 117 of the Copyright
Act since it had acquired a copy. Not so, said the CMAX court. Since
the copyright owner did not authorize embedding the software in the
circuit board, the secured creditor had no authority to authorize a
transfer of the copy and Section 117 was inapplicable.3 62 The use was
infringing.
In re SSE International Corp.363 dealt with whether a security
interest in accounts attached to royalty proceeds from a know-how
license. The creditor argued that the know-how was embodied in
heat-resistant steel casings, that these were goods, so the royalties
were really accounts generated by a "sale of goods." Disposing of this
argument, the court said:
[Blecause the subject of the "license" agreement in question was
the debtor's rights to its know-how and not merely a reproduction
of debtor's ideas and thoughts, the debtor furnished... intellectual
property rather than goods. This determination is made
358. See Weise, supra n. 32, at 1095 n. 76.
359. See Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 E3d 621 (2d Cir. 1995); see Platt & Munk Co.,
Inc. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F2d 847 (2d Cir. 1963) (1909 Act); also McCoy v.
Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 E3d 917 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (patented knives); Monte Carlo Shirt
Co. v. Daewoo Intl. (America) Corp., 707 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1983) (trademarked shirts).
360. DSC Comm. Corp. v. Pulse Comm., 170 F.3d 1354, 1361-1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
Adobe v. One Stop Micro 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Stenograph v. Sims, _ F.
Supp. 2d __, 2000 WL 964748, 55 USPQ2d 1436 (E.D. Pa. 2000); The Walt Disney Co. v.
Video 47, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Fla. 1996); Microsoft Corp., 846 F. Supp. at 213.
361. 804 F. Supp. 337, 356 (M.D. Ga. 1992).
362. Id.
363. In re SSE Intl. Corp., 198 B.R. 667,670 n.3 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996).
independent of whether the tangible medium by which the debtor
furnished such rights.., constituted a good.'64
The court also addressed the problem of public confusion that
arises from assuming that possession of a physical copy grants an
ostensible license to use a copyright:
This holding prevents a strange, if not nonsensical, result that could
occur were this Court to hold that the debtor's intellectual property
rights in its know-how were goods merely because they were
embodied in a tangible medium that itself constitutes a good.
Because "[a] security interest in. .. goods... may be perfected by
the secured party's taking possession of the collateral," 9-305, an
entity could perfect its security interest in the debtor's intellectual
property, if it were a good, by merely taking possession of a
tangible medium, such a written manual, embodying such
intellectual property. Perfection by such methods could have
disastrous results, however, because mere possession of the tangible
medium by the secured entity would undoubtedly fail to notify
other entities of such security interest, which is the point of
perfection in the first place.365
It probably needs no further elaboration than saying that
knowing use of "embedded software" for private financial gain where
the first sale doctrine does not apply can also be criminal.366
Federal law has given crystal clear guidance with how to deal
with a security interest in "embedded software." Revised 9 did not
follow it.
K. R 9-102(a)(11): Software Licenses as "Chattel Paper"
1. Original Article 9:
The word "license" can mean either the legal privilege itself or
its documentary evidence. To distinguish these meanings, let us use
"license right" for the former and "license record" for the latter.
Now, is a license record a form of "chattel paper"? Under prior law it
never was. Original Article 9 is explicit on that point:
364. Id. at 670 (emphasis added).
365. Id. at 670, n. 3. It has been suggested that one purpose of including "embedded
software" in "goods" is to simplify collateral descriptions. The purpose of a collateral
description, however, is to provide adequate notice so that a subsequent creditor would
reasonably make further inquiry. In re Value-Added Comm., Inc., 139 F.3d 543, 545 (5th
Cir. 1998). The definition of "embedded software" would seem to conceal the fact that
real collateral at least purportedly includes a general intangible (copyright interest) as well
as a good (physical copy).
366. See Drebin, 557 F.2d at 1316; U.S. v. Moore, 604 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1979); Lorin
Brennan, Embedded Software - Fact or Felony?, West's UCC Bulletin, vol. 43, rel. 4 (May
2001) and vol. 44 rel. 1 (June 2001).
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Current 9-105(1)(b)
"Chattel paper" means a record or records that evidence both a
monetary obligation and a security interest in or a lease of specific
goods ... "
Under this definition, a license record for information, which does not
refer to any interest in tangible goods, is not chattel paper.
2. Revised Article 9:
Revised Article 9 now purports to define a license record for
software as chattel paper. It says:
Revised 9-102(a)(11)
"Chattel paper" means a record or records that evidence both a
monetary obligation and a security interest in specific goods, a
security interest in specific goods and software used in the goods, a
security interest in specific goods and license of software used in
the goods, a lease of specific goods, or a lease of specific goods and
license of software used in the goods. In this paragraph, "monetary
obligation" means a monetary obligation secured by the goods or
owed under a lease of the goods and includes a monetary
obligation with respect to software used in the goods.
"Embedded software" confuses the copy with the copyright. This
section now confuses the license record with the license right. Once
again, the result is contrary to controlling federal law.
3. Detailed Analysis:
a. Origins of the Error
To understand the error in Revised 9-102(a)(11) requires a brief
review the history of intangible financing. 67 At common law, personal
property was financed by pledge, which required turning possession
over to the creditor. Intangibles could not be so financed since they
were incapable of physical possession. Eventually, various types of
intangibles evidenced by a writing, such as negotiable instruments,
corporate securities, and the like, were allowed financing by "pledge"
through the device of turning the writing over to the creditor. This is
the origin of "chattel paper." However, this technique never applied
to "pure" intangibles like copyrights, patents or trademarks.
The crucial difference between chattel paper and information
intangibles is the existence of a recording act. At common law there
was no public office for filing security claims in chattel paper. Thus,
possession was deemed the best evidence of a creditor's claim. This
made commercial sense, since the chattel paper often involved
367. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § II.B(1).
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negotiable instruments, and a debtor would not easily part with them
without good cause. But information intangibles could not be so
treated. This is a primary reason why Congress extended the federal
recording acts to cover mortgages of copyrights in patents the Act of
1870 and federal trademarks in the Act of 1905.368 It is by recording in
the federal system that a creditor gives public notice of an interest in
federal information, not by taking possession of a license record.
When original Article 9 was adopted, it continued to recognize
perfection of a chattel paper security interest by taking possession
due to the large commercial practice that had developed.36 9 However,
it also allowed creditors to perfect by filing.37° In a nod to entrenched
practices, it said that a purchaser of chattel paper for value and in the
ordinary course who takes possession prevails over a filed security
interest of which the purchaser had no knowledge . 71 Revised 9
continues this approach. Revised 9-312(a) authorizes perfection of a
chattel paper security interest by filing. Alternatively, a creditor can
perfect in tangible chattel paper by taking possession, or in electronic
chattel paper by taking "control. 3 72 Revised 9-330(b) continues the
rule that a purchaser of chattel paper for value, in good faith and in
the ordinary course takes free of a prior security interest if without
knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party.
Under Revised 9, "knowledge" means actual knowledge, not
constructive knowledge.373
The trick with chattel paper is the claim is that possession of the
license record gives the holder the authority both to exercise the
license rights evidenced by the record and to seize the royalties due
under the license ahead of the licensor. Both results are contrary to
federal law.
b. License Rights: Conflicts With Federal Law
Does possession of a license record of copyrighted computer
software, whether or not for "use in goods," convey any license right
in a copyright? Federal law has a simple answer: "No."
368. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § II.B(1) & II.C.
369. Original U.C.C. 9-305; see Clark, supra n. 96, at I 2.06[1][a].
370. Original U.C.C. 9-304(1).
371. Original U.C.C. 9-308.
372. Revised 9-313(a) (tangible chattel paper) & Revised 9-314(a) (electronic chattel
paper). Jane Winn, The Electronic Filing Rules in Revised Article 9, Chi-Kent L.R. (1999).
373. Revised 9-102(c) incorporates the definitions in U.C.C. Article 1, and under
Article 1-201(25) "knowledge" means "actual knowledge." See Official Comment No. 6 to
Revised 9-330.
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The leading case is Kingsrow Enterprises, Inc. v. Metromedia,
Inc.,37 4 decided under the 1909 Act. A defendant purchased copyright
certificates for 26 episodes of "The Judy Garland Show" at a sheriff's
sale. He claimed possession of the certificates gave him a valid license
to broadcast the shows. To this the court said:
The certificate is not the copyright; it is at its insufficient best in this
setting "prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein." [Citation.]
Even the owner may controvert such statements. [Citation.] .... The
dispositive point is that the possessor of a copyright certificate is
not ipso facto the copyright owner. The valuable federal right is not
transferred by mere physical delivery, or other acquisition, of the
certificate. The owner may, of course, assign the copyright. But this
is to be done "by an instrument in writing signed by the proprietor
of the copyright." [Citation.]
The statutory provisions relied on in Kingsrow were reenacted
and expanded in the current Copyright Act. Section 204(a) continues
the requirement that a transfer of copyright ownership must be
evidenced by a written instrument of conveyance or memorandum of
transfer signed by the owner of the rights conveyed.375 Section 204(b)
says that an acknowledgement is prima facie, not conclusive, evidence
of a transfer.3 76 By referring to "transfer," not "transfer of ownership,"
Section 204(b) covers nonexclusive licenses as well as assignments,
mortgages and exclusive licenses. Under Section 205, recording an
instrument of transfer in the Copyright Office in accordance with
statutory requirements provides constructive notice of the facts stated
in the instrument. 77 These provisions preempt contrary state law. 8
Revised 9-102(a)(11), in purporting to treat a license record as
conveying a license right in copyrighted computer software, runs
374. 397 F.Supp. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In Luft v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 772 F.Supp.
1378 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), the same sheriffs sale purchaser' sold master tapes containing
recorded performances of Judy Garland to the defendant, which the defendant proceed to
copy, distribute and sell. The copyright owner sued for infringement, claiming that the
transfer of the copies (master recordings) granted no right to do so. The court upheld the
infringement claim.
375. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a). The signature requirement applies to a transfer of copyright
ownership (assignment or exclusive license), not a non-exclusive one. For the impact of
this differentiation on state law, see Article 2 and Software, supra note 60, at 481-484. This
article does not consider the effect of any legislation authorizing electronic signatures.
376. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a). The evidence of transfer is rebuttable. See, e.g. Lottie Joplin
Thomas Trust v. Crown Publishers, 456 F.Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (although defendant
possessed written assignment of renewal copyright which assignment was duly recorded in
Copyright Office, plaintiff met burden of showing assignment invalid for lack of authority;
decided under 1909 Act).
377. 17 U.S.C. § 205.
378. Konigsberg Intl. v. Rice, 16 F.3d 355, 357 (9th Cir. 1994).; In re Peregrine
Entertainment, Ltd., 116 B.R. at 199.
contrary to at least four preemptive provisions of federal law.
The first is the writing requirement in Section 204(a) for a
transfer of copyright ownership. Mere possession of a license record
conveys nothing in the copyrighted software evidenced by the record,
regardless of whether the software is "used in goods."
The second conflict is with Section 204(b)'s proviso that an
acknowledgement is only prima facie evidence of a transfer, meaning
the presumption of a transfer is rebuttable. Revised 9 purports to
make a state UCC-1 filing or taking possession of a license record
conclusive evidence of a transfer of a security interest in the copyright
interest evidenced by the license record. Federal law preempts this
result.
The third conflict is with the copyright priority provisions.
Section 205 says that recording in the Copyright Office in accordance
with statutory formalities establishes priority over later transfers. The
recording provisions apply to all transfers, including nonexclusive
licenses. Yet Revised 9-330(b) asserts that a purchaser "in the
ordinary course" of a license record acquires a right to "use in goods"
the copyrighted software evidenced by the license record superior to
a prior transfer recorded in the Copyright Office.
The fourth conflict deals with the constructive notice provisions
in Section 205 which say that due recording in the Copyright Office
imparts constructive notice of the facts stated in the instrument.
Revised 9-330(b), however, provides that a purchaser "in the ordinary
course" of a license record takes free of a recorded security interest
unless the purchaser has actual knowledge - not constructive
knowledge - that it violates the rights of a secured party.
These conflicts are not limited to financing transactions. As
discussed above, Revised 9 purports to classify assignments and
exclusive licenses as "security interests" along with actual copyright
mortgages. Revised 9-330(b) is therefore asserting that a person who
"purchases" a license record "in the ordinary course" to "use software
in goods" has an interest in the license rights superior to any prior
transfer duly recorded in the Copyright Office. Federal law disagrees.
c. License Royalties: Conflicts With Federal Law
Does mere possession of the license record give a right superior
to the licensor to collect the royalties from the licensee? The Official
Comments indicate this is what is intended 379 :
379. Official Comment No. 4.b to Revised 9-102. The Permanent Editorial Board
added the quoted text to the Official Comments by the in 1999.
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The expanded definition of [chattel paper] covers transactions in
which the debtor's or lessee's monetary obligations include
amounts owed with respect to software used in goods. The
monetary obligations with respect to the software need not be owed
under a license form the secured party or lessor, and the secured
party or lessor need not be a party to the transaction itself. Among
the types of monetary obligation that are included in "chattel
paper" are amounts that have been obtained or advanced by the
secured party or lessor to enable the debtor or lessee to acquire or
obtain financing for a license of the software used in the goods.
The chattel paper rules are thus evidently another device to strip
a licensor of royalties. The Drafters say a licensor could try to perfect
its right to royalties over a subsequent lien against a licensee by filing
a "protective" financing statement.3" (This would not work against a
prior lien due to the priority rules.) The chattel paper rules, however,
now allow a licensee to defeat even this narrow protection by
"selling" the license record to a "buyer in the ordinary course." The
only way the licensor can protect itself is to take possession of the
original record, something few rational licensees would allow since
the licensee needs the signed record to prove a defense to an
infringement claim.
The assertion that a right to royalties is necessarily severable
from the copyright was examined in Valente-Kritzer Video v.
Pickney.381 The case involved an oral agreement to grant an exclusive
license, which the court found invalid for failure to comply with the
writing requirements in Section 204(a). The Defendant then argued
that contract actually contained severable obligations to grant an
exclusive license and to pay a "finder's fee" equal to its earnings, and
that only the first was barred by Section 204(a). While "doubting that
a state law's definition of severability can undercut the policy of §
204(a)," '382 the court found that the obligation to pay was not
severable from the grant and hence the entire contract as barred
under Section 204(a).Such a ruling is consistent with the Copyright
Act. Indeed, Section 501(b) indicates that a copyright owner retains a
beneficial ownership interest in the rights transferred, giving a right a
380. Weise, supra n. 32, at 1085, fn.29: "Revised section 9-505(a) provides that a
person in a transaction that might be classified as a transaction subject to Article 9 may file
a protective security financing statement. It should be noted that this section specifically
provides that a licensor may file a protective financing statement indicating its interest in a
license. See R § 9-505(a)." [Emphasis in original.].
381. 881 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1989)
382. Id. at 776. Compare Papa-John's Music, Inc. v. McLean, 921 F.Supp. 1154
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (oral agreement by joint authors to unequal sharing of copyright in joint
work barred by § 204, but defendant granted leave to assert a good faith claim that the
oral agreement was really one to administer royalties.).
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right to sue for infringement as this may effect royalties due.383
In providing that possession of a license record constitutes a
mandatory right to collect license royalties ahead of the licensor,
Revised 9 is in effect asserting that a software owner cannot grant a
license conditioned on payment of royalties. Instead, Revised 9 would
use the chattel paper rules as a way to sever the royalty obligation
from the grant of rights, regardless of the deal with the licensor. Such
mandatory separation is contrary to federal information policy.
L. R 9-103: Purchase Money Security Interests
1. Original Article 9
Original Article 9 defines a purchase money security interest in
the following section:
Current 9-107
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the
extent that it is:
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an
obligation gives value to enable to the debtor to acquire rights
in or use of the collateral if such value is in fact so used.
Although this provision has its primary application for goods, in
principle there is no reason why it could not apply to intangibles.3"
2. Revised Article 9
Revised Article 9 redefines and constricts "purchase money"
status where intellectual property is concerned. It provides:
Revised 9-103
(a) In this section:
(1) "Purchase money collateral" means goods or software that
secures a purchase money obligation incurred with respect to
that collateral.
(2) "Purchase money obligation" means an obligation of an
obligor incurred as all or part of the price of the collateral or
for value given to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the
use of the collateral if the value is in fact so used.
(c) A security interest in software is a purchase money security
interest to the extent that the security interest also secures a
purchase money obligation incurred with respect to goods in which
the secured party holds or held a purchase money security interest
if both of the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) The debtor acquired its interest in the software in an
integrated transaction in which it acquired an interest in the
383. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1994); see 3 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 47, § 12.02[C].
384. Gilmore, supra n. 4, § 29.2, at 780.
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goods.
(2) The debtor acquired its interest in the software for the
principal purpose of using the software in the goods.
Official Comment 5 to Revised 9-103 says: "Subsections (b) and
(c) limit purchase money security interests to goods, including
fixtures, and software.... [However,] [t]he software must be acquired
by the debtor in a transaction integrated with the transaction in which
the debtor acquired the goods, and the debtor must acquire the
software for the principal purpose of using the software in goods." All
types of intellectual property other than "software" - copyrights,
patents, trademarks, domain names, rights of publicity, etc. -can
never qualify for purchase money treatment under Revised 9. As to
software, the purported attempt in Revised 9-103(c) to treat an
intangible copyrightable computer program as "embedded" in goods
is legal nonsense.
3. Detailed Analysis
a. Purchase Money In Intangibles
As Prof. Gilmore opines, current Article 9 certainly
accommodates purchase money status for intangibles:
[T]he species of property which the Code calls "general
intangibles" could easily become the subject of a purchase-money
transaction: for example, an inventor transfers his patent (or his
rights under it) for a sum to be paid in installments, reserving a
security interest until paid; or a bank lends money to the X
Corporation for the purpose of enabling it to acquire the inventor's
patent, with a security interest in the patent reserved to secure the
loan.... There seems to be no reason, however, why the term
"collateral" should have other than its normal meaning: the
purchase money concept may thus, in an occasional case, apply to
intangible property.3 8 5
There are several examples of patent owners doing precisely this.
In Transducer Patents Company v. Renegotiation Board,386 a patent
owner assigned a patent, reserving the right to a royalty. In order to
secure its interest, the patent owner also took back a "lien," which the
court duly identified as a security interest, in the patent in order to
secure the payment of royalties. Transducer Patents relied on the pre-
Code Supreme Court decision in Littlefield v. Perry,87 in which the
385. Gilmore, supra n. 4, § 29.2, at 780. See also Clark, supra n. 96, at 3.09[2][b]
("[T]here is no logical reason to exclude intangible collateral from purchase money
treatment if the right case comes along.").
386. 492 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1974).
387. 88 U.S. 205,220 (1874).
patent owner also reserved a lien on the patent to secure the payment
of royalties. Similar patterns exist in other information industries.
Revised 9, however, looks to impose the "horizontal" financing
model adopted in original Article 9 on intellectual property, since this
would allow information royalties to be subject to pre-existing
floating liens against licensees. As described in the companion article,
the "horizontal" model requires a super-priority both on the going-in
side when goods are bought, and on the going-out side when goods
are sold to a buyer in the ordinary course. Imagine what would
happen in the goods world if purchase money status were
unavailable.388 What lender would finance a factory's acquisition of a
new piece of heavy equipment if it knew its loan would become
immediately subject to a prior floating lien of the buyer with no way
to gain priority? If Revised 9 were consistent, it would subject
information to both sides of the horizontal financing imagery. It
certainly subjects intellectual property to the half that hurts creators
by saying a security interest does not extend to "licensees in the
ordinary course."38 9 Purchase money status, however, would give
information transferors a chance to secure their royalties by filing
within the limited purchase money period, just like any seller of a
user car. But this would prevent lenders to transferees from using
floating liens to ensure priority in the transferor's royalty income.
b. Conflicts with Federal Law
The approach in Revised 9-103 is arguably inconsistent with the
federal information statutes. Section 205 of the Copyright Act
contains a detailed recording scheme for determining the priority
between all conflicting copyright transfers, whether exclusive or
nonexclusive. For a document to obtain constructive notice under this
system, it must specifically identify the registered work to which it
applies." A floating lien which merely identifies "all general
intangibles, including copyright interests, now owned or later
acquired," even if recorded federally, would not impart constructive
notice since it does not identify the affected works. Thus, such a
floating lien would not have priority over a later recorded security
interest on a specifically registered and identified work licensed to a
debtor, subject to a floating lien.3 91
388. See discussion in Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.D(1).
389. See infra n. 302 and accompanying text.
390. 17 U.S.C. § 205(c) & (d) (1994).
391. Unfortunately, the decision in Aerocon Engr., Inc. v. Silicon Valley Bank (In re
World Auxiliary Power Co.), 244 B.R. 149 (1999), inexplicably held that a security interest
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The Patent Act raises similar problems. The PTO regulations
require that all assignments specifically identify the patent in order to
be recorded.9  Like copyrights, an earlier floating lien against "all
patents now owned or later acquired" would also be insufficient to
gain priority over a later mortgage specific to the patent. The
problems for patents arise in licensing, since the Patent Act only
covers assignments, not licenses. This means that a patent owner or
exclusive licensee grants a license to someone subject to a pre-existing
floating lien, all royalties payable to the transferor become junior to
the floating lien. There is no way for the patent transferor to gain
priority against the floating lien except to beg the floating creditor to
subordinate. In the goods world, no one could tolerate this state of
affairs even for outmoded equipment, but the patent owner must now
accept it for the latest invention. As Everex393 observed, in a world of
free assignability, paid-up non-exclusive patent licenses can be
extraordinarily risky for a licensor. Revised 9-103 now makes
licensing on a royalty basis just as risky.
The more serious problem, however, is With the Lanham Act.
The courts have held that security interests in federal trademarks are
perfected solely under state law.394 This means that if a trademark
owner grants a license to a licensee subject to a pre-existing floating
lien, under Revised 9 the floating lien automatically attaches to and
has priority over any royalty right of the licensor, regardless of
restrictions in the license. Such a "naked" security transfer was
addressed in the Haymaker Sports, Inc. v. Turian.395 It held that
granting a security interest in a mark independent of good will
constituted an invalid assignment in gross, voiding the mark. A mere
recital that "good will" was included in the collateral was insufficient
where the secured creditor obtained none of the facilities necessary to
ensure quality control nor ever exercised any supervision over
quality.96 Under Revised 9, a trademark owner cannot prevent an
assignment by the licensee for security, nor "carve-out" its mark by
use of a purchase money security filing. If the licensee is subject to a
in an unregistered work was perfected by a filing in the state UCC registers. This would
mean that a licensee's pre-existing floating lien would take priority over a later security
interest in an unregistered work under Revised 9. This questionable decision is reviewed
in Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.G.(1).
392. See Manual of Patent Examining Procedures, Patent and Trademark Office, U.S.
Department of Commerce, Rule 316 (February 1, 2000).
393. In re CFL, Inc., 89 F.3d 673,679 (9th Cir. 1996).
394. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.G.3.
395. Haymaker Sports, Inc. v. Turian, 581 F.2d 257 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
396. Id. at 259.
prior floating lien with an after-acquired property clause that sweeps
in the trademark, then merely making the license risks invalidating
the mark. It is true that Revised 9-408(d) prevents the secured
creditor from using the mark in several ways. In Haymaker, however,
the security agreement was an escrow that also prevented various
uses. Whether the limitations in Revised 9-408(d) are sufficient to
overcome the objections in Haymaker remains to be seen.
M. R 9-702: Unperfection Day
Revised Article 9 proposes many changes in the law applicable to
information financing. The impact of these changes will be felt both
retroactively, due to the transaction rules, and prospectively, due to
the choice of law rules. In the changes wrought by Revised 9, one
date stands out: July 1, 2001. It could become known as Unperfection
Day.
1. Retroactive Effect: Transition Rules
Under Revised 9-701, the statute's official effective date is July 1,
2001. However, in those states that have adopted Revised 9, the
statute is in effect today due to the Revised 9's transition rules. All
information security interests existing as of the date Revised 9 goes
into effect must comply with the filing rules under Revised 9, not
under former law. Since the rules under Revised 9 differ from those
under former law, lenders with existing information loans can look
forward to extensive refiling to maintain their perfected status. There
are two grandfather provisions, but neither one appears to cover
information. Let's see how this works.
The basic transition rule as contained in Revised 9-702 as
follows:
Revised 9-702(a)
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this part, this [Act] applies to a
transaction or lien within its scope, even if the transaction or lien
was entered into or created before this [Act] takes effect.
As a result, all information security interests existing as of the date
Revised 9 goes into effect in an applicable state are governed by
Revised 9, not former law, unless an exception applies.
Under Revised 9-301, a security interest in information must be
perfected by filing a financing statement in the jurisdiction where the
"debtor is located," unless an applicable federal statute or treaty
requires a different place. As discussed above, under Revised 9-
307(c), for information many a debtor may well be deemed "located"
in the District of Columbia. For federal information, at least as far as
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Revised 9 goes, the federal statutes do not provide an exception. For
information outside the United States, the debtors, including the
licensees paying royalties, will often be deemed located in their home
countries. This makes July 1, 2001, a potential Unperfection Day:
absent federal preemption, a lender with information collateral may
need to refile its security interest under the law of the District of
Columbia or another State, and in applicable national registers in
other countries or it will be unperfected - unless one of the
grandfather provisions apply.
The first grandfather provision could apply both to federal
information and to royalty financing. It says:
Revised 9-702(b)
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) and in Sections
9-703 through 9-708:
(1) Transactions and liens that were not governed by [former
Artilce9], were validly entered into or created before this [Act]
takes effect, and would be subject to this act if they had been
entered into or created after this [Act] takes effect, and the rights,
duties, and interests flowing from those transactions and liens
remain valid after this [Act] takes effect; and
(2) the transactions and liens may be terminated, completed,
consummated, and enforced as required or permitted by this [Act]
or by the law that would otherwise apply if this [Act] had not taken
effect.
With regard at least to copyrights and patents, and arguably
federal trademarks, they were "not governed" by former Article 9 at
least as to the priority and perfection rules under original Article 9-
302(3)(a). It is not clear whether this meets the "not governed"
requirement in Revised 9-702(b)(1), although the issue may be moot
due to federal preemption in any case. As to royalties, as discussed
previously, royalties under intellectual property licenses were not
accounts under original Article 9-103. Thus, a "sale" (executed
assignment) of royalties was outside Article 9, although a security
transfer of royalties would be within Article 9.397 In practice, there
seemed to be little differentiation, some cases analyzing royalty
financing under the law of assignment, others under Article 9, without
differentiating the nature of the transaction. Nonetheless, it may be
possible to argue that at least some royalty "financing" transactions
effective pre-Revised 9 should remain effective under former law due
to the savings clause. Note that this would apply only to financing the
royalties, not the information.
The next grandfather provision is in Revised 9-705:
397. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, at § II.B.3.
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(b) The filing of a financing statement before July 1, 2001, is
effective to perfect a security interest to the extent the filing would
satisfy the applicable requirements for perfection under this
division.
(c) This division does not render ineffective an effective financing
statement that is filed before July 1, 2001, and that has satisfied the
applicable requirements for perfection under the law of the'
jurisdiction governing perfection as provided in former Section
9103. However,.... the financing statement ceases to be effective at
the earlier of either of the following:
(1) The time the financing statement would have ceased to be
effective under the law of the jurisdiction in which it is filed.
(2) June 30, 2006.
Under Revised 9-705(b), a pre-Revised 9 financing statement is
effective to perfect to the extent that it would satisfy the requirements
for perfection under Revised 9. Before Revised 9, perfecting an
information security interest did not require a filing under the laws of
the District of Columbia, at least for "covered debtors" outside the
District, and one cannot necessarily expect pre-Revised 9 information
security interests to be filed under its law for such debtors. If a
secured creditor did file in the District, then that presumably would
be the "jurisdiction governing perfection" for purposes of Revised 9-
307(c). Unfortunately, unless and until the District adopts Revised 9,
the District may refer to the law of yet another state as the place to
file under the circular renvoir problem discussed above. Undoubtedly,
most information security interests filed against "covered debtors"
located outside the District will need careful review to determine if,
when, where and how they should be refiled.
There is another grandfather provision in Revised 9-703. It says:
Revised 9-703
(a) A security interest that is enforceable immediately before July
1, 2001, and would have priority over the rights of a person that
becomes a lien creditor at that time is a perfected security interest
under this division if, on July 1, 2001, the applicable requirements
for enforceability and perfection under this division are satisfied
without further action.
(b) Except as otherwise. provided in Section 9705, if, immediately
before July 1, 2001, a security interest is enforceable and would
have priority over the rights of a person that becomes a lien
creditor at that time, but the applicable requirements for
enforceability or perfection under this division are not satisfied on
July 1, 2001, when all of the following rules apply with respect to
the security interest:
(1) It is a perfected security interest until July 1, 2002.
(2) It remains enforceable thereafter only if the security
interest becomes enforceable under Section 9203 before July 1,
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2002.
(3) It remains perfected thereafter only if the applicable
requirements for perfection under this division are satisfied
before July 1, 2002.
Under Revised 9-703(a), a pre-Revised 9 security interest
perfected against a lien creditor before July 1, 2001, remains perfected
if the applicable requirements for enforceability and perfection under
Revised 9 are satisfied without further action. This provision again
uses the "lien creditor test" as the intellectual solvent for determining
where to file. As discussed above, such a test could often be
inapplicable to information security interests since they look to
perfect against bona fide purchasers, not lien creditors.9 Revised 9-
703(b) gives a one-year period following July 1, 2001 in which to
reprefect under Revised 9. Unfortunately, this one-year period also
only applies to security interests that take effect against lien creditors.
This could also exclude information security interests, so arguably the
one-year grandfather period does not exist for information.
Undoubtedly, a bankruptcy trustee would so argue.
Prudent secured creditors with information collateral subject to
Revised 9 should carefully evaluate whether any existing security
interest will become unperfected on July 1, 2001, and act accordingly.
2. Prospective Effect: Choice of Law Rule
If a lender decides that financing information under Revised 9
leads to less than optimal results, can the lender elect to have law
other than Revised 9 govern its security interest? The answer is "no."
The adoption of Revised 9 required the following conforming
amendment to Article 1-105 of the UCC:
UCC 1-105
(2) Where one of the following provisions of this code specifies the
applicable law, that provision governs and a contrary agreement is
effective only to the extent permitted by the law (including the
conflict of laws rules) so specified: ... Law governing perfection,
the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of
security interests and agricultural liens. Sections 9-301 to 9-307,
inclusive.
Under this provision, the choice of law rules in Revised 9 are
mandatory and cannot be changed by agreement. If the borrower is
located in a jurisdiction that has adopted Revised 9, perfection and
priority must be determined under Revised 9. There is no escape by
clever drafting.
The only way to ensure that Revised 9 does not apply is locate
398. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.E.3.
the debtor in a jurisdiction that has not enacted it. Since the goal is to
have Revised Article 9 adopted in every state in the country, this
means locating the debtor outside the United States. Organize a
borrowing entity in another country, transfer all of the information
collateral to that entity, and then make the loan under the laws of that
country. Make sure that all international license royalties are not
repatriated to the United States, but stay in the overseas entity. In
other words, ensure that the number one export industry in America
ceases to exist.
III
Revised 9 Redux
Revised 9 is a subtle and complex statute. Most of its real effects
are buried beneath a bewildering statutory text and opaque Official
Comments. Some examples may therefore help demonstrate how it
could work in practice.
A. A Copyright Financing Example
Motion picture financing is a fitting illustration since the
architects of Revised 9 claimed they discussed motion picture
financing extensively in crafting the statute. 99 It also illustrates
prototypical intellectual property financing, with tiers of exclusive
and non-exclusive licenses, and extensive use of export financing
mechanisms.4" Consider this hypothetical:
Producer contacts Bank to finance production of the motion
picture Big Pix. The Bank will secure the loan by the copyright and
all other rights worldwide in the screenplay and completed motion
picture, along with royalty payments due under exploitation
licenses in all media worldwide. Both Producer and Bank are
headquartered in California. Producer duly registers the screenplay
in the U.S. Copyright Office, and Bank files a copyright mortgage
in the Copyright Office and a UCC-1 financing statement in
California to cover the physical materials (props, sets, film
elements, etc.) and any other state intellectual property interests.
The Producer then engages in what the industry calls "pre-sales."
This means Producer enters into exclusive distribution licenses for
various rights and territories before starting production. These
include crucial licenses in the U.S. as well as export licenses to
distributors in other countries, for example a grant of exclusive
399. Weise, supra n. 32, at 1077, n.3 ("Substantially all of the discussions on these
issues [the methods of financing for intellectual property] involved software and motion
picture financing").
400. For further discussion see Schuyler M. Moore, Entertainment Bankruptcies: The
Copyright Act Meets the Bankruptcy Code, 48 Business Lawyer 567 (1993).
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theatrical, video and television rights in Japan. Each licensee agrees
to pay Producer a contingent share of exploitation income (a
''royalty") against a fixed "Minimum Guarantee" (guaranteed
payment) due on delivery of the film elements. Bank expects the
total of the Minimum Guarantees to retire the production loan.
Bank requires Producer to give each licensee written Notice of
Bank's security interest and to obtain a signed Acknowledgement
of the Bank's superior lien and agreement to pay all moneys due
Producer directly to the Bank. Producer also makes a number of
nonexclusive licenses for a variety of ancillary rights, such as for a
soundtrack album and merchandising rights, on similar terms.
Based on this collateral, Bank advances funds to produce Big Pix.
Upon its completion, Producer registers Big Pix with the U.S.
Copyright Office and the Bank records its mortgage against the
motion picture as well.
Unfortunately, Big Pix is a flop. Some licensees refuse to pay.
Meanwhile, scores of unpaid general creditors harass Producer.
After Big Pix is completed and before the loan is repaid, Producer
files for bankruptcy.
This example illustrates many basic components of intellectual
property financing. The purpose of the financing is to allow the
Producer to create a new work, in this case Big Pix. The Producer
does so by encumbering the intellectual property rights and the
royalty income from licenses of those rights. There are two types of
licenses involved, exclusive and nonexclusive, and they arise both
from licenses within the U.S. and from export licenses to other
countries.
Both rights and royalties are critical to the financing scheme. The
reason that royalties are important is obvious. The rights are
important because the Producer often retains the right to terminate a
license for nonpayment (a "Termination Right").' Typically, a
license provides that no rights vest until the Minimum Guarantee is
paid. If it is not paid when due, then Producer will exercise the
Termination Right and try to license the rights elsewhere. Whether
Producer can exercise a Termination Right for failure to pay royalties
over and above the Minimum Guarantee ("Overages") is negotiable.
However, a Termination Right is often less valuable than payment;
once a picture is released, it cannot be re-released for the same
return.
In order to secure the loan, the Bank needs to establish priority
in two classes of assets - rights and royalties - against two classes of
competing creditors - those of the Producer, and those of the
401. For further discussion of the termination right, see Moore, supra n. 400 at 589-
594.
licensees. For the Producer, we can assume that before making the
loan the Bank conducted an appropriate search of the chain of title
for Big Pix and determined that there are no pre-existing mortgages
or clouds on title. Therefore, the Bank needs to perfect against
Producer's subsequent creditors for the rights in Big Pix and for the
royalty payments due to Producer from the licensees. To protect
against the licensees, the situation is more complicated. Licensees
may be subject to prior liens that could attach to their rights or
royalties. They may also declare bankruptcy. Therefore, the Bank
needs to establish priority in both the rights and royalties against each
licensee's pre-existing creditors and against any subsequent creditors.
In so doing, the U.S. and the international licenses must be treated
separately.
Let us look at how Revised 9 will effect the Bank's ability to
secure its production loan:
U.S. Nonexclusive Copyright Licenses:
Situation: Assume Producer has licensed Big Pix for theatrical
exhibition in the U.S. under customary nonexclusive exhibition
licenses. Esquire Theaters has an existing floating lien over all
"accounts and general intangibles" evidenced by a UCC-1 financing
statement filed at the state level. Big Pix generates $100,000 in box
office receipts, of which Producer's share is 50%. Esquire's Lender
claims it is entitled to the entire $100,000 in case Esquire defaults on
its loan. Who wins?
Revised 9 Result: Under Revised 9, Esquire's Lender prevails.
Esquire Theaters is a "licensee in the ordinary course of business"
who takes free of the Bank's security interest in Producer's share of
box office. Neither the Bank nor Producer can claim priority against
Esquire's Lender under a "purchase money security interest" because
Revised Article 9 eliminates purchase money status for intellectual
property. Bank cannot use the technique under current law of
sending notice to Esquire Theaters of its assignment, because Revised
9 has now reclassified royalties as "accounts" for which a financing
statement must be filed. Such a filing would not gain priority because
Lender's "floating lien" was recorded first. Under Revised 9, the only
thing Producer or Bank can do to secure their share of the box office
is to beg Esquire's Lender to subordinate, a result Esquire's Lender
finds quite satisfactory.
Federal Result: Under the Copyright Act, this result is certainly
preempted as to the rights, and should be for royalties, although one
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must deal with Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hirsch.4 2 Establishing this
point, however, may require litigation. Original Article 9 deferred to
federal law, did not recognize a "licensee in the ordinary course,"
allowed "purchase money" status for intangibles, and did not treat
royalties as "accounts," so no litigation was needed.
U.S. Exclusive Licenses:
Situation: Assume Producer granted exclusive U.S. video
distribution rights in Big Pix to a Video Wholesaler. The Wholesaler
defaults, but continues distributing cassettes. Producer sends a notice
of cancellation for nonpayment and attempts to license the rights
elsewhere. The Wholesaler sues for an injunction to stop the re-
licensing and for damages. Who wins?
Revised 9 Result: Under Revised 9, the Wholesaler does. Since
Revised 9 claims exclusive copyright licenses are "really" financing
arrangements, an exclusive licensee's interest cannot be cancelled for
breach; it must be foreclosed under the procedures in Revised 9. The
Wholesaler can therefore enjoin the termination as an "improper
foreclosure" and sue the Producer for damages to boot. Moreover,
even if Producer follows the foreclosure procedures, the Producer
may not be able to reacquire the video rights but must license them to
a third party in a public auction. As to Bank, its interest in the
royalties due from the Wholesaler to Producer is junior to any pre-
existing "floating lien" against the Wholesaler, and now the ability to
exercise a Termination Right for nonpayment is significantly
impaired.
Federal Result: Under the Copyright Act, there is again a
preemption argument. Original Article 9 does not treat exclusive
copyright licenses as ipso facto security transfers, and so would not
penalize exercise of a Termination Right.
U.S. Ancillary Licenses:
Situation: Assume Producer has made several licenses of
ancillary rights under state law, including a right of publicity to use
the name and likeness of major stars on merchandising, and the
domain name for a Web page about Big Pix. Producer's bankruptcy
Trustee claims that the Bank's filing was insufficient to perfect an
interest in these rights or royalties. Correct?
Revised 9 Result: Under Revised 9, yes. Since the Producer is a
partnership, it now requires security transfers of state intellectual
property to be perfected under the law of the District of Columbia, at
least for "covered debtors." If the District has not adopted Revised 9,
402. Broad. Music, 104 F.3d at 1163; see Federal Financing, supra n. 3 at § III.G(1).
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the Trustee will argue that the circular renvoir in Revised 9-307(c)
nonetheless requires a filing in the District.
Federal Result: Since these are state law information rights,
federal law does not apply. Under original Article 9, the California
filing would have been sufficient.
International Exclusive Licenses - Minimum Guarantees
Situation: Assume Producer exclusively licensed all rights in Big
Pix for France to a French Distributor headquartered in Paris for a
minimum guarantee of $1,000,000 payable, 25% on signature and
75% on delivery of the film elements. The initial $250,000 has been
paid into a collection account at the Bank. The second $750,000 is
now due but unpaid. Producer's bankruptcy Trustee claims all the
money. Who wins?
Revised 9 Result: Under Revised Article 9, the Trustee wins.
Start with the unpaid $750,000. Under Revised 9, the Notice and
Acknowledgement is no longer effective to perfect the Bank's
interest against U.S. creditors. Instead, the French Distributor is a
"debtor" and arguably the Bank must look to French law to
determine how to perfect its right in the royalty payments. France,
like many countries, maintains a copyright registration system that
requires a filing in France for a creditor to obtain priority against
insolvency representatives. Since the $750,000 is proceeds from the
rights in France owed by a French "debtor," under Revised 9 the
Bank apparently must file in France to perfect its right to collect the
French royalty payments ahead of Producer's bankruptcy Trustee. As
to the $250,000 already paid, since they are proceeds from the license
in France, the Bank is unperfected unless it has separately perfected a
security interest in the deposit account into which the amounts are
paid. Of course, this separate deposit account perfection may be
challenged if it constitutes a preference.
Federal Result: Federal statutory preemption does not apply
here since the copyright interest is in France. Although French law
will control the priority of rights in France, U.S. law, including as
applicable Revised 9, will control when the royalties are remitted to
the U.S. The Bank's only hope is to claim that France has adhered the
Berne Convention, that Article 5(2) establishes the territoriality
principle as the conflicts rule, that it would reference U.S. law once
royalties are remitted to the U.S., so that recording in the Copyright
Office was thus sufficient to perfect. The argument is a slender reed at
best. Under Original Article 9, the Notice and Acknowledgement
would have been sufficient to perfect against the Trustee.
International Exclusive Licenses - Additional Royalties
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Situation: Assume that for a similar Japanese license, the Bank
collected the entire minimum guarantee of $1,000,000 before the
Producer declared bankruptcy. In Japan, the theatrical release of Big
Pix was disappointing, but the television release was successful.
Eighteen months after the license was made, the Japanese distributor
is prepared to pay substantial "overages" (royalty payments in excess
of the Minimum Guarantee) to the Producer. The Trustee claims
entitlement to all overages and, in addition, asserts that the Bank is
required to disgorge the initial $1,000,000 it has already received.
Who wins, Trustee or the Bank?
Revised 9 Result: The Trustee wins. Under Revised 9-316, the
Bank's security interest becomes unperfected against an exclusive
licensee unless, within one year of the license, it perfects in the
jurisdiction where the licensee is located. Once the security interest
becomes unperfected, its is deemed unperfected ab initio. Japan also
has a register that requires a filing for a copyright mortgagee to gain
priority. Since the Bank never recorded there, it is unperfected in
both the overages and the original Minimum Guarantee, at least
against the Trustee as a garnishing creditor against the Japanese
licensee.
Federal Result: Again, there is no federal statutory preemption,
and Bank is forced to rely on some conflicts argument based on a
renvoi from the licensee's country to U.S. federal law or a treaty
preemption in the United States. Under original Article 9, the Notice
and Acknowledgement was sufficient to perfect against the Trustee.
Conclusion
Knowing all this, what will the Bank do when the Producer asks
for a production loan for Big Pix II? Require the Producer to set up a
production entity overseas and ensure that all license income stays
outside the United States. The alternative - staying in the U.S. - is
bleak. Under Revised Article 9, Bank will not be able to perfect in
royalty payments due under nonexclusive licenses without a massive
campaign of seeking subordination agreements from potential lenders
to hundreds of licensees. For exclusive licenses, its priority in royalties
will also be in doubt, and any Termination Right for nonpayment
could be significantly impaired. To perfect in license income outside
the U.S. will require another massive and expensive campaign of
registering in scores of national registers. The Bank may be able to
change some of these results if it is willing to endure the risks of
extensive litigation, but that is not the Bank's business. Under
Revised 9, for both the Bank and the Producer, the commercially
reasonable choice may well be to leave the country.
B. A Trademark Financing Example
The situation with regard to trademarks will be somewhat
different. The following is an example:
Fred's Flyer is the sportsman's choice for clear water fly-fishing.
Light, durable, reasonably priced, it has quickly become the market
leader throughout Georgia, where Fred lives, and several
neighboring states. Fred has obtained a federal trademark for
Fred's Flyer.
A Sporting Goods Chain, Sportland, a California joint venture
between two corporations, wants to expand it product line. It
approaches Fred about obtaining an exclusive assignment to
manufacture and sell fly rods under the Fred's Flyer mark in
several Western States, promising Fred a handsome royalty on each
sale. Fred agrees. Encouraged by this success, Fred makes several
other non-exclusive trademark licenses in the South, and an
exclusive license with an British Company for the E.U. Each license
promises up front payments and royalties based on sales of poles
under the mark; they also contain detailed manufacturing
instructions and quality controls.
Since all the contracts promise royalties over time, Fred contacts
Bank to finance them. The Bank agrees, and files a UCC-1
financing statement against Fred where he lives in Georgia which
covers "all accounts and general intangibles now known or later
acquired." Just for good measure, it also filed in the Patent and
Trademark Office. It sends a notice to the British company and
receives a written acknowledgement of its interest.
Things work out, for a while. Then they go wrong.
U.S. Exclusive Trademark Licenses:
Situation: Unbeknownst to Fred, Sportsland was in deep
financial trouble, and was looking to new product lines, including the
popular Fred's Flyers, to revitalize its sagging sales. All of its assets
were encumbered with a "floating lien" to a Finance Company that
covered after-acquired property and included "all accounts and
general intangibles." Sportsland was a California joint venture, so the
Finance Company filed a UCC-1 financing statement against
Sportsland in California, but only after Fred's license was executed.
Sportsland stores were operated as franchise operations, so
Sportsland made several non-exclusive licenses to local stores
authorizing them to manufacture and sell fly rods under the Fred's
Flyers mark. Although payments were good, for a while, Sportsland
eventually began experiencing cash flow problems, resulting in fifteen
considerable unpaid royalties owed on Fred's license. Fred sends a
notice canceling the license and demanding past-due royalties. The
Finance Company now forecloses on its security interest. Who gets
the past-due royalties and the trademark license, Fred or Fred's Bank
Finance Company? Assume all relevant jurisdictions have adopted
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Revised 9.
Revised 9 Result: Under Revised 9, the Finance Company. Let's
start with the trademark rights. The Finance Company prevails for at
least three different reasons. First, in Georgia does not allow
attachment or levy on a "chose in action," so under Revised 9-307(c)
Fred will most likely be deemed located in the District of Columbia
with regard to the trademark collateral. As to Sportsland, it is unclear
whether a joinjt venture (unregistered) of corporations (registered)
would qualify as a "covered debtor," but it is arguable that Sportsland
would be a "covered debtor" and thus also located in the District of
Columbia under California's approach to liens on intangibles. Since
neither Fred, with regard to his royalty "account," Fred's Bank nor
Finance Company have filed in the District, they could all be
unperfected under District law, and so the first security interest to
"attached or become effective" will prevail under Revised 9-
322(a)(3). Since Finance Company's "floating lien" "became
effective" before Fred's right to royalties or the Bank's security
interest, it should prevail. Second, even if Fred or Bank had filed in
the District, since Sportland's transfer was an executory partial
assignment, under Revised 9-3179(d) Finance Company could argue
it was perfected without necessity of a filing in any case, even though
Fred had no way of discovering the "secret" lien. Third, since more
than 12 months have elapsed since the partial assignment was made,
and neither Fred not Bank filed in the District (or California?) they
are unperfected ad initio under Revised 9-316(b). Similar reasoning
will apply to the past-due royalty accounts. This means that Finance
Company prevails in both the trademark rights and the past-due
royalty payments. Moreover, since Revised 9 now purports to classify
information assignments as "security interests," Fred's cancellation
would constitute a wrongful foreclosure under Revised 9 and Finance
Company can sue to enjoin the cancellation and for damages to boot.
In addition, since the interest of Fred and Bank is now "really" a
security interest, their "junior" interest, in the form of a Termination
Right, has arguably been wiped-out by Finance Company's
foreclosure, so maybe Finance Company can keep the trademark
license until the end of its term as well.
Federal Law Result: Although Fred's Flyers is a federal
trademark, the courts have inexplicably held that state law governs
perfection of a security interest in a federal trademark.4 3 To
overcome this result, Fred or Fred's Bank must be prepared to
403. See Federal Financing, supra n. 3, § III.G.(3).
initiate a lawsuit challenging these holdings or alleging some other
ground for prevailing, such as treaty preemption.
Non-Exclusive Sublicensees:
Situation: After its foreclosure, Finance Company tries to cancel
the non-exclusive licenses to the Sportsland franchisees. It wants to
transfer the trademark, good will and manufacturing equipment to a
large discount chain, which will not agree to the transfer if other
stores can compete with it. Two of Sportsland's franchise stores resist,
claim they are "licensees in the ordinary course of business" who took
free of Finance Company's interest. Who is right?
Revised 9 Result: Under Revised 9, the stores. Revised 9 says
that, as "licensees in the ordinary course of business," they take free
of Finance Company's security interest and can continue under their
license. (This presumes that Finance Company's security interest
against Sportsland did not include the assets of its independent
franchisees).
Federal Law Result: Under federal law, termination of
Sportsland's license by foreclosure should have terminated non-
exclusive sublicenses. But, once again, one must deal with the case
law saying that state law governs security interests in federal
trademarks.
Other Licensees:
Situation: One of the Sportsland franchisees, Salvage Co., begins
selling its own Salvage Co. brand of the Fred's Flyer in its amateur
sportsman section for a reduced price. The Fred's Flyer is a quality
pole not meant for amateurs. Without proper instruction, amateurs
tend to break it. The word begins to spread that the Fred's Flyer is
not that good after all. Adventure Land, one of Fred's licensees
across the border in a neighboring state, complains to Fred about
what Salvage Co. is doing to the reputation of the Fred's Flyer.
People are confused about the difference between the "genuine"
Fred's Flyer sold by Adventure Land, and what they believe is the
inferior model sold by Salvage Co. Fred complains to Salvage Co., but
it claims it still has a valid license from Sportsland. Finally, Adventure
Land refuses to pay on its license at all, claiming that Fred as
abandoned the mark. Who is right?
Federal Law Result: Under federal law, upon termination of
Sportsland's license, Fred had a duty to prevent any use of the Fred's
Flyer mark by any sublicensee of Sportsland for precisely this reason.
It looks like Fred has forfeited the trademark by a failure to act, even
though Revised 9-321 place a major road block in Fred's way.
Bank's Security Interest:
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Situation: Once Adventure Land refuses to pay, other licensee's
join in. Eventually, Fred is forced to file for bankruptcy. Fred's Bank
claims that it has a perfected security interest in the trademark and
any remaining licenses ahead of Fred's Bankruptcy Trustee. It is
correct?
Revised 9 Result: Under Revised 9, no. The Bankruptcy Trustee
prevails. Recall that Fred was "located" in the District of Columbia
under Revised 9-307(c); since the Bank did not file there, it is
unperfected against the Trustee. As the license to the British
Company, since the U.K. requires trademarks to be filed in the
Company's Register for perfection against insolvency representatives,
and the Bank did not file there, is unperfected in the royalty
payments from the British licensee.
Conclusion
Grandpa Peevyhouse sits on the elbow bend of the Little Clyde,
teaching his grandson the traditional ways of the angler. The
grandson reaches for Grandpa's special pole, but Grandpa gently
demurs. The boy is not ready to try that pole just yet. You see, it's a
genuine Fred's Flyer, and they don't make them any more.
C. Revising Revised 9?
Can Revised 9 be revised to harmonize with intellectual property
law? The prognosis is not good. The Official Comments tells us that,
where information is concerned, the purpose of Revised Article 9 is
to make available "previously unavailable property as collateral" in
order to "enable debtors to obtain additional credit.""° But this begs
the question: unavailable to whom? Intellectual property law grants
creators the exclusive right to make information unavailable precisely
to encourage the creation of viable markets in the first place."' "[T]he
law gives [creators] the right to exclude that functions in much the
same way as do fences, or real property's rights against trespass:
These rights gives owners an ability to bar certain uses of their
creative work and thus gives them the ability to extract a price from
those who wish to use the work."4°6 By attempting to free up these
"otherwise unavailable assets" - information unavailable to licensees
and their lenders precisely to enable creators to bargain for royalties
from their use - Revised 9 runs contrary to the economic
404. Official Comment 8 to Revised 9-408.
405. Gordon, supra n. 9, at 854. ("[Clreators and their potential customers would face
a market failure in the absence of a legal rule that requires copyists to seek permission and
pay license fees.").
406. Id. at 855 (emphasis in original).
fundamentals necessary for viable markets in information.
Think of information markets as a vast cycle. Rights flow
"downstream" from creators through licensees to end users, and
royalties flow back "upstream" from end users through licensees to
creators. In this image, waves of cash -royalties - flow through
licensees on their way from their sublicensees back up to their
licensors. It is tempting to think that a licensee owns the entire
royalty wave passing through its coffers at any point in time, but in
fact the licensee only surfs on top of the wave to the extent of its
royalty share. The remaining royalty share must be passed on to its
licensor for the cycle to continue. Revised 9 now says that, no matter
what a licensor may say or do, a licensee must have the absolute right
to dam the flow and redirect the entire royalty wave to its secured
creditor. It is surely a windfall for the licensee and its lender, at least
in the beginning. But the inevitable result will be to deprive creators
of the financial nourishment then need to create new information
flows in the first place, and soon the entire river will run dry.
One can fuss with the details, argue over the meaning of this
phrase or that, but none this will change the fact that at the end of the
day the avowed purpose of Revised Article 9 is in direct conflict with
the core purpose of federal intellectual property law.
Congress has so far been reluctant to preempt all secured
financing rules for federal information, preferring to let federal law
establish the priority rules, and state law to fill the gap with rules for
creating and enforcing a security interest. Original Article 9 respected
this partnership. Revised Article 9 has sundered it. Congress must
establish a preemptive federal scheme for financing intellectual
property. The companion article discusses how this could and should
be done.
IV
Conclusion
The information industries are now at the center of America's
economic future. They employ more people than the manufacturing
sector, are growing at a rate double that of the economy as a whole,
and have become the leading national export industry. As the world
continues its irrevocable transition to an international information
economy, a vigorous information sector will be critical to America's
global competitiveness and future prosperity.
Revised Article 9, absent effective federal preemption, could
decimate the information industries. Under Revised 9, licensees will
find that by going deeper into debt they can freely speculate with
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some else's money - the royalties they would have paid to licensors.
Those who gamble with other people's money do not incline to a
prudent restraint. The result will be intense fights in the bankruptcy
courts over the carcasses of failed speculators and further fights in the
federal courts over the conflicts between Revised 9 and federal
intellectual property law.
Twenty years after drafting original Article 9, Grant Gilmore, as
a "repentant draftsman," had this to say:
If we [the drafters of the UCCI had listened to what the courts were
trying to tell us, we might have come closer to the mark.... [W]hy
on earth should the fruits of a known insolvent's labors feed the
assignee while all the other creditors starve? ... [D]oes it make any
sense to award everything to a secured party who stands idly by
while a doomed enterprise goes down the slippery slope into
bankruptcy?
407
Revised Article 9 has bet the future on the conceit that the
information sector will prosper if free riders are given free reign. It is
not a wise bet. It could be a national disaster.
407. Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial
Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 Ga.L.Rev. 605, 627 (1981).
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